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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
SECURE CONTROL AND OPERATION OF ENERGY CYBER-PHYSICAL 
SYSTEMS THROUGH INTELLIGENT AGENTS 
by 
Mohamad El Hariri 
Florida International University, 2018 
Miami, Florida, USA 
Professor Osama A. Mohammed, Major Professor 
The operation of the smart grid is expected to be heavily reliant on microprocessor-
based control. Thus, there is a strong need for interoperability standards to address the 
heterogeneous nature of the data in the smart grid. In this research, we analyzed in detail 
the security threats of the Generic Object Oriented Substation Events (GOOSE) and 
Sampled Measured Values (SMV) protocol mappings of the IEC 61850 data modeling 
standard, which is the most widely industry-accepted standard for power system 
automation and control. We found that there is a strong need for security solutions that are 
capable of defending the grid against cyber-attacks, minimizing the damage in case a 
cyber-incident occurs, and restoring services within minimal time.  
To address these risks, we focused on correlating cyber security algorithms with 
physical characteristics of the power system by developing intelligent agents that use this 
knowledge as an important second line of defense in detecting malicious activity. This will 
complement the cyber security methods, including encryption and authentication. Firstly, 
we developed a physical-model-checking algorithm, which uses artificial neural networks 
to identify switching-related attacks on power systems based on load flow characteristics. 
 vii 
 
Secondly, the feasibility of using neural network forecasters to detect spoofed sampled 
values was investigated. We showed that although such forecasters have high spoofed-
data-detection accuracy, they are prone to the accumulation of forecasting error. In this 
research, we proposed an algorithm to detect the accumulation of the forecasting error 
based on lightweight statistical indicators. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithms 
was experimentally verified on the Smart Grid testbed at FIU. The test results showed that 
the proposed techniques have a minimal detection latency, in the range of microseconds. 
Also, in this research we developed a network-in-the-loop co-simulation platform that 
seamlessly integrates the components of the smart grid together, especially since they are 
governed by different regulations and owned by different entities. Power system simulation 
software, microcontrollers, and a real communication infrastructure were combined 
together to provide a cohesive smart grid platform. A data-centric communication scheme 
was selected to provide an interoperability layer between multi-vendor devices, software 
packages, and to bridge different protocols together. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The smart grid’s reliable operation is a function of the configuration and cyber-physical 
nature of its constituting system components. The smart grid, thus, is a complex system, in 
which communication and information technologies are the main propellers of its evolution 
and expansion [1][2]. Lately, the engineering literature showed that researchers are 
utilizing communication technologies for adding intelligence to the smart grid, allowing 
system operators to do more with the current physical assets of the grid.  
Generically, the communication infrastructure of the smart grid could be divided into 
several levels depending on its function and location, as seen in Figure 1.1. The lower level 
of the communication infrastructure consists of the Home Area Network, or the HAN. The 
HAN extends the capabilities of the smart grid to reach inside the home by enabling two-
way information exchange between appliances inside the home and the utility grid for 
better energy usage. This enables applications, such as building management systems, 
control of smart appliances or loads, and energy management systems. Control networks 
of electric vehicle parks and even small microgrids are considered to be on the same level 
of the HAN. The second layer is the Neighbor Area Network, or the NAN. The NAN is 
implemented within the distribution network. The NAN allows energy providers to 
dispatch power to customers based on load demand data collected from smart meters. As 
can be seen in Figure 1.1, the NAN connects neighboring meters together. On the higher 
level, the Field Area Network and Wide Area Network, or the FAN and WAN, 
respectively, consist of groups of NANs, field devices, substation automation networks, 
and generation control. 
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Figure 1.1: Smart Grid Cyber Infrastructure. 
This communication infrastructure enables the migration from the conventional 
centralized control networks to decentralized and eventually distributed control. In 
centralized control, a single server collects all the measurements, performs the control logic 
processing, and issues the commands to field devices [3][4]. The server in this case is a 
single point of failure. Therefore, as can be seen in Figure 1.2, a communication failure or 
a successful attack against centralized control could lead to serious damage and loss of 
service. Unlike centralized control, the decentralized control contributes to the security of 
the power system by avoiding single points of failure. In decentralized control, lower-level 
components perform tasks based on local information and are supervised by a higher-level 
agent responsible for their area [5]. Finally, in distributed control, each node exchanges 
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information and cooperates with neighbor nodes in a peer-to-peer fashion to improve the 
stability of the system and eventually minimize the attack surface, as can be seen in Figure 
1.2 [6]. The three control schemes are shown in Figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.2: Client/Server versus Publisher/Subscriber Communication Schemes. 
Centralized Control Decentralized Control Distributed Control  
Figure 1.3: Smart Grid Control Schemes. 
Although communication technologies brought many advantages to the control and 
operation of the smart grid, they introduced new sets of threats to the grid that are different 
in nature from the concerns related to the standard bulk power system operation. The 
largest threat to the smart grid is that the same technology that is advancing the power grid 
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is being abused by adversaries to exploit vulnerabilities in the grid and maliciously tamper 
with its operation. Therefore, migrating to a reliable and secure smart grid requires a 
paradigm shift in the design and implementation of power system applications and control 
to account for cyber security early on, in the design stages. 
In terms of cyber security, regulatory bodies, such as the International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), along 
with researchers, are concerned about changes in system features, attributes, and are 
worried about system inefficiency, resiliency, and even failure when under cyber-attacks. 
The ultimate goal is to harden the power grid against cyber-attacks by minimizing the 
damage and providing quick healing mechanisms. From a broad perspective, research work 
related to the cyber security of the power grid could be categorized as follows: 
• Protection: to develop cyber security solutions that ensure resilient delivery of 
energy. Work in this area includes authentication, encryption, key management 
and storage, and others. 
• Detection: to develop cyber security solutions that are capable of identifying 
the occurrence of cyber incidents. Work in this area includes anomaly detection, 
detection of false data injection, detection of password cracking attempts, and 
others. 
• Response: to develop cyber security solutions that take appropriate measures in 
response to the detected cyber incidents. 
• Recovery: to develop tools and techniques that allow the restoration of energy 
and other services that were lost due to cyber incidents. 
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Most of the current security solutions are based on cyber rules and mechanisms, such 
as digital signature verifications, message encryption, and others. However, different 
power system applications require different security levels, and at the same time, might 
impose strict requirements that will hinder the use of conventional security techniques [7]. 
For instance, based on the IEC 61850 standard, messages within a substation are 
categorized based on their sensitivity to communication delays. These range from 3 
milliseconds up to several 100 milliseconds, depending on the message type and content 
[8]. For example, for messages with 3 milliseconds time delay, encryption is infeasible 
[9][10][11]. 
Recently, there has been a research thrust in complementing cyber detection techniques 
with physical detection techniques. That is, the security algorithms are now being trained 
to take into consideration the physical properties of the system that is being protected.  
Table 1.1 summarizes the work in the recent literature that provided new technologies 
related to the cyber security of the power grid. Table 1.1 categorizes the work as being 
related to one or more of the previously mentioned thrusts: protection, detection, response, 
and recovery. Also, Table 1.1 identifies the work that uses physical information of the 
power system in their algorithm. 
Table 1.1. Classification of Cyber Security-related Work for Smart Grids. 
Ref. P D R RY UPP Technique Used 
[12]  ✓    
Classifies synchrophasor data as anomalous or not 
using machine learning techniques. 
[13]  ✓    
Surveys machine learning techniques for anomaly 
detection and analyzes their performance. 
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[14]  ✓    
Compares the performance of several data-stream-
based intrusion detection techniques to detect 
anomalous behavior in smart meter data. 
[15]  ✓    
Presents a multiattribute intrusion detection system 
specific for Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) systems. 
[16]  ✓    
Presents a behavior-based Intrusion Detection 
System (IDS) for the IEC 61850 protocols using 
statistical analysis and traditional network features. 
[17]  ✓    
Develops an intrusion detection system that 
identifies corrupt GOOSE and SMV messages 
based on predefined security rules using a 
specification-based algorithm. 
[18]  ✓    
Provides an integrated anomaly detection system on 
the host and network levels to detect attacks on a 
single substation or on several substations based on 
a predefined set of violations indications. 
[19] ✓     
Proposes a layer 2 security algorithm in HSR Rings 
in substation networks. 
[20] ✓     
Proposes a lightweight security algorithm for SASs 
that provides authentication and authorizations at 
different levels utilizing public key certificates and 
zero-knowledge protocol-based server-aided 
verification and access control mechanisms. 
[21] ✓     
Proposes a hybrid method of securing IEC 61850 
GOOSE messages based on DES and RSA. 
[22]  ✓   ✓ 
Uses register access indices and power consumption 
indices to detect attacked smart meter readings. Did 
not actually implement the physical indices. 
[23]  ✓   ✓ 
Detects network traffic that deviates from the 
expected communication pattern or physical 
limitations that the system must obey. Applied to 
overcurrent protection application of a transformer. 
[24]  ✓   ✓ 
Utilizes three types of agents with different physical 
rules, based on current and voltage deviations, to 
enhance the security of protection schemes against 
attacks that maliciously control circuit breaker. 
[25]  ✓   ✓ 
Uses common paths mining to detect intrusions on 
an electric transmission distance protection system 
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using system data from synchrophasors and 
network logs. 
[26] ✓ ✓    
Monitors the traffic behavior of GOOSE messages 
to forecast or detect any deviation from the 
performance of GOOSE messages. 
[27] ✓ ✓ ✓   
Uses data mining and forensics tools to identify 
users’ login behaviors, thus, preventing, detecting, 
and blocking insiders or attackers from performing 
malicious activities in closed environments. 
[28]  ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Compares physical system candidate invariants 
based on dynamic analysis of the microgrid with the 
actual invariants to detect false data injection 
attacks and take appropriate mitigation action to 
restore services. 
[29] ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Proposes a multi-agent scheme for protection and 
emergency control when a power system is under 
attack. 
[30] ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
 Utilizes a modified AC power flow algorithm to 
detect control-related attacks in power grids. 
[31] ✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Utilizes a model-checking approach for detection 
and mitigation of attacks on automatic generation 
control in power systems. 
[32]  ✓ ✓   
Proposes a framework for detecting and responding 
to intrusions on the media access control level of 
wireless networks in smart grids based on the 
notion of defense-in-depth. 
[33]  ✓ ✓   
Develops a GOOSE attack detector, which 
identifies Ethernet storms and other fraudulent 
GOOSE frames using standard stipulations.  
*P: Protection; D: Detection; R: Response; RY: Recovery: UPP: Use Physical Properties. 
Following that trend, in this dissertation, we focused on developing cyber-physical 
techniques for securing smart energy cyber-physical systems. That is, in this dissertation, 
we focus on environment awareness by providing intelligent agents that are capable of 
learning the characteristics of the physical environment within which they operate. The 
agents, then, use this knowledge as an important second line of defense in detecting 
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malicious activity, thus complementing the cyber security methods, such as encryption and 
authentication. Therefore, the decisions made by these agents are based on properly 
correlating the requirements of the cyber and the physical domains to detect and mitigate 
malicious activity that is trying to tamper with the grid operation. Unlike the work 
presented in the literature, the agents developed in this dissertation utilize artificial 
intelligence to characterize the power system. As will be shown later, artificial intelligence 
techniques can learn the characteristics of the power system with high accuracy and have 
fast response time, which will not add significant latency to the operation and control of 
the smart grid. 
1.1 Interoperability and Security Challenges of the Smart Grid as a Cyber-Physical 
System 
1.1.1 Interoperability Challenges 
Communication and data exchange between various system components in the smart 
grid are a prerequisite for the realization of modern monitoring and control services in the 
future smart grid. However, the different systems of the smart grid are usually owned by 
different entities and are governed by different rules. This poses an interoperability 
problem. Also, as seen in Figure 1.4, there are a variety of standards and protocols that 
have been developed for automating the operation of the smart grid. In order to establish a 
link between multi-protocol and multi-vendor devices, mapping the data protocols from 
one to another is required. 
As such, there is a strong need for a common data bus that allows application 
developers to easily develop smart grid applications that link different sectors of the grid, 
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such as energy management applications and demand side management applications [34]. 
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Figure 1.4: Protocols associated with different physical layers of the grid. 
1.1.2 Security Challenges 
Establishing a bullet-proof digital communication infrastructure is not an easy task to 
perform and spans a wide area of research topics, such as threat identification and detection, 
protection against known threats, and responding to/recovering from unknown malicious 
cyber incidents. 
With the advent of the electric grid, security was taken for granted by the utility 
industry. Cyber security was not a design requirement since utility networks were private 
and not connected to the public internet. However, recent threats to the grid and other 
critical industrial systems raised the level of awareness across people in the industry and 
in research and development. In fact, in 2010, Stuxnet was the first malware to be 
discovered, targeting SCADA along with Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) control 
networks [35]. In fact, it has been said that the “power grid infrastructure is teetering on 
the brink of a hacker-induced meltdown.” As seen in Figure 1.5, recent statistics show that 
“more than 85% of all ICS vulnerabilities have been disclosed since 2011 - the year 
following the discovery of Stuxnet. The Open-Source Vulnerability Database tracked more 
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ICS vulnerabilities than other sites, including the National Vulnerability Database ...” [36]. 
 
Figure 1.5: Data obtained from the former Open-Source Vulnerability Database [36]. 
Several researchers were able to prove the ability of a determined adversary to tamper 
with the grid’s operation. In [37], a stealth error vector was devised that was 
unrecognizable by state estimators. This stealth vector was also able to fool estimators into 
using erroneous data. The importance of state estimation led researchers to assess state 
estimation uncertainties and impacts of the communication system delays [38]. Global 
Positioning System (GPS) spoofing techniques to disrupt the operation of Phasor 
Measurement Units (PMUs), which directly affect the stability of the power system, were 
discussed in [39] and [40]. The work in [41] and [42] discussed an important security 
shortcoming in IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging. By breaching a substation’s network, the 
authors were able to successfully launch a data manipulation attack to maliciously open 
and close circuit breakers. As it is well known, a chain is as strong as its weakest link. 
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Therefore, with a widespread and complex system, such as the smart grid, there is always 
a possibility of a zero day attack. That is, the grid is always under the risk of exploiting 
previously unknown vulnerabilities.  
Today, cyber security is at the core of the smart grid. It is critical to everything we do 
to try to modernize the grid, such as integrating renewables, introducing energy 
independence, and reducing the reliance on foreign oil. It is true that the smart grid itself 
is a complex interconnected system; however, the operation of commercial, industrial, 
medical, military, and many critical infrastructures is critically dependent on the cyber-
physical smart grid. Looking at the critical industries today, the smart grid is said to be the 
first among equals [43]. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Utilizing microgrids as building blocks of the smart grid with increased penetration of 
distributed energy resources - whether renewable or not - controllable smart loads, and 
energy storage, will provide a lot of new services that will radically enhance the operation 
and control of the current power system. However, to manage the distributed components 
of the microgrids and integrate the microgrids together require a shift from centralized 
control to decentralized and distributed control schemes. This, in its turn, will necessitate 
reshaping the current communication infrastructure of the grid to interface with different 
types of distributed software/hardware controllers and sensing devices. 
However, the enhanced operation of the grid came at the cost of new interoperability 
challenges and security risks. To address the interoperability challenges, there is a need for 
a platform that seamlessly integrates the components of the smart grid together, especially 
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since they are governed by different regulations and owned by different entities. To achieve 
that, one first needs to develop a strong understanding between the cyber information flow 
and the physical information flow in the smart grid, and the interrelationship between them. 
On the other hand, to address the security risks, there is a strong need to come up with 
solutions that are capable of defending the grid against cyber-attacks, minimizing the 
damage in case a cyber-incident occurs, and restoring services within minimal time. 
1.3 Research Objective 
In this dissertation, we present the concept of enhancing the robustness of cyber 
security solutions against cyber-attacks by complementing their decision with information 
about the physical characteristics of the power system through the use of intelligent agents. 
The idea behind this concept stems from the fact that the cyber information flow and the 
physical information flow in the smart grid are correlated. That is, physical processes are 
influenced by the decisions of the control logic, and control algorithms are influenced by 
the states of the physical system.  
Therefore, information pertinent to the physical behavior of the system should be 
treated as an indispensable element, alongside a detailed analysis of communication 
protocols used in power system automation, when designing algorithms that defend the 
power grid against malicious attacks. 
In order to reach that objective, we analyzed the cyber and physical information flow 
in a safe environment and in a high-fidelity communication network-in-the-loop co-
simulation setup. We also used the setup to emulate industrial communication protocols, 
such as the IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging and the IEC 61850 SMV protocols. Based on 
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the analysis of these protocols, we applied the concept of physical-model-checking to 
detect switching-related attacks on power systems. Also, we investigated the use of neural 
network forecasters to detect spoofed sensor measurements. 
1.4 Original Contribution of this Dissertation 
The main goal of the research work in this dissertation is to provide security solutions 
that harden the smart grid against cyber-attacks, taking into consideration not only the 
cyber domain, but also the physical characteristics of the grid. To achieve that, we 
developed a communication network-in-the-loop co-simulation platform, and performed 
an analysis of the effects of the cyber information flow on the physical dynamics of the 
power system, and vice-versa, to develop an understanding for the strong correlation 
between the cyber and physical domains of the smart grid. In this co-simulation framework, 
the dynamics of the power system were simulated on software packages, the control logic 
was programmed on hardware embedded microcontrollers, and the data exchange was 
performed over a real communication network. We utilized the Data Distribution Service 
(DDS) middleware as a common data bus that linked the components of the system 
together. Also, we performed protocol emulation to link commercial devices into the co-
simulation setup. We performed three studies, with three different objectives, to verify the 
effectiveness of the developed co-simulation framework. : 1) Hierarchical control of 
Electric Vehicles (EV) charging in microgrids; 2) IEC 61850 protocol emulation for 
protection of active distribution networks; and 3) Online lost packet forecasting for IEC 
61850 Sampled Measured Values. The results showed that the co-simulation platform 
provides a high fidelity design, analysis, and testing environment for cyber information 
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flow and their effect on the physical operation of the smart grid, as they are experimentally 
verified, down to the packet, over a real communication network. 
Since it is the most industry-accepted power automation standard, we conducted a 
detailed analysis of the IEC 61850 protocol mapping. The GOOSE messaging protocol, 
which is the protocol used by modern digital relays for event-driven communication, such 
as the opening and closing of circuit breakers, was analyzed. Based on this vulnerability 
analysis, we developed a GOOSE poisoning malware. The malware is able to sniff GOOSE 
messages, filter them based on their unique identifiers, change any field of the message, 
and then, re-transmit it in a legitimate GOOSE packet format. We utilized this malware to 
analyze the different implementations of the GOOSE messaging protocol on commercial 
devices and to recommend best practices. 
To defend against GOOSE poisoning, especially manipulating the data fields and 
spoofing the source MAC address to maliciously open and close circuit breakers, we 
developed an artificially intelligent physical-model-checking security algorithm. The 
algorithm utilizes artificially intelligent neural networks to learn the load flow 
characteristics of the power system and benefits from the fast responses of the AI to decode 
and understand contents of network packets. Then, the output of the AI is processed 
through an expert system to verify that incoming control commands do not violate the 
physical operational constraints of the power system and do not put the power system in 
an insecure state. 
Similarly, we analyzed in detail the IEC 61850 SMV protocol, which is used to digitally 
transmit current and voltage measurements over the process bus. We found that the 
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structure of the SMV protocol is robust against several types of known attacks, but it is still 
vulnerable to spoofing attacks. In order to mitigate that, we investigated the feasibility of 
using neural network forecasters to detect spoofed SMV packets. Although forecasters 
showed a high detection accuracy, they were still vulnerable to the accumulation of 
forecasting errors. Accordingly, we developed another malware, which is targeting SMV 
packets. This malware allows the user to eavesdrop on SMV packets and inject malicious 
measurements at his/her discretion. We utilized the malware as a vaccine to enhance the 
resiliency of neural network forecasters against the accumulation of forecasting errors. To 
that end, we added a second layer to the developed neural network forecasters to detect the 
accumulation of the forecasting errors based on lightweight statistical indicators. 
On the application layer, we developed an Energy Management System (EMS) not only 
to help customers reduce their energy bills, but also to hide their load pattern profiles 
through proper utilization of energy storage devices. This is extremely important for 
military bases that are operating on foreign lands and connected to foreign utility grids. 
The work in this dissertation sheds the light on the importance of communication 
technologies and the criticality of hardening the smart grid against cyber-attacks. 
Therefore, it is important to educate the current and future users of the cyber infrastructure 
with the tools and techniques that are necessary to keep advancing and protecting the smart 
grid. Accordingly, a demonstration of utilizing some of the tools required to develop the 
algorithms in this dissertation is presented. 
Finally, the developed security algorithms in this dissertation were verified in hardware 
experimentation on the Smart Grid Testbed at Florida International University. 
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1.5 Dissertation Organization 
Chapter 2 emphasizes the importance of understanding the cyber information flow and 
the physical information flow in the smart grid, and the interdependency between them. 
This chapter also explains the concept of co-simulation as it relates to energy cyber-
physical systems, and presents a literature review on the available co-simulation setups. 
Finally, a network-in-the-loop framework to analyze cyber and physical information flow 
in the smart grid utilizing the DDS as the system’s orchestrator is proposed. 
Chapter 2 also presents three case studies for the purpose of verifying the effectiveness 
of the network-in-the-loop framework. The first case study is about hierarchical charging 
control of electric vehicles and is focused on showing how the DDS is used as a common 
data bus to seamlessly interface the components of the system together. The second case 
study is about protocol emulation. It gives an example about emulating the IEC 61850 
GOOSE and SMV protocols for use in protection of active distribution networks. Finally, 
the third case study focuses on the ability of the proposed framework to provide a credible 
platform for testing cyber algorithms, such as dropped packet forecasting, study their 
effects on the physical system, and verify them, down to the packet level, on a real network. 
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of the IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging protocol and its 
recommended implementation procedures by the IEC 62351 standard. Then, a study is 
conducted on two different IEC 61850 GOOSE compliant devices. Miss-implementation 
issues are found and the chapter is concluded by a set of standard practices for proper 
implementation of the GOOSE protocol. 
Chapter 4 analyzes the standards that are currently used for switching-related activities 
in power systems (i.e. GOOSE, R-GOOSE, and DNP 3.0) and the cyber threats associated 
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with those protocols. Next, a physical-model-checking technique is proposed to detect 
switching related attacks. The proposed technique is experimentally verified on a 
laboratory-scale power system. 
Chapter 5 analyzes in detail the IEC 61850 SMV protocol, which is used to transmit 
current and voltage sensor measurements over Ethernet networks. The benefits of the SMV 
process bus are identified. The current security countermeasures is also outlined. Chapter 
5 also investigated the use of neural network forecasters to detect spoofed sampled 
measured values. 
Chapter 6 presents the steps of developing a malware script that performs SMV spoofing 
attacks. The results show that this malware is capable of reducing the accuracy of neural 
network forecasters. It is also proposed in this chapter that this malware is to be used as a 
vaccine to harden the robustness of the neural network forecasters against sophisticated 
attacks. 
Chapter 7 discusses the importance of complementing cyber intrusion detection 
techniques with physical rules. In this chapter, a bi-layer algorithm to detect spoofed SMV 
messages is proposed. The proposed algorithm is verified in hardware on a laboratory-scale 
hybrid AC/DC microgrid. 
Chapter 8 addresses issues related to the privacy of the customers’ data in the artificial 
metering infrastructure. An energy management system, which utilizes energy storage, to 
camouflage the customers’ load demand profiles and reduce their electricity bills is 
presented in this chapter. The energy management system is verified on the network of the 
smart grid testbed at FIU. 
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Chapter 9 discusses security issues related to the charging of electric vehicles. Comments 
on the importance of including security in the design stage of smart infrastructure, such as 
electric vehicle charging, were made. 
Chapter 10 educates the reader on necessary tools to develop and prototype applications 
for energy cyber-physical systems. 
Chapter 11 concludes this dissertation and gives insight on future work. 
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Chapter 2 Design, Analysis, and Testing Framework for Cyber Physical 
Interactions in the Smart Grid 
 
Being a complex and highly interdependent cyber-physical system makes capturing the 
relation between the cyber and physical domains of the smart gird a necessity to understand 
the effect that each one has on the other. This chapter presents a network-in-the-loop co-
simulation platform that formalizes the understanding of cyber information flow, the 
dynamic behavior of physical systems, and captures the interactions between them in 
applications related to the smart grid. Here, power system simulation software packages, 
embedded microcontrollers, monitoring and logging services, and a real communication 
infrastructure are combined to provide a cohesive smart grid cyber-physical platform. A 
data-centric communication scheme, with automatic network discovery features, is 
selected to provide an interoperability layer between multi-vendor devices, software 
packages, and to bridge different protocols. This chapter also provides a review and an 
analysis about the available co-simulation frameworks in the literature. The effectiveness 
of the framework proposed in Chapter 2 is verified in three case studies: 1) Hierarchical 
control of electric vehicles charging in microgrids; 2) IEC 61850 protocol emulation for 
protection of active distribution networks; and 3) Online lost packet forecasting for IEC 
61850 Sampled Measured Values. The results showed that the co-simulation platform 
provides a high fidelity design, analysis, and testing environment for cyber information 
flow and their effect of the physical operation of the smart grid, as they are experimentally 
verified, down to the packet, over a real communication network. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Bulk centralized generation has been the foundation of the power system for decades. 
In fact, in the early stages of the grid, power system was divided into two parts: bulk 
generation and transmission on one hand, and the distribution system on the other hand. In 
this model, the main concern was the balance of supply and demand. The utilities have 
been studying their customers’ demand for power and were managing and allocating their 
resources to meet that demand. A typical daily load demand profile shows low demand for 
power in the early morning when most of the people are sleeping, a peak in demand during 
midday when industrial activities are ongoing, and the demand remains high when people 
leave work and come back home to cook dinner. The demand for power then decreases at 
night when people go to sleep. Given that, utilities have divided their customers’ demand 
for power as base load, which is served by nuclear power plants or large coal units, 
intermediate load, which is served by medium size gas and coal units, and peak load, which 
is served by gas units. As a precaution measure, utilities also have an operating reserve for 
reliability purposes [43]. 
Therefore, the distribution grid was regarded as a passive power consumer. That is, 
power was flowing in a unidirectional manner from generation to transmission to 
distribution. However, with the advancement of technology and changes in lifestyles, the 
demand for power increased drastically. A comparative study on the demand for power 
between the industrial, commercial, and residential sectors showed that from 1956 to 2007, 
the residential and commercial demand for power increased from 48% to 73%, whereas 
the demand for power in the industrial section dropped from 52% to 27% [43]. 
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Figure 2.1: The transformation of the power industry. 
It would be very expensive and time consuming if utilities were to build new bulk 
centralized plants to meet the new increasing demand. However, coming up with novel 
technologies to manage/control the demand in the distribution side to reshape and peak 
demands would be faster and more economical. Advancements in communication and 
information technologies where the main reason behind the transformation of the power 
industry to the recently known Smart Grid. In the new power grid, the distribution system 
transformed from passive consumers, or load, to active consumers, or prosumers. As can 
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be seen in Figure 2.1, a lot of new technologies have been integrated into the distribution 
side, such as smart meters, distributed and renewable energy resources, energy storage, 
SCADA systems, etc … 
In order to manage the two-way flow of power in the new smart grid, the concept of 
microgrids emerged. A microgrid is a small geographical area with a group of distributed 
energy resources, mainly composed of renewable resources, that provide power to local 
customers and has a connection point to the main utility grid. The smart grid is, thus, 
composed of a group of interconnected smaller microgrids. Each microgrid is controlled 
locally, and is coordinating with neighboring microgrids and the utility grid to maintain 
reliable power delivery. 
Therefore, the reliable operation of the smart grid is a function of the configuration and 
cyber-physical nature of its constituting subcomponents. However, the power system and 
the communication network differ in terms of their dynamic behavior. Therefore, 
understanding the dynamics of the smart grid’s cyber and physical domains, and the ability 
to model, analyze, and test the interactions between them, are important in order to ensure 
reliable power delivery to the critical infrastructures of current and future cities [44]. In 
pursuit of this, co-simulation has emerged as an effective method for the assessment and 
validation of cyber-physical energy systems [45]. Several works in the literature have 
introduced the concept of co-simulation and, as seen in Figure 2.2, they can be categorized 
into two clusters: 
1. Integrating two software packages and providing synchronization among them. 
2. Hardware-in-the-Loop testbeds. 
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Figure 2.2: Categories of co-simulation platforms present in the literature. 
 
2.2 Integrating software packages and providing synchronization among them. 
As the section title indicates, in this category of co-simulation, the efforts to provide a 
cohesive cyber-physical energy platform comprises the use of a power system simulation 
tool, a network simulation tool, and an event synchronization tool to harmonize the flow 
of events between the former and the latter. 
In [46], co-simulation is described as the process of integrating two software packages 
together and providing synchronization among them. In [47] a co-simulation framework 
was developed by combining OpenDSS for simulation of the power system and OMNeT++ 
for simulation of the communication network to investigate wide area monitoring systems. 
Similarly, [48] presented a framework for simulating a power routing algorithm for clusters 
of microgrids by integrating a real-time digital simulator and OMNeT++. Authors in [49] 
argued that there is a large gap in the area of simulating cyber-physical systems and more 
efforts are needed to be put in the co-simulation area. For that, they introduced an event 
driven co-simulation module based on OpenDSS and Network Simulator NS2. A co-
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simulation platform of a low voltage grid based on IEC 61850 was presented in [50], where 
MATLAB’s SimPowerSystems and SimEvents toolboxes were used to model the system’s 
physical and cyber information flow, respectively. The following table, which is adopted 
from [45], provides more examples about co-simulation frameworks and is presented here 
for the convenience of the reader. 
Table 2.1. Application-Specific Simulation-Based Co-simulation Frameworks. 
Co-
Simulation 
Framework 
Power System 
Simulator 
Network 
Simulator 
Synchronization 
Strategy 
Application 
[51][52] PSLF NS-2 Global Event-
Driven 
PMU-based 
WAMPAC 
[53] ADVES NS-2 DEVS WAMPAC 
[54] VTB OPNET Master-slave WAMPAC 
[55] PowerTech 
TSAT 
GridStat Time stepped WAMPAC 
[56] Modelica NS-2 Master-slave Control 
[57] NETOMAC NS-2 Time stepped Evaluation of 
DERs 
[58][59] RTlab OPNET 
SITL 
Asynchronous WAMC, HVDC 
[60] OpenDSS NS-2 N/A DER Integration 
[61] PowerWorld OPNET N/A Cyber-security 
of SCADA 
[62] PSCAD OMNet++ Global Event-
Driven 
Cyber-security 
of LV Grid 
* PMU: Phasor Measurement Unit; WAMPAC: Wide Area Monitoring, Protection, and 
Control; DER: Distributed Energy Resource; WAMC: Wide Area Monitoring and Control; 
HVDC: High Voltage DC; SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition; LV: Low 
Voltage. 
 
The mentioned works represent an important step towards properly modeling the cyber 
and physical domains of a cyber-physical system. Nonetheless, these simulators are not 
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implemented over a real communication network. Therefore, they will not be able to 
account for practical issues with high fidelity, as they are limited with the functionalities 
provided in the network simulation software. For instance, network simulators do not work 
on the packet level. They usually model networks on the large scale and use statistical 
and/or probabilistic models to predict delays. Also, practical issues due to different 
firmware implementations cannot be realized in network simulators. Another drawback of 
the previously discussed frameworks is that they are application specific and hard to 
expand. As shown in Table 2.1, each framework was tailored to a specific application in 
the smart grid. 
2.3 Hardware-in-the-Loop Testbeds 
From another perspective, several works included hardware in the loop with simulation 
platforms. There are two methodologies for this approach: 
1. Integrating power equipment such as generators, actuators, and converters into the 
simulation environment to test control algorithms on real hardware. 
2.  Integrating IEDs and other embedded devices with traffic generation software 
packages for designing and testing communication networks. 
A hardware in the loop simulation test-bed for distributed microgrid management was 
presented in [63]. The presented system is based on the Zigbee protocol and the simulation 
and hardware were integrated through an I/O conditioning board. Also, in [64] actual 
PMUs were integrated with a real-time digital simulator via an IEC 61850 bus to model 
passive islanding schemes. These two implementations are application specific and are 
hard to expand and manage the complex communication requirements for other smart grid 
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applications. From a pure networking perspective, [65] proposed a method for testing IEDs 
in a platform that incorporates several protocols. However, the integration of these 
protocols is based on a proprietary Distributed Test Manager, and therefore, is not easily 
expandable and requires special libraries to interface with.  
Both modeling approaches presented are single sided and do not provide a 
comprehensive framework to properly model cyber-physical systems, and most 
importantly the interactions between their cyber and physical domains. Also, the second 
approach (2) is usually concerned with a single or a few protocol combinations and will 
require a lot of engineering and programming efforts to integrate different applications and 
devices together. 
Additionally, and as explained in [66], comprehensive security mechanisms are 
required to deal with cyber security and vulnerabilities brought about by communication-
assisted control and operation of the smart grid. Therefore, co-simulation, which provides 
a cohesive platform for the physical and communication infrastructures of the smart grid 
are important in the design and testing stages of cyber security algorithms. 
Accordingly, the work in this chapter presents a communication network-in-the-loop 
framework to analyze the cyber and physical information flow in the smart grid. Further to 
what is presented in the literature, which are well-detailed but application oriented co-
simulation platforms, the contributions of this framework are as follows: 
1. Providing a holistic cyber-physical energy systems framework, with ease of 
integration of simulation packages, software, and hardware by utilizing a data-
centric communication backbone to manage information exchange and 
seamlessly orchestrate the components of the system together. 
 27 
 
2. Enabling protocol emulation and translation that allows the integration of a 
wide range of multi-protocol/multi-vendor devices into the developed 
framework. 
3. Supporting scalability to a wide range of smart grid applications, as 
demonstrated in the case studies of Chapter 3. 
4. Providing remote connectivity, data monitoring, and logging services. 
2.4 Interoperability and Capturing the Relations between the Cyber and Physical 
Components of Smart Grid Applications 
Before moving forward in discussing the details of the developed co-simulation 
framework, an overview about the importance of interoperability in the envisioned smart 
grid will be provided. This is important because the future grid is seen as a complex system 
with different components communicating together and lots of efforts are being placed to 
find a common ground to achieve harmony among all the devices and applications. 
2.4.1 The Human Interactions Analogy 
The IEEE Standard Computer Dictionary defined the term Interoperability as the ability 
of two or more systems or components to exchange information and to properly use the 
information that has been exchanged [67]. The Utility Standards Board (USB) explained 
this definition by introducing the human interoperability paradigm as an analogy to cyber 
interoperability [68]. USB argues that people speak their native language within their own 
local environment, similar to applications within their own computing platform. However, 
if geographically dispersed groups need to communicate with each other, then English 
would be used as a common language. This is because the English language has been 
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accepted and is known by most societies worldwide. The concept of English as a common 
language is illustrated in Figure 2.3. Similarly, there is a strong need for the adoption of a 
common cyber language, or backbone, especially for large and complex systems, such as 
the smart grid. 
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Figure 2.3:  Interoperability in Human Interactions. People from difference countries use 
English language as a common ground to establish communications as indicated by the 
green connection lines (map adopted from [69]). 
2.4.2 Language, Platform, and Vendor Independence 
The envisioned smart grid is a complex system, which is in continuous evolving and 
expanding. Communication and information technologies are the main propellers of the 
evolution and expansion of the smart grid. These technologies leveraged the intelligence 
level of the smart grid. In fact, the term smart was not present before the integration of the 
communication technologies into the power grid. With the realization of the importance of 
communication technologies in making the former possible, more effort is going towards 
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this need, with particular interest in the concept of interoperability. Several national and 
international entities are working with electricity utilities, vendors, regulatory bodies, and 
in some cases end users on developing standards that will make interoperability in the smart 
grid a reality. These include IEEE, IEC, National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), American National Standards Institute (ANSI), North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation (NERC), and many others.  
Like the English language, a common cyber language should have a profound word 
diction and a well-defined set of communication rules. Therefore, standards development 
bodies have a lot of functionalities that need to be well orchestrated together to achieve 
sound interoperability. Middleware technology is a practical solution which ensures 
language, platform, and vendor independence in smart grid applications. Recently, authors 
in [70] proposed the use of a data-centric middleware to manage the communication in a 
laboratory scale smart grid system. As shown in Figure 2.4, using this network architecture, 
i.e. the common middleware data bus, applications exchange messages via the middleware 
without worrying about each other’s computing devices and configurations. The 
middleware, thus, introduces an abstraction level to the smart grid from the heterogeneous 
nature of the communication networks, operating systems, and programming languages 
[71]. 
In this work, the DDS machine-to-machine middleware from the Object Management 
Group (OMG), [72], was utilized to enable real-time integration of various applications 
within the developed co-simulation framework. DDS is a data-centric middleware that 
follows a publisher-subscriber model for distributed control applications. It possesses a 
relational data modelling method in a decentralized data space, which decouples 
 30 
 
applications in time and space. DDS supports automatic network discovery and has a rich 
set of quality-of-service (QoS) profiles, which are configured depending on the 
applications’ needs [72][73]. More details about the DDS will be explained later in this 
chapter. 
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control logic
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control logic
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control logic
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Application N 
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Application i 
control logic
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management, data 
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network)
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Figure 2.4: Utilizing a common data bus (middleware service) as an interoperability layer 
for different smart grid applications. 
2.4.3 Cyber Security, Vulnerability, and Impact Analyses 
As explained earlier, standardization in smart grid communications is necessary to 
facilitate complex operations of modern power system functions. However, the strong 
coupling between the cyber and physical domains of the contemporary grid exposes the 
system to more vulnerabilities. As such, standards need to be continuously assessed for 
reliability and are expected to be implemented properly on field devices [41][42]. The 
developed platform becomes more useful when we add cyber security, vulnerability 
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analysis, and impact analysis into the equation of the smart grid. For instance, cyber 
security for industrial control systems in general, and power systems in particular, is 
different from enterprise cyber security because the former usually operates in real-time 
and has stringent time delay requirements. As an example, the IEC 62351 part 6, which 
covers cyber security for Layer 2 messages in substation automation systems, recommends 
not to use encryption on these messages because their required transfer time is limited to 4 
ms end-to-end [42]. Therefore, developing and testing new security and authentication 
mechanisms is a necessity. However, it is infeasible, dangerous, and highly expensive to 
test these algorithms directly on physical systems. The developed framework provides a 
safe and high-fidelity platform to test cyber security algorithms over a real network with 
physical embedded computing platforms (e.g. could be commercial IEDs) integrated with 
a scalable set of simulation software packages, operating in real-time, to capture the 
physical information flow as well. 
Also, vulnerability analysis on industrial communication systems and standards could be 
performed on the developed platform. The impact of these vulnerabilities could be 
investigated safely on a simulated system. Maximum reverse current fed back into a 
distributed generator exciter due to malicious data sent to the synchronization controller 
could be investigated. Questions about how a certain device would operate under an attack 
or a network outage could be answered. The ability of the system to reconfigure and self-
heal could also be investigated as well as many other scenarios involving cyber-physical 
interactions. 
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2.5 Framework Development and Description 
Figure 2.5 shows a conceptual representation of the proposed framework. The developed 
framework consists of 4 main components:  
1. Power system simulation packages. 
2. Embedded microcontrollers. 
3. Information exchange interface and protocol translation. 
4. Monitoring, logging, and remote connectivity. 
2.5.1 Power System Simulation Packages 
In the smart grid, cyber information flow affects physical processes and the dynamics of 
physical systems influence the operation and decision of cyber processes. However, in the 
analysis, design, and testing phases of smart grid applications, which are the scope of this 
chapter, it is impractical and highly expensive to test newly developed algorithms directly 
on field devices. Also, in the design stage, physical system dynamics and their tolerance to 
software and communication constraints cannot be ignored. Given the fact that the laws of 
physics that govern the operation of the physical processes are well formulated in 
mathematical models with high accuracy, the interrelation between the power systems on 
one hand, and the software and communication realms on the other, could be adequately 
and safely captured through the incorporation of power system simulation software. In this 
work, SimPowerSystems from Matlab/Simulink was utilized as the power system 
simulation package due its popularity and extensive libraries. 
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 Figure 2.5: Conceptual representation of the overall framework. 
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Figure 2.6: Embedded microcontrollers utilized in the co-simulation framework. 
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2.5.2 Embedded Microcontrollers 
Software developers face many challenges when implementing their algorithms on 
microcontrollers. These challenges include limitations in speed of the processors, memory 
allocation, interfacing with the network, and other practical issues. Since software 
algorithms will be controlling critical processes, it is important that the mentioned 
challenges are exhausted in a safe and high fidelity environment. Therefore, in this work, 
all the software and control logic will be implemented on hardware-embedded devices. 
2.5.3 Information Exchange Interface and Protocol Translation 
Middleware technology is a practical solution, which ensures language, platform, and 
vendor independence in smart grid applications. Using the common middleware data bus, 
applications exchange messages via the middleware without worrying about each other’s 
computing devices and configurations. The middleware, thus, introduces an abstraction 
level to the smart grid from the heterogeneous nature of the communication networks, 
operating systems, and programming languages [71]. 
As mentioned earlier, in this work, the Data Distribution Service machine-to-machine 
middleware from the Object Management Group was utilized to enable real-time 
integration of various applications within the developed co-simulation framework. The 
reason for choosing the DDS as a common data bus for the developed platform is that it 
has an Application Programing Interface (API) that facilitates mapping of other industrial 
protocols, such as Common Interface Model (CIM), IEC 61850 GOOSE messages and 
SMV messages into DDS, as will be explained later.  
 
 35 
 
In this work, protocol translators were developed to enable seamless interfacing of multi-
vendor/multi-protocol devices with the developed framework. 
The focus of this work is providing a credible platform that harmonizes information flow 
between different smart grid applications and an understanding to their cyber-physical 
nature. By utilizing the DDS middleware layer here, the proposed framework has the ability 
to support multiple power system communication protocols and standards, thus, providing 
interoperability between devices from different vendors. Since DDS could be interfaced 
with many simulation tools, the developed platform supports fully distributed applications 
over an expandable number of different simulation stations. The operator does not need to 
worry about integrating all these devices together as the DDS provides automatic network 
discovery features, which also learn the various data structures and types of the newly 
joined devices and/or applications. Therefore, conceptually, a holistic smart grid 
framework could be modelled over a distributed network architecture, managed by the 
DDS, and is allowed to interact with real hardware devices over a real network. 
2.5.4 Monitoring, Logging, and Remote Connectivity 
A monitoring and logging service was developed for the operator to keep track of the 
operation of the tested systems. The monitoring service also provides a visualization tool 
in the form on a relational graph that shows the logical relation between the components 
of the system and their data structures in real-time. The data logging service stores the 
exchanged information and the network packets for post-processing. 
 36 
 
There are a lot of situations in the smart grid where controllers interact with each other 
and collect sensor data over the wide area network, such as smart metering and demand 
side management. Therefore, in this work, remote connectivity to the developed framework  
was established through routing and web integration services. 
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                <publication_name>
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Figure 2.7: Steps to combine the framework components. 
Figure 2.7 shows the general procedure to link the components of the developed co-
simulation framework together. In terms of the power system, the simulation model needs  
to be created first. Next the developers need to identify the measurement points (or the 
feedback loops) and the actuators (or the feed foreword loops). The next step is to create 
the DDS Gateways. In this step, it is important to identify the nature of the measured data. 
If the data is circuit breaker status, then it is defined as Boolean, if the data is current 
measurements, then it is defined as Float, and so on. After that, the data structures are 
organized in an Interface Definition Language (IDL) file, one file for each gateway. 
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Finally, an eXtensible Markup Language (XML) file was created to define the quality of 
service profiles for each application. 
In terms of the cyber control, the first step is to select the hardware devices and identify 
their communication protocol and programming language. Next, a data mapping table, if 
needed, is to be developed to organize the translation procedure between the protocol of 
the hardware devices and the data structures defined in the DDS gateways. Finally, the 
quality of service profiles are defined in XML files. 
To link the communication software with the hardware devices, a Global Data Space 
(GDS or a DDS domain) needs to be created. In that domain, different topics need to be 
created. The creation of the data topics allows the developers to draw logical relational 
graphs between all of the components of the system. That is, a relation graph will be created 
between all the publishers (and the corresponding data writers) and the subscribers (and 
their corresponding data readers). 
 
Figure 2.6 shows the hardware microcontrollers that were selected to implement the 
control logic of all applications in the case studies that will be detailed later. The devices 
are Odroid C2 embedded microcontrollers that have ARM® Cortex®-A53 1.5Ghz 
processors and are running on a real-time Linux Kernel. Also, a dedicated Ethernet switch 
was utilized in this framework. 
2.6 Verification Case Studies 
This section presents three case studies that were implemented on the developed co-
simulation framework. The first case study will be about hierarchical control of electric 
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vehicle charging. The emphasis of this case study will be on the utilization of the DDS 
common information exchange bus to link the components of the co-simulation framework 
together. The second case study will be a protection application for active distribution 
networks. Its focus will be on showing the ability of the developed framework to 
incorporate multi-vendor/multi-protocol devices via protocol translation and emulation. 
Finally, the last case study will be lost packet forecasting and will focus on the importance 
of the developed framework in cyber-resiliency studies. 
2.6.1 Hierarchical Control of Electric Vehicle Charging 
A block diagram of the microgrid in this case study is shown in Figure 2.8. It consists 
of four buses with a local conventional generator connected to bus B1 and an inverter-
based photovoltaic (PV) source connected to bus B4. The microgrid has four constant 
loads, each connected to a different bus, and two 3-phase dynamic loads connected to buses 
B3 and B4. An EV is connected to every bus. This is done to take into consideration the 
anticipated high penetration of electric vehicles. The PV source is controlled through an 
inverter, which controls the amount of injected power to the microgrid. The charging of 
the EVs is done through controlling the pulse width modulation of the DC-DC converter.  
As shown in Figure 2.8, a cyber-layer is present on top of the physical layer. It is 
composed of a two-level hierarchy of agents. The lower layer of the hierarchy is composed 
of 4 EV agents, which are responsible for calculating the requested charging current for the 
EV chargers. The higher layer of the hierarchy is composed of a microgrid control agent 
(MCCA), which is responsible to set the final reference charging current for every EV to 
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charge the batteries while maintaining the voltages at the different buses within the ANSI 
standards [74].  
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Figure 2.8: Hierarchical control of EV charging. 
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A communication layer links the physical layer to the cyber layer through a Global 
Data Space, which contains three topics: Requests, Decisions, and Simulation Clock. Due 
to the complexity of the simulated power system and the limitation on the available 
hardware resources, the simulation clock is much slower than the real-time clock. 
Therefore, the Simulation Clock topic was developed to synchronize the hardware agents 
with the clock of the simulation. A DDS gateway was created for every bus of the simulated 
microgrid. On one hand, these gateways will collect and publish the necessary input for the 
hardware agents. On the other hand, they will subscribe to the commands issued by the 
hardware agents and execute them on the simulated microgrid. 
Every 6 minutes, each EV Agent reads the current state of charge (𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑐) of the EV 
battery and calculates the requested charging current (𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞) based on equations (2.1) and 
(2.2). 
𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞 =  
(𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑓 −  𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑐) × 𝑀𝐶
𝑡
 (2.1) 
𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞_𝑓 = min (𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞, 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑) (2.2) 
where 𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑓 is the final state of charge, which is set to 80%, 𝑀𝐶 = 24 𝑘𝑊ℎ is the battery 
capacity, 𝐼𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 15 𝐴 is the maximum charging rate, and 𝑡 is the requested time to reach 
𝑆𝑜𝐶𝑓. In this study 𝑡 = 4, 6, 7, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 5 ℎ𝑟𝑠 for EV1, EV2, EV3, and EV4 respectively. After 
calculating the requested charging current, each EV agent writes a charging request vector 
to the Requests topic, as shown in equation (2.3). 
 
𝑅 = {𝐸𝑉𝐼𝐷 , 𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑓 , 𝑉𝑝𝑢} (2.3) 
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where 𝐸𝑉𝐼𝐷 is the unique identifier of the EV and 𝑉𝑝𝑢 is the p.u. voltage of the bus at which 
the EV is connected.  
Next, the Microgrid Control Center (MCC) Agent collects all the charging requests and 
readjusts the charging currents for each EV according to the heuristic rules in (2.4) and 
(2.5). The MCCA utilizes (2.4) to guide its decision in the cases where the bus voltages are 
healthy, i.e. no under voltage. However, the MCCA utilizes (2.5) to guide its decision when 
there is an under voltage on at least one bus. 
 
𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 =  {
𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖                          𝑖𝑓  (𝑉𝑖 > 0.97) ∀ 𝑖 ∈ [1,4]
0.75 𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖 𝑖𝑓 (0.955 < 𝑉𝑖 ≤ 0.975)𝑖𝑓∃𝑖𝜖[1,4]
  
  
(2.4) 
 
𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑖 = {𝑘 𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑖  
𝑘 = 0 𝑖𝑓 𝑉𝑖 ≤ 0.955   𝑖𝜖[1,4] 
𝑘 = 0.5 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 (2.5) 
The MCCA publishes its decisions vectors 𝐷 = {𝐸𝑉𝐼𝐷, 𝐼𝑟𝑒𝑓} to the Decisions topic. 
 
Figure 2.9: Battery state of charge. 
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Figure 2.10: Bus voltages in p.u. 
 
Figure 2.11: Battery currents. 
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Figure 2.9 shows the SoC of the EV batteries over time. It can be seen that all EVs 
reached 80% SoC within the requested periods (t=4.2, 6.2, 7, and 5.1 hrs for EV1, EV2, 
EV3, and EV4, respectively). The voltages in per unit at the four different buses are shown 
in Figure 2.10. During the experiment, the voltages at all buses were maintained above 
0.95 p.u, which is desired. One can see that the voltage at B1 is the highest since it is 
connected directly to the generator. At bus 4, the voltage drop across the feeder is 
compensated for by the power injected from the inverter. Therefore, B4 maintained high 
voltage values. However, buses B2 and B3 have lower voltages since they are far from the 
generation buses, especially B3, since it is connected at the far side of the feeder. The 
fluctuations in the charging currents of the EV batteries can be seen in Figure 2.11. It is 
evident that the charging currents are following the reference values set by the MCCA. 
As can be appreciated from the results of this case study, the developed framework was 
successful in providing a smooth link between a multi-agent hardware/software 
infrastructure and a simulated power system. Through this link, the effect of the control 
logic, which was implemented in C++, was tested and the response of the power system to 
the control logic was analyzed. 
2.6.2 Protection of an Active Distribution Network 
In this case study, we focus on how the developed framework supports the incorporation 
of multi-protocol devices through protocol translation. To achieve that, an IEC 61850-
based differential protection algorithm is designed and interfaced with a 4-bus active 
distribution network. 
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The developed microgrid model is shown in Figure 2.12. The microgrid under study 
consists of 3 transmission lines, named TL1, TL2, and TL3. Various types of AC and DC 
loads are connected to Buses 3 and 4. Transmission line one links the microgrid to the 
utility grid through Circuit Breakers (CBs) 1 and 2. Power is transferred from either the 
main utility grid or the two distributed generators (G1 and G2) to the system busses and 
their corresponding loads over transmission lines TL1 and TL2. Three DDS gateways were 
incorporated into the model in order to provide an interface link between the simulated 
microgrid on one hand, and the physical Merging Units (MUs) and IEDs on the other. The 
DDS gateways receive the three phase current measurements from Simulink and publish 
them into the DDS GDS, each to its corresponding topic. 
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Figure 2.12: Simulated distribution network linked to the IEC 61850 agents. 
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DDS Global data Space
Modeling and simulation System Monitoring
 
Figure 2.13: Architecture of the communication network. 
Table 2.2. Example DDS Data Structure & Corresponding Iec 61850 Messages 
Topic 
DDS Data 
Structure 
IEC61850 Msg Description 
TL_11 TL_11_meas { 
float Ia; 
float Ib; 
float Ic; } 
SMV data set: 
float Ia 
float Ib 
float Ic 
Three phase current 
measurements from the first end 
on TL1 mapped as 2 SMV data 
sets.(TL_11 on the side of CB1 and 
TL_12 on the side of CB2) 
 
TL_12 TL_12_meas { 
float Ia; 
float Ib; 
float Ic; } 
SMV data set: 
float Ia 
float Ib 
float Ic 
Three phase current 
measurements from the second 
end on TL1 mapped as 2 SMV data 
sets. 
TL1_Trip TL1_GOOSE { 
Bool status; } 
GOOSE data 
set:  
bool status 
GOOSE trip command mapped as 
a logical  Boolean field to control 
the simulated circuit breakers 
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The merging units then receive the measurements, translate them into IEC 61850 SMV 
packets, and publish them over the Ethernet network. For each transmission line, a 
publisher IED reads the published measurements and issues a trip GOOSE message 
according to the protection scheme coded into its firmware. The subscribing IED reads the 
GOOSE commands and translates them into DDS messages to control the status of the 
circuit breaker in the simulated microgrid. The mapping between the DDS and the 
IEC61850 GOOSE and SMV messages was coded in C with the help of libraries from the 
DDS API from Real Time Innovation (RTI) OMG and the open source library libIEC61850 
[72][75]. An IDL file, which contains the IEC 61850 data modules, is passed to the 
automatic publisher/subscriber code generator from RTI. The generated code is then 
interfaced with the routines available from libIEC61850. The developed codes were 
downloaded on Odroid C2 single board computers (SBCs) running a Linux kernel. The 
communication took place over a dedicated Ethernet network switch, as shown in Figure 
2.13. Table 2.2 provides an example correspondence between DDS and IEC 61850 SMV 
and GOOSE messages for the section covering TL1. Measurements are assigned float data 
types, whereas circuit breaker statuses are assigned Boolean data types. 
As mentioned earlier, the DDS provides a flexible and standard API to integrate with 
different systems and programming languages. Since DDS is a data-centric communication 
middleware, the message structure is driven directly from the system data model without 
the need for a predefined set of structures for messages. In addition, the automatic code 
generation for publishers/subscribers based on the data models defined by XML and/or 
IDL files simplifies the integration with different data types for other protocols utilized by 
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different IED and remote units’ vendors. Figure 2.13 shows how the IEC 61850 is linked 
to the simulation environment through the DDS global data space. 
A three-phase-to-ground (ABCG) fault was applied on TL2 of  
Figure 2.12 at t = 5.50 seconds. DDS Gateway 2 reads the current measurements at both 
ends of the transmission line and publishes them as DDS messages. Two physical merging 
units are subscribing to the values of the current published from each end of the 
transmission line. From this point, the actual IEC 61850 process bus is implemented.  
Ia21
Ia22
If
Trip CB
Ib21
Ib22
If
Ic21
Ic21
If
If         Fault Current Setting
Ii21     Phase i RMS Current at Left End of TL2
Ii22     Phase i RMS Current at Right End of TL2
Id_i    Phase i RMS Current Difference
I           represents phase a, b, or c
Id_a
Id_b
Id_c
 
Figure 2.14: Protection logic. 
These merging units publish the measured current values as SMV packets at a 4,800 Hz 
publishing rate, as set by IEC 61850 for 60 Hz systems. An IED, which has the protection 
logic implemented on it, will then subscribe to these SMV messages. First, the IED will 
calculate the Root Mean Square (RMS) value of all received measurements. Next, the IED 
will calculate the difference in the RMS current values for each phase according to equation 
(2.6) 
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𝐼𝑑
𝑎𝑏𝑐 =  𝐼21
𝑎𝑏𝑐 −  𝐼22
𝑎𝑏𝑐   (2.6) 
 
where 𝐼𝑑
𝑎𝑏𝑐 is the per phase difference in current, 𝐼21
𝑎𝑏𝑐 is the phase current at the left 
end of transmission line TL2, and 𝐼22
𝑎𝑏𝑐 is the phase current at the right end of TL2. If the  
 
Figure 2.15: System frequency and status of CB3. 
difference in phase A current, phase B, or phase C currents at both ends of TL2 is greater 
than or equal to the fault current setting, the IED will issue a trip command in the form of 
a GOOSE message. This is represented in the logical diagram of Figure 2.14 
𝐶𝐵 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 =  {
1 (𝐼𝑑_𝑎 ≥   𝐼𝑓) || (𝐼𝑑_𝑏 ≥   𝐼𝑓) ||(𝐼𝑑_𝑐 ≥   𝐼𝑓)
0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
   (2.7) 
Finally, an IED subscribing to this GOOSE message will map it into a DDS Boolean 
command to control the status of CB3 and CB4 in the simulated microgrid model. The 
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frequency of the system was recorded, and is shown along with the status of the circuit 
breakers in Figure 2.15. 
Figure 2.15 shows a drop in the system frequency from 60 Hz to a minimum of 59.82 
Hz after the fault occurs at t = 5.50 seconds. The system frequency was restored to 60 Hz 
after the circuit breakers (CB3 and CB4) opened in response to a GOOSE trip message  
             
Figure 2.16: Performance of SMV messages. 
 
Figure 2.17: Performance of GOOSE messages. 
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Table 2.3. Recorded Time Delay 
MESSAGE TYPE Average Delay Time 
SMV 120 μs 
GOOSE 11.2 𝜇𝑠 
sent by the intelligent electronic device. As can be appreciated from the results, the 
microcontrollers were able to sense, locate, and send trip commands to isolate the fault in 
the simulated model in a timely manner based on feedback measurements sent to the 
controllers through the DDS Gateways. Similarly, the simulation model received the 
correct trip commands from the controllers through the DDS gateway and opened the 
appropriate circuit breakers to clear the fault. The cyber part of the system, which was 
exchanging SMV and GOOSE messages over a real Ethernet network, was successfully 
integrated with the simulation software, which was recording the dynamics of the power 
system in response to the control actions. Again, this verifies the ability of the proposed 
framework to accurately capture the relation between the cyber information flow and the 
physical information flow in power systems. 
 Additionally, the co-simulation framework was used to analyze the performance of the 
IEC 61850 process bus in terms of sampling rate and transmission delays. SMV and 
GOOSE messages were recorded using Wireshark network analyses tools. The 
transmission rate of SMV messages was recorded in Figure 2.16. The average transmission 
rate of SMV messages was found to be around 4.76 KHz, which is close to the 4.8 KHz set 
recommended by IEC 61850 [8][41][42]. On the other hand, Figure 2.17 shows the re-
transmission rate of GOOSE messages controlling the status of CB3. Figure 2.17 shows 
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that during steady state operation of the microgrid, the GOOSE messages were being 
retransmitted with a fixed rate of about 10 ms. Packet number 20 reflects the event of a 
fault. During such events, the IED sends GOOSE messages with an incrementing 
transmission rate until the system reaches steady state again. Table 2.3 shows that the 
average delays recorded for GOOSE and SMV messages fall within the 4 ms constraint. 
2.6.3 Online Lost Packet Forecasting for IEC 61850 Sampled Measured Values 
Today, MUs play a significant role in the IEC 61850 process bus. In modern 
substations, MUs are installed near primary equipment in switchyards and are meant to 
provide synchronized phase voltage and current measurements, digitize them into an SMV 
packet format, and publish them to the substation process bus [8][76][77]. The deployment 
of the Process Bus in SAS has introduced several advantages, including reduced copper 
wiring, modular substation architectures, easier commissioning and maintenance 
processes, and enhancing protection and control applications by leveraging data 
availability. 
From a network implementation perspective, several points need to be considered in 
the deployment of the IEC 61850 process bus. IEC 61850 recommends that for a power 
system operating at a 50-60 Hz frequency, SMV messages should have a transmission rate 
of 80 samples per AC cycle. Therefore, 4,800 samples are transmitted, for a given set of 
measurements, per second. Assuming an SMV frame size of 124 bytes, as more merging 
units are publishing packets, more network bandwidth is consumed, and thus, more 
sampled packet delays are incurred, leading to the loss of some samples [78]. Also given 
the fact that all MUs need to be synchronized [77], SMV traffic will be simultaneously 
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generated, increasing the latency of these messages. The work in [78] further emphasizes 
the consequences of lost SMV packets in SAS. 
Complex forecasting techniques, such as non-linear interpolating polynomials and time 
series, have been widely used in the literature in applications requiring sensor 
measurements [79][80][81]. Although very accurate, these highly nonlinear models require 
a lot of computational time, which is not feasible in the case of SMV. Therefore, the 
problem of compensating for lost sampled values within the limited time delays and limited 
computational power of field devices, is poorly addressed in the engineering literature. 
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Figure 2.18: Block Diagram of the Physical System. 
As such, in this case study, an online lost packet forecasting algorithm using time series 
Neural Networks (NNs) for IEC 61850 SMV messages is presented. The system takes 
advantage of the fast responses of the NN in order to meet the time requirements of SMV 
messages. IEC 61850-based MUs and IEDs were programmed and connected to the co-
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simulation platform’s network. This to assess the performance of the system in a real-time 
environment and over a real network. The results showed excellent performance in 
accurately forecasting lost samples. 
Figure 2.18 shows the system used to generate the proper training data for the lost 
sample forecasting NN. The power system, which was simulated on MATLAB Simulink, 
consists of 5 transmission lines, to which various types of linear and non-linear loads are 
connected. Non-linear loads were present to add harmonic contents to current and voltage 
measurements. Transmission line TL1 connects the system under study to the main utility 
grid. Transmission lines TL2 to TL5 transfer power from either the utility or the generators, 
G1 and G2, to the system busses and their corresponding loads. All transmission lines are 
modeled to be10 Km in length. 
In order to guarantee accurate responses of the neural network, care must be put in 
generating and selecting appropriate training data. Two major cases were studied: the first 
one is grid-connected mode of operation, whereas the second is islanded mode of operation. 
For each of the two mentioned cases, and on each transmission line, 5 types of faults were 
applied. These fault types are single-line-to-ground (A-G), line-to-line (B-C), double-line-
to-ground (B-C-G), three-phase (A-B-C), and 3-phase-to-ground (A-B-C-G) faults. 
Additionally, each type of fault was applied on the beginning (10%), middle (50%), and 
end (90%) of each transmission line. 
For all the cases mentioned above, current and voltage measurements from MUs on 
TL3 were recorded, since this is where the proposed algorithm was implemented. To make 
sure not to over train the network, only samples that represent the shift from normal 
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operation to the unstable fault operation were utilized for training. Also, one AC cycle after 
the fault clearance was used for training. 
As mentioned earlier, MUs digitize voltage and current measurements and send them 
over the processes bus as broadcast messages for various SAS applications to use. As 
shown in Figure 2.18, IED3 subscribes to SMV messages published by MU31 and MU32. 
In a simple differential protection scheme, IED3 calculates the difference between the 
received current values and compares the results to a predefined threshold. If the difference 
is greater than the threshold, then IED3 sends a trip signal in the form of a GOOSE message 
in order to isolate the fault. Therefore, the proposed lost samples forecasting system is 
implemented on IED3. Since the forecasting problem in this case depends only on a single 
variable, which is time, then a time series approach was used in training the developed 
neural network. In order to capture all the features in the measured signals and decrease 
the forecasting error, a window of 20 samples covering a quarter AC cycle for a 60 Hz 
system was used to train the NN. The developed NN has an input layer with twenty neurons 
to account for the 20 history samples, a hidden layer with 10 neurons, and an output layer 
with 1 neuron for the forecasted sample.  
As seen in the flowchart in Figure 2.19, after 20 samples are received, the system 
forecasts a new SMV only if the 4ms time constraint is exceeded. Next, if the new SMV is 
received before 4ms, therefore, it is not lost and it will be used. 
Figure 2.20 shows the results of forecasting lost SMV packets for various fault types 
and locations according to the proposed algorithm. Randomly selected packets were 
dropped (shown with zero values on the blue waveform), covering fault and normal 
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operating conditions of the studied microgrid. Here, it is noteworthy to emphasize that the 
developed forecasting system was able to forecast accurately lost samples during fault 
peaks. This is of particular importance, since the IED settings are commonly programmed 
at these higher current values. If a fault occurred and those samples were dropped, the IED 
will not sense the fault and thus renders the protection scheme failed. However, the 
proposed scheme ensures smooth operation of protection the application, even under 
congested or poor network conditions. 
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Figure 2.19: Online IDS and Forecasting Algorithm 
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Figure 2.20: Response of the Lost Sample Forecasting Algorithm 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a survey analyzing the recent co-simulation platforms for smart grid 
applications was developed and provided. We have shown that there is a need to provide a 
comprehensive co-simulation platform capable of modeling the relation and interaction 
between the cyber and physical parts of the smart grid. Accordingly, this chapter presented 
a network-in-the-loop co-simulation platform that formalizes the understanding of cyber 
information flow, physical power system dynamics, and the interrelation between them. A 
discussion about the importance of interoperability in large and highly complex systems is 
given. The data-centric DDS communication middleware was selected to orchestrate the 
components of the developed co-simulation platform together and to bridge the different 
communication protocols and software applications.  
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Three case studies were presented to verify the effectiveness of the developed network-
in-the-loop co-simulation platform in analyzing the interrelation between the cyber and 
physical information flow in smart grid applications. First, an electric vehicle charging 
algorithm was implemented. Second, an IEC 61850-based microgrid protection algorithm 
was developed, in which two protocols, GOOSE and SMV, and several applications 
implemented in C and MATLAB were interleaved together through the DDS common data 
bus. Finally, to satisfy the purpose of the co-simulation platform in testing new algorithms 
that enhance the resiliency of the power system to cyber vulnerabilities, a lost sample 
forecasting algorithm for SMV messages was implemented and tested on the developed 
framework. The results showed the plausibility of such an expandable hybrid framework 
and emphasized its importance in the analyses of physical and cyber information flow and 
testing of new control algorithms in a safe and credible environment. 
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Chapter 3 On the Implementation of the IEC 61850 Standard 
 
Standardization in smart grid communications is necessary to facilitate complex 
operations of modern power system functions. However, the strong coupling between the 
cyber and physical domains of the contemporary grid exposes the system to vulnerabilities 
and thus places more burden on standards’ developers. Therefore, standards need to be 
assessed continuously for reliability and are expected to be implemented properly on field 
devices. However, the actual implementation of common standards varies between 
vendors, which may lead to different behaviors of the devices even if present under similar 
conditions. The work in this chapter tested the implementation of the IEC 61850 GOOSE 
messaging protocol on commercial Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and the open 
source libiec61850 library - which is also used in commercial devices - which showed 
different behaviors in identical situations. Based on the test results and analysis of some 
features of the IEC 61850 GOOSE protocol itself, this chapter proposes guidelines and 
recommendations for proper implementation of the standard functionalities. 
3.1 Introduction 
Communication protocols are the basis for determining how a cyber-physical system 
gathers information and sends it as control signals. Therefore, an accurate definition of 
communication protocols is of paramount importance in defining the architecture of control 
systems [9]. However, intricate interdependencies between the cyber and physical 
components of a cyber-physical system increase the difficulty of devising communication 
protocols that ensure proper information flow in such systems, and thus complicates the 
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design process of control algorithms. The challenge lies in the fact that in a highly 
interconnected cyber-physical system, a slight exploit in the cyber domain can have a 
significant impact in the physical domain and vice-versa [2]. In current days, the operation 
of commercial, industrial, medical, military, and many critical infrastructures relies on the 
cyber-physical smart grid. The reliance of such critical infrastructure on the smart grid 
means reliance on the grid’s cyber domain, physical domain, and most importantly, the 
interactions between them [2]. Therefore, understanding and modelling data exchange in 
the smart grid is a noticeably challenging process with considerable effort placed on 
accurately capturing the interactions between both the cyber component and the physical 
component of the grid. 
In order to solve the information flow modelling problem and facilitate the design of 
cyber-physical smart grid applications, various data communication standards were 
developed for different parts of the smart grid. One of the vital standards in the electrical 
automation systems around which many automation projects have been built is IEC 61850 
[82][83][84]. Communication between substation devices, namely IEDs, is integral for 
substations to keep up with their real-time operations. IEDs are embedded microcontroller 
systems that support Ethernet-based communication and perform several protective and 
control functions in an SAS, such as data and file transfer [82][85]. In order to ensure 
interoperability between IEDs, the IEC 61850 standard was developed by the IEC 
Technical Committee Number 57 Working Group 10 (TC57 WG10) and IEEE for Ethernet 
(IEEE 802.3)-based communication in electrical substations [86]. The IEC 61850 provides 
a comprehensive data modelling and organization method that unifies data structure 
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definitions across all IED brands. The standard abstracts the definition of the service and 
data items to be independent from the underlying protocols. The abstracted data items and 
services can thus be mapped into any other communication protocol. IEC 61850 maps the 
data to three different protocols based on the application: the Manufacturing Message 
Specification (MMS) protocol is used for control and automation functions, whereas the 
GOOSE and SMV protocols are used for real-time operations [42]. Recently, the IEC 
61850 has been extended (IEC 61850-90-1) to cover applications that require inter-
substation communication, such as tele-protection, which requires the use of GOOSE 
messaging protocol over WAN for fast propagation of control signals [87][89]. A close 
look at the current engineering literature also shows a trend of utilizing IEC 61850 GOOSE 
messages in some microgrid control applications [90][91]. 
Standards are developed to be implemented. Nonetheless, due to different device 
topologies and hardware used, not all vendors follow the same implementation process. 
Here, concerns arise about the degree of compliance of devices from different vendors with 
the standard being implemented. Due to its criticality, failing to implement the IEC 61850 
standard properly on field devices may expose the overall system they operate in to 
unwanted vulnerabilities. In fact, the criticality of IEC 61850-based communications in 
terms of data transfer, reliability, availability and efficiency has been the concern of several 
research works [92][93]. In this work, a case study of the implementation of IEC 61850 
GOOSE messaging on commercial IEDs present at the Smart Grid test bed at Florida 
International University and the open source libiec61850 [75] library, which is also 
implemented on commercial devices, was performed. GOOSE messaging protocol in 
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particular is of paramount importance due to its application in transporting time-critical 
power system protection commands. Several experiments were conducted to test critical 
features of the standard, which are detailed later in this chapter. The results showed that 
different devices produce different responses under similar conditions. This paved the way 
to launch a successful data manipulation cyber-attack on the devices under study. 
3.2 IEC 61850 GOOSE Messaging Protocol 
GOOSE messaging is a fast, non-routable, and reliable data exchange protocol between 
IEDs defined in IEC 61850-8-1, which is the basis of critical power system functions, such 
as power line protection. GOOSE messages are Ethernet messages sent over layer 2 of the 
Open System Interconnect (OSI) model (IEEE 802.3) following a publish/subscribe model, 
unlike MMS messages, which are routable and sent over layer 3 of the OSI model. That is, 
the publishing IED creates a multicast message to which a number of destination IEDs 
subscribe concurrently. In order to ensure delivery of the message, at every substation 
event, the publishing IED repeatedly transmits the same GOOSE message with an 
increasing transmission period until a maximum predefined period is reached [8]. 
3.2.1 The Anatomy of a GOOSE Message 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the GOOSE datagram follows a modified Abstract Syntax 
Notation One (ASN.1) Basic Encoding Rules (BER) Tag/Length pair encoding scheme [8]. 
The Tag field represents the type of information, which is represented in the following 
GOOSE frame. Each of the fields has a unique tag value specified by the standard. As 
shown in Figure 3.2, the tag for the GOOSE Protocol Data Unit (goosePDU) field is 81, 
whereas the tags for the stNum and sqNum fields are 85 and 86, respectively. The Length 
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field represents the number of bytes in the following GOOSE frame. For example, the 
sqNum in Figure 3.3 has a Length field of 03, which means that the following three hex 
pairs (00-c9-06) are the sqNum itself. The sqNum here is in hexadecimal. 
Destination MAC Address Source MAC Address Priority Tagging/VLAN ID
Ethertype
(88B8)
APPID Length
Reserved 1
Tag Length gocbRef Tag Length timeAllowedtoLive
Tag Length datSet Tag Length goID
Tag Length t Tag Length stNum
Tag Length sqNum Tag Length test
Tag Length confRev Tag Length ndsCom
Tag Length numDatSetEntries Tag Length allData
Tag Length Data 1 (Boolean) Tag Length Data 2 (Float)
Tag Length Data N
Tag Length goosePDUReserved 2
 
Figure 3.1: Structure of a Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE) Datagram. 
goosePDU
Tag/Length Pair
Tag/Length Pair sqNum Tag/Length Pair
stNum
 
Figure 3.2: Hexadecimal Representation of a GOOSE Datagram. 
The GOOSE datagram starts with the Destination MAC Address, which is a multicast 
address reserved for IEC 61850 applications always starting with 01-0c-cd, and is followed 
by a six-octet source MAC address. This is the MAC address of the publishing IED. A 
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GOOSE message has an IEEE 802.1Q Virtual Local Area Network ID (VLAN ID) and a 
unique Ethernet type (88-b8). The Application ID (APPID) field is a four-octet field, which 
the subscribing IEDs use to identify messages to which they are subscribing. The Length 
field represents the length of the overall GOOSE datagram minus eight bytes, and is 
followed by two reserved fields left out by the standard for future use. The goosePDU field 
itself is composed of twelve subfields that follow the modified ASN.1 BER encoding 
scheme as well [8]. The goosePDU consists of the following: 
• gocbRef: GOOSE control block reference 
• timeAllowedtoLive: the time a receiver waits before receiving a re-transmitted 
message 
• datSet: name of the Data Set 
• goID: ID of publishing IED 
• t: time stamp indicating a new GOOSE event 
• stNum: counter that increment with every GOOSE event 
• sqNum: counter that increment with every repeated GOOSE message 
• test: specifies if a message is/is not intended for testing 
• confRev: number of times Data Set has changed 
• ndsCom: needs commissioning field 
• numDataEntries: number of data elements in allData 
• allData: actual data being sent (bool, integer, float, …) 
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3.2.2 IEC Standard Guidelines for Processing GOOSE Messages 
IEC 61850-8-1 defines the structure of a GOOSE message and the means by which it 
is communicated over a network. Despite its criticality, IEC 61850 advanced in an era 
where substations operated in isolated proprietary networks and thus did not include any 
cyber security measures for data communication. However, this will no longer be the case, 
as operators are moving towards open networks and remote access of substation control 
systems through the aid of contemporary communication technologies, such as cloud 
services. For instance, authors in [94] investigated the use of IEC 61850 for tele-protection 
outside the boundaries of a single substation over WAN. Also, in an effort called Cloud 
IEC 61850, authors in [95] investigated the idea of having virtualization and cloud 
technologies as the underlying infrastructure of electrical automation systems with a 
specific example of a substation automatic voltage control. Recent literature also shows the 
application of IEC 61850 in hierarchical microgrid control, where the authors in [96] 
propose a comprehensive hybrid agent framework combining the Foundation for 
Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA), IEC 61850, and DDS standards. With the realization 
of this modern communication infrastructure, IEC 62351 emerged in order to tackle the 
shortcomings of IEC 61850 in terms of communication security. IEC 62351 was developed 
by IEC TC57 WG15 and consists of eleven parts to cover end-to-end security issues in 
power system communications [9]. IEC 62351-6 covers communication security within the 
boundaries of a substation covering MMS, GOOSE and SMV protocols. 
IEC 62351-6 devises an algorithm for proper processing of GOOSE messages in order 
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Figure 3.3: GOOSE Messages Processing Algorithm. 
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to mitigate some cyber-attacks, such as replay and man-in-the-middle attacks. From the 
publishing IED side, each GOOSE message has a status and sequence number fields 
(stNum and sqNum, respectively). When a substation event occurs, for example, an 
overcurrent is sensed, the publishing IED instantly transmits a message with an 
incremented stNum field. The message is then repeated with variable increasing time delay 
until the maximum defined period is reached. The sqNum counter increments with every 
repeated message until the maximum number count (232−1) is reached, the point at which 
the sqNum counter rolls over. IEC 62351-6 states that a subscriber IED that detects a new 
message with a new stNum must discard any message having an stNum less than or equal 
to the previous message and which time allowed to live has not timed-out yet, unless a 
rollover of the stNum counter occurs. If none of the above conditions are true, the 
subscribing IEDs process the messages. A flowchart describing the algorithm for 
processing GOOSE messages set by IEC 62351-6 is presented in Figure 3.3. 
3.3 Testing of Commercial IEDs Communicating with IEC 61850 GOOSE 
Messaging Protocol 
A case study of the implementation of IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging on commercial 
IEDs present at the Smart Grid test bed at Florida International University and the open 
source libiec61850 [75] library, which is also implemented on commercial devices, was 
performed. 
Figure 3.4 shows the experimental setup with the commercial IEDs having the vendor’s 
proprietary implementation of IEC 61850. Manufacturer details of the commercial IEDs 
under test are intentionally oitted. Under normal conditions, the publishing IED is 
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programmed to broadcast a GOOSE message with two Boolean data fields set to False (00-
00). The subscribing IEDs read the Boolean data and control the status of the circuit breaker 
accordingly. In this case, the data read (False) maintains the relay’s un-tripped status and 
the circuit breaker’s closed status. 
Similarly, Figure 3.5 shows the experimental setup in which the libiec61850 GOOSE 
open source library has been implemented on two embedded boards. The publishing IED 
has the goose_publisher routine implemented on it, whereas the receiving IED has the 
goose_subscriber routine. More details about the implemented routines can be found on 
the open source library’s website [75]. It is worth mentioning that this library has also been 
implemented on other commercial devices. The device on the left is the publishing IED, 
whereas the device on the right is the subscribing IED. The publishing IED also transmits 
Boolean data (either True or False), which the subscribing IED reads and triggers a digital 
output accordingly, as marked in red in Figure 3.5. The subscribing boards were designed 
with connection capabilities to the solid-state circuit breakers shown in Figure 3.4. 
In order to perform the tests, a Python script was written in conjunction with network 
traffic capturing and packet crafting libraries from Scapy [97][98]. The developed script 
takes advantage of the simplicity of the unencrypted GOOSE message structure defined in 
Section II in order to monitor the Local Area Network (LAN) and capture Ethertype (88-
b8) GOOSE messages. Each field in the captured GOOSE messages was properly decoded 
based on the IEC 61850-8-1 modified ASN.1 BER mechanism. The script then modifies 
the content of the messages, encodes all the fields, crafts the new fake packet, and 
broadcasts it over the LAN. For each test, a certain field in the GOOSE message was modif-  
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-ied and the results of the various tests are discussed below. A general overview of  
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Figure 3.4: Experimental Setup with Commercial Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs). 
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Digital Outputs for Control of 
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Figure 3.5: Experimental Setup with libiec61850 Implemented on Embedded Boards. 
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the data manipulation procedure performed is shown in Figure 3.6. Figure 3.7 shows a 
screen shot of the captured messages by the developed script and the corresponding 
decoded fields. The script was run on a Virtual Machine operating on Ubuntu Version 
16.04. 
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Figure 3.6: GOOSE Messages Data Manipulation Overview. 
 
Figure 3.7: Captured Packet (manufacturer’s details are intentionally omitted). 
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In the experimental setup for both the commercial IEDs and the developed embedded 
devices running the open source libiec61850 library, the publishing IED transmits 
messages with a status number stNum = 1, False Boolean Data fields (00-00), and 
incrementing sequence numbers. 
3.3.1 Processing of Status Number 
As explained in the flowchart of Figure 3.3, any GOOSE message with a status number 
different than that of its predecessor shall be discarded if it has an stNum equals to or less 
than that of the previous message and is still within its valid time allowed to live. 
3.3.1.1 Commercial IEDs 
In this test, first a message with stNum = 2 (>1) and True (01-01) Boolean data fields 
was sent. As anticipated from the standard, this message was processed and the circuit 
breakers status changed from closed to open. Next, a message with stNum = 3 (>2) and 
False Boolean fields (00-00) was transmitted and was also processed. Finally, another fake 
message with stNum = 2 (<3) with True Boolean fields (01-01) was broadcasted. Although 
this final message had a lower stNum than its predecessor, it was processed and the status 
of the circuit breaker changed from closed to open. The GOOSE datagrams of the 
broadcasted messages are shown in Figure 3.8. It should be noted here that all messages 
had the same time stamp, which was three days old. When compared with the subscribing 
IED time stamp, it was noticed that the 2-min time skew mentioned in Figure 3.3 was 
exceeded; however, the messages were still processed. 
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Figure 3.8: Wireshark Capture of Transmitted Messages (manufacturer’s details are 
intentionally omitted), red: original message with low status number, green: fake message 
with high status number, blue: original message retransmission with low status number. 
3.3.1.2 Libiec61850 
The same test was repeated on the open source libiec61850 library implemented on the 
two developed embedded devices. Here, the final message with a low stNum (2 < 3) was 
not processed. This is because libiec61850 has an IsValid() function which checks if the 
TimeAllowedToLive timeout is not elapsed and if GOOSE messages were received with 
correct state and sequence IDs [75]. 
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3.3.2 Message Time Stamp 
Each GOOSE message has a time stamp field, which is updated with each increment 
of the status number (i.e. with each substation event). Therefore, subscribing IEDs 
receiving a new message with changed data fields and an incremented stNum field must 
expect to have a message with an updated time stamp. 
3.3.2.1 Commercial IEDs 
In this test, we sent a fake GOOSE message with an incremented status number (stNum 
= 2) and altered data True (01-01), but with an old time stamp (three days old). As shown 
in Figure 3.9, the device processed the message and the status of the circuit breaker changed 
from closed to open. 
 
Figure 3.9: Wireshark Capture of Transmitted Messages with Same Time Stamp (t) and 
Incremented status number (stNum). 
3.3.2.2 LibIEC61850 
The test was repeated on the open source libiec61850 library implemented on the two 
developed embedded devices. The subscribing IEDs processed the messages even though 
they have the same time stamps and incremented status numbers. The red LED in Figure 
3.10 indicates that the message was processed and a digital output (HIGH) was produced, 
signaling a circuit breaker trip. 
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It is noteworthy to point out that, according to the flowchart of Figure 3.3, IEC 61850 
recommends checking for a message’s time stamp only if it recognizes an stNum different 
than that of the previous message. The experiments revealed that when sending new 
messages with three-day-old time stamps exceeding the 2-min skew, they were processed 
as long as they had status numbers equal to or higher than the previous message. 
3.3.3 Processing of Source MAC Address 
All fake messages in the three tests performed above were sent from the virtual machine 
with a spoofed MAC address mimicking that of the publisher IED. That is, all IEDs 
subscribing to this message process the fake messages as if they were originating from the 
publisher IED. One common network defense procedure to counter MAC address spoofing 
incidents is to apply a MAC address filter to network switches. This will deny any machine 
connected to the network from sending a message with a source MAC address other than 
its own. After applying this filter, the messages with the fake MAC address were blocked 
from being sent over the network. However, in this test, we sent fake GOOSE messages 
with the MAC address of the virtual machine and altered data, and noticed that the 
subscriber IEDs processed these messages. The circuit breaker’s status changed from 
closed to open. 
This test actually exploits a vulnerability in the GOOSE messaging protocol itself 
rather than its implementation in commercial devices. In the GOOSE protocol, subscribing 
IEDs use the APPID field to subscribe to desired GOOSE messages. Since the subscribing 
IEDs in this case do not check for the source MAC address, they will process any message 
with their defined APPID, regardless of its origin.  
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Figure 3.10: Subscribing IED Processing Fake Message (output port triggered as indicated 
in the red box). 
3.4 Guidelines for Proper Implementation of IEC 61850 GOOSE Protocol 
Table 3.1 summarizes the results of the performed tests on both the commercial IEDs 
and libiec61850. 
It can be concluded from the results of the performed experiments that the actual 
implementation of IEC 61850 and its associated IEC 62351 cyber security standard on field 
devices depends on the vendors themselves. While vendors try to fully abide by the 
standard, differences in the implementation process might still be found as shown in this 
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paper. The presence of such differences in the implementation process might expose the 
system to unwanted vulnerabilities, which might be exploited by prying eyes to launch 
cyber-attacks on the power grid [10][86]. As GOOSE messaging is the base protocol for 
critical applications, such as power system protection, any vulnerability in the system 
might lead to devastating consequences, ranging from system disturbances to complete 
blackouts. 
Recent literature shows several security concerns about the IEC 61850 standard itself 
[42]. Therefore, in order to avoid additional exploits, extreme care must be placed on 
implementing IEC 61850 functionalities on commercial devices, as well as abiding by the 
Table 3.1. Compliance Test Results. 
Test 
Commercial 
IED’s 
Libiec61850 
Standard 
Practice 
Processing of messages with lower 
stNum 
Y N Discard message 
Processing of messages with 
outdated time stamp 
Y Y Discard message 
Processing of messages with 
unspoofed MAC address 
Y Y 
Not specified by 
standard 
Y: Message processed; N: Message not processed. 
 
cyber security requirements set by IEC 62351. The analysis of the outcome of this work 
distinguishes between two levels of vulnerabilities: one on the device level and the other 
on the network level. On the device level, when devices are configured to communicate 
via GOOSE messages, the firmware on the subscribing IEDs must be tested for proper 
processing of messages as stated by the IEC 61850-8-1 and IEC 62351-6 standards. Since 
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IEC 61850 does not provide any cyber security measure by itself, manufacturers should 
also make sure that their devices comply with IEC 62351 requirements. First, as stated by 
IEC 62351-6, messages with repeated or old status numbers must not be processed by 
subscribing devices. In fact, the open source libIEC61850 has an IsValid() function to 
ensure this, whereas the tested commercial IEDs lack this important check and thus 
processed fake messages. In addition, the association of a new time stamp with every 
increment of the status number must be checked for before publishing and/or processing 
messages. In the case of a new GOOSE event (i.e. an incremented stNum), it is important 
to compare a newly received message’s time stamp with the subscribing machines time to 
check whether or not the 2-min skew set by IEC 62351 was exceeded. Also, every change 
in the Data fields of a GOOSE message must be checked for association with an increment 
in the status number field. Finally, repeated messages with a change in their control signal 
(i.e. data fields) must be rejected. Message retransmissions should be identical, with no 
alterations in any field except for an incrementing sequence number. 
On the network level, in order to avoid compromised machines from publishing fake 
GOOSE messages using a spoofed MAC address, MAC filters must be applied to all 
switches in the substation’s local area network to prevent MAC address spoofing. As 
concluded from the presented case studies, MAC filtering did not prevent subscribing IEDs 
from processing fake messages with unspoofed MAC addresses. Therefore, the source 
MAC address field in GOOSE messages must be checked to be belonging to an 
authenticated machine authorized to communicate via the GOOSE protocol within a 
substation’s local area network. In fact, this vulnerability has not been accounted for, 
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neither in IEC 61850 nor in IEC 62351. Until the standards cover this issue, it is up to the 
substation’s network administrators to make sure that only authenticated devices can 
communicate via GOOSE messages. 
3.5 Conclusions 
Testing of two different available implementations of the IEC 61850 GOOSE 
messaging protocol was performed on commercial IEC 61850-based devices and on the 
open source libiec61850 library. The results demonstrated that different implementations 
of the same standard might lead to different behaviors even if the devices were present 
under similar conditions. Deviation from the actual procedures set forth by the IEC 61850 
standard and its complementary cyber security IEC 62351 standard were found in the 
responses of the devices. From the experiments in this chapter, it was found that the 
processing of the GOOSE messages status number was not properly implemented on the 
commercial devices as recommended by IEC 62351. This vulnerability provides a strong 
attack surface for prying eyes to inject malicious activities in power systems, such as the 
data manipulation attack demonstrated in this work. Additionally, all the tested devices 
were processing messages with old time stamps, which is another attack surface for 
launching replay attacks. This point is of importance since GOOSE messages are broadcast 
in nature and, therefore, sniffing and replaying them is possible when an attacker is in the 
same LAN. Moving to the network level, it was shown that as long as it has a valid APPID 
field, a GOOSE message is processed whether originating from an authentic device or a 
malicious one. Since both IEC 61850 and 62351 do not clearly outline how to present clear 
rules for authenticating source MAC addresses, it is up to the substation network designers 
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to take this issue into consideration and apply the appropriate defense mechanisms. Thus, 
this work raises a serious issue as such devices are out in the field and are controlling 
critical and potentially dangerous power system operations. The work in this chapter also 
proposes guidelines to better enhance utilization of IEC 61850. Proper processing of a 
message’s source MAC address, better utilization of the time stamp field to check for 
messages’ validity, and the association of new message content with a status number 
increment are advised. 
Finally, the vulnerabilities presented in this chapter present a strong attack surface for 
attackers to perform GOOSE poisoning that will be successful in controlling the switching 
activity of circuit breakers in power systems. Realizing the criticality of that, the next 
chapter will present a physical-model-checking security algorithm to detect such types of 
switching-related attacks on power systems.  
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Chapter 4 Physical-Model-Checking to Detect Switching Related Attacks on 
Power Systems 
 
Recent public disclosures on attacks targeting the power industry showed that savvy 
attackers are now capable of obfuscating themselves from conventional rule-based network 
IDS, bringing about serious threats. In order to leverage the work of rule-based IDS, this 
chapter presents an artificially intelligent physical-model-checking intrusion detection 
framework capable of detecting tampered-with control commands, from control centers of 
power grids. The work in this chapter utilizes AI to learn the load flow characteristics of 
the power system and benefits from the fast responses of the AI to decode and understand 
contents of network packets. The output of the AI is processed through an expert system 
to verify that incoming control commands do not violate the physical system operational 
constraints and do not put the power system in an insecure state. We tested proposed 
content-aware IDS in simulation on a 14-bus IEEE benchmark system. Also, we carried 
out experimental verification on a small power system, with an IEC 61850 network 
architecture. The results showed the accuracy of the proposed framework in successfully 
detecting malicious and/or erroneous control commands. 
4.1 Introduction 
Resilient and secure operation of the power grid relies on judicious cooperation 
between several cyber and physical entities. Cyber processes, for instance, read the 
physical states of the grid and interact with it by actuating physical devices. Therefore, 
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communication signals could be feedback from sensory devices or control commands to 
actuating devices. 
On several occasions, the literature showed the ability of attackers to exploit 
vulnerabilities in the communication networks of electricity grids and tamper with control 
fields in network packets. For instance, [30] presented how a switching control command 
could be manipulated by an attacker to maliciously open circuit breakers causing blackouts. 
The work in [99] showed how the power could be interrupted by tampering with sensor 
measurements. Reference [100] showed that blackouts could be caused due to the 
sequential removal of substations or transmission lines by malicious acts. Similarly, [101] 
discussed attack scenarios capable of causing cascaded failures in power systems. 
Furthermore, recent public disclosures emphasized the brutality of control-related 
attacks on critical processes, such as the Stuxnet and the Crash Override malwares targeting 
industrial control systems and power plants [102][103]. In the Stuxnet malware, attackers 
targeted PLCs by changing the control signals going to Variable Frequency Drives (VFDs) 
of motors. In a similar approach, the Crash Override malware targeted intelligent electronic 
devices by altering the switching commands sent to open and close circuit breakers. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the aforementioned attacks targeted critical infrastructure, 
the gravity of these attacks is also accentuated by their ability to obscure themselves from 
conventional rule-based IDSs. In such attacks, the modified control fields are re-encoded 
in the proper packet format before being transmitted on the network [30][41]. Rule based 
IDS rely on information in the header of network packets and compare them against 
standard stipulations or perform statistical analysis on network traffic to identify 
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anomalous ones based on cyber rules. By that, conventional IDS disregard the actual data 
fields. Accordingly, there is a need for new innovative solutions that detect attacks that 
might disrupt of the operation of the power grid. 
Attacks on power control loops can be categorized as: 
1. False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) that target sensor or meter measurements. 
In these types of attacks, attackers attempt to feed back to the controller fake 
sensor measurements to alter its operation. For instance, a malware in [104] 
showed that injecting high current values into a substation’s network could 
cause controllers to issue unwanted trip signals, jeopardizing the reliability of 
the power system. There are extensive efforts on detecting and mitigating 
FDIAs. For instance, the authors in [105] presented an algorithm based on the 
linear Weighted Least Square Error (WLS) to detect bad or corrupted sensor 
measurements in digital substations. However, there are practical limitations on 
the WLS method, such as the latency. In [28], a false data injection attack 
detection mechanism, which is based on identifying a set of candidate invariant 
microgrid parameters, was introduced. This method was designed specifically 
for DC microgrids. In [99], the authors focused on detecting fake sensor 
measurements in power systems and enhancing the reliability of power grid by 
forecasting the values of lost measurements, due to network congestion, based 
on historical trends. Similarly, there are plenty of other works that are focused 
on FDIAs, such as [106][107][108]. 
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2. Control-related attacks that target control commands going to actuators and 
field devices. Several recent works that have been placed to detect control-
related attacks in the energy sector that incorporates physical rules along with 
cyber rules. In [30], a semantic analysis framework, which integrates network 
IDS with power flow analysis was proposed to detect malicious control 
commands. To achieve acceptable detection latency, this technique requires 
adapting the power flow analysis algorithm, leading to a tradeoff between 
accuracy and latency, as the system expands. In [31], an anomaly detection 
algorithm, which is specific for detecting attacks on automatic generation 
control, is proposed. In the former, the control signal is executed on the physical 
system only if it is regarded as legitimate by the anomaly detection engine, 
otherwise, a signal from a model-based automatic generation control is utilized. 
This work relies on the assumption that the feed-back frequency and tie-line 
measurements are trusted and do not discuss their security requirements. In 
[24], faults are distinguished from cyber-attacks by following a mathematical 
formulation that incorporates PMU data, event status, and monitoring logs. 
Similarly, the work in [109] utilizes lookup tables for current measurements 
and circuit breakers statuses to compare current and previous states for attack 
detection. Both [24][109] require that data collection for the detection 
algorithms to be performed by a trusted entity, which is not always the case 
[110]. 
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Therefore, there is a need for security systems that not only are capable of detecting 
anomalous network activity based on cyber rules, but also are aware of the content of 
network packets to be able to understand and assess their consequences on the physical 
grid. Since the goal of most attackers is to disrupt the operation of the power system, 
attackers have more incentive to directly alter control commands, rather than tamper with 
sensor measurements to affect the controllers’ actions. Accordingly, the focus of this 
chapter will be on the detection of switching attacks on circuit breakers, which falls under 
the category of control related attacks. 
This chapter proposes a multi-agent security framework to detect and prevent cyber-
attacks targeting circuit breakers in a power system. Unlike the work presented in the 
literature, the work in this paper utilizes AI to learn the load flow characteristics of the 
power system and benefits from the fast responses of the AI to decode and understand the 
contents of network packets. The output of the AI is processed through an expert system 
to decide on whether an incoming control command contains malicious content or not. 
The contributions of the chapter are as follows: 
While the work in the literature assesses network packets against mathematical models 
of the power system, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first effort to discuss 
the use of machine intelligence to develop a content-aware intrusion detection and 
prevention system that decodes and understands the physical meaning of the content of 
network packets. 
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The use of AI reduces the online computational burden as compared to complex 
mathematical models and therefore, accelerates the attack detection and decision-making 
processes (in the range of microseconds). 
Taking appropriate preventive action upon detecting malicious control commands and 
not only detecting intrusions. 
Finally, implementing the developed security multi-agent system on a hardware 
laboratory scale power system with an IEC 61850 communication architecture, taking into 
consideration the practical aspects that arise from the hardware implementation of the 
power system, agents as embedded microcontrollers, and communication network. The 
obtained results from the experimental setup proved the feasibility of the proposed security 
algorithm in real-time physical power systems. 
The performance of the proposed framework was tested in simulation on a 14-bus IEEE 
benchmark system for 36 test cases covering all N-1 contingency scenarios. The results 
showed that all the malicious commands that will place the system in an insecure state, 
have been prevented from actuating the circuit breakers. The framework was also verified 
experimentally, where the security algorithm was compiled on embedded microntrollers 
that are interfaced with a 5-bus hardware power system testbed setup having an IEC 61850 
communication infrastructure. 
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4.2 The Artificially Intelligent Physical-Model Checking Approach 
The proposed multi-agent security framework is shown in Figure 4.1. In this work, the 
power system is sectionalized into several zones. In each zone, an agent is responsible for: 
(1) local control and (2) security actions. 
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Figure 4.1: 14-Bus IEEE benchmark system with decentralized and hierarchical control. 
In terms of local control, each agent is interfaced with sensors, actuators, and field 
devices within its zone. Based on the feedback that it gets from the sensors, agents control 
the actuators and the field devices. The agents communicate among each other to achieve 
the global objective of stable and reliable operation of the power system. The agents also 
act as mediators between control centers and field devices/processes. This will allow 
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control centers to poll information/data from sensors to monitor the entire system and to 
send control actions to actuators and field devices. Such a control architecture is referred 
to as decentralized control. The standard industrial communication protocols that allow the 
adoption of the decentralized control are discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
Unlike centralized control, the decentralized multi-agent framework in this chapter 
contributes to the security of the power system by avoiding single points of failure. In 
centralized control, all the sensors and field devices communicate with a single server, 
which from a security view-point is a bottle-neck and single point of failure. However, in 
decentralized control, even if one of the agents failed, the system will not entirely collapse. 
In addition to that, by processing data locally and performing local control actions, the 
amount of data to be transferred to the control center and the communication bandwidth 
will be reduced. The required processing power on control centers will be less and the 
system reliability will be improved. 
In terms of the security actions, the goal of the proposed algorithm is to add an 
additional security layer to the operation of the power system by detecting malicious 
actions, which might occur on switching commands traveling the communication network. 
Switching commands that come from the system operator can be tampered with. The agents 
in this work are capable of assessing the physical consequences of these switching 
commands before they are executed, to ensure reliable operation of the power system and 
that the voltage levels and line loadings do not violate the safe operational limits set by 
standards [74][111]. The agents’ ability to assess the physical consequences is coming from 
intensive training of its neural network, by performing all the possible N-1 contingency 
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analysis and all possible switching attack combinations on the loads and generators, and 
feeding all this data to the neural network. The proposed security algorithm is discussed in 
detail in Section 5.2.2. 
4.2.1 Current Standards and Associated Threats 
The two most used protocols for microgrid operation and control in the power industry 
are the DNP3.0 for SCADA systems and IEC 61850 MMS, GOOSE, and SMV messages 
in more recent systems [30][109]. Although these protocols enabled decentralized, robust, 
and more accurate microgrid control, they also introduced some vulnerabilities in terms of 
cyber security. Each of the aforementioned protocol suites has its own vulnerabilities that 
were previously exploited to launch successful attacks on power grids. For instance, [30] 
presented a successful data manipulation attack on a DNP3 packet, which has 4 control 
relay objects to operate 4 circuit breakers in a substation. A man-in-the-middle attack was 
also presented in [41] to generate malicious circuit breaker control commands as GOOSE 
messages. As mentioned previously, these attacks remained obscure form the network IDS, 
since the attackers established fake data, as legitimate network packets, but with malicious 
content.  
A major facilitator of such attacks is that power system communication networks need 
to accommodate the real-time operation of the grid. Therefore, strict time-delay 
requirements are imposed on the exchange of communication signals. Since current 
microcontrollers and Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) have low processing power, 
such industrial control networks are left unencrypted, and sometimes, without 
authentication. In fact, a study conducted in [9] shows that even the latest processor 
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technologies cannot meet the 4 ms end-to-end time delay requirement set forth by the IEC 
61850 standard stipulations on GOOSE messages. 
Since this work targets the detection of control-related attacks, the publisher/subscriber 
GOOSE messaging protocol is selected for controlling the statuses of circuit breakers in 
the studied system. As will be shown later in the chapter, the latency of the proposed 
detection algorithm falls within the 4 ms time delay set for GOOSE messaging. 
Attack Model: 
In order to understand the threat models assumed in this chapter for DNP3.0 and 
GOOSE switching commands, we differentiate between two types of switching commands, 
as in [30]: 
1. Automatic Switching Commands: These are commands exchanged between 
IEDs/Agents to clear short-circuit faults, and they are usually exchanged over a LAN. 
Typically, these messages are either DNP3.0 switching commands or GOOSE commands. 
2. Manual Switching Commands: These are commands sent by the system operator in 
the control center over a WAN. These messages could be either DNP3.0 or R-GOOSE 
messages, as defined in IEC Technical Report TR 61850-90-5 for Routable GOOSE over 
WAN. 
As reported in Table 4.1, GOOSE messages are Layer 2 messages of the OSI, which 
are exchanged over a LAN. The OSI model divides a network into seven abstraction layers 
with the goal of providing interoperability to communication systems. In this work, we 
assume that an attacker is able to perform a GOOSE Spoofing and Poisoning attack. First, 
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the attacker sniffs the network for GOOSE messages. Since these messages are 
unencrypted, the attacker could decode the content of the GOOSE message and modify the 
data fields (i.e., change the OPEN command to CLOSE, or vice-versa). Here, it is important 
to understand that GOOSE messages are event-driven, and each message is associated with 
an incremental counter, called stNum. For example, the IED starts by sending a GOOSE 
message with stNum = 1. If a fault happens, the IED senses this fault and issues a new 
GOOSE commands with stNum = 2, to open the circuit breaker and clear the fault. 
Knowing that, the attacker then publishes the poisoned GOOSE message with a new 
incremented stNum and a spoofed MAC address. That is, the attacker uses the MAC 
address of the original sender. This process is depicted in Figure 4.2. 
Table 4.1. Classification of Switching Commands and the Assumed Attacks. 
Message 
Type 
Open System Interconnect 
Layer 
Network Assumed Attacks 
GOOSE Layer 2 Data Link (MAC) LAN 
GOOSE Poisoning and 
Spoofing 
R-GOOSE Layer 3 Network (IP) LAN/WAN 
ARP Poisoning 
Man-in-the-Middle 
DNP3.0 Layer 4 Transport (TCP/IP) LAN/WAN 
ARP Poisoning 
Man-in-the-Middle 
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Subscribing IED Control Center
MAC  00:00:00:00:00:00
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Figure 4.2. (a) Goose Poisoning and Spoofing Procedure; (b) ARP Poisoning and R-
GOOSE and DNP3.0 Man-in-the-Middle Attack. 
 
Table 4.1 also shows that R-GOOSE and DNP3.0 are Layer 3 and Layer 4 messages, 
respectively. This means that they are exchanged over an IP network. Accordingly, they 
are susceptible to Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) Poisoning and Man-in-the-Middle 
(MITM) attacks. ARP is a communication protocol used to convert IP addresses into MAC 
addresses [42]. As shown in Figure 4.2b, the attacker sends an ARP Reply to install a fake 
IP address and MAC address mapping to other hosts on the network. Therefore, the IP 
address of the attacker is, now, associated with an incorrect MAC address. This allows the 
attacker to intercept the messages exchanged between the control center and the subscriber 
IED. The attacker can, then, perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack and manipulate the data 
fields in the R-GOOSE or DNP3.0 packets. 
Finally, although most industrial communication networks are not open to the public 
internet, we assume that they can still be penetrated through corporate networks or personal 
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devices of the employees with techniques such as password cracking, backdoors, and 
malwares among others [30]. 
4.2.2 The Proposed Security Algorithm 
As seen in Figure 4.1, the proposed multi-agent framework requires sectionalizing of 
the microgrid into several zones and assigning an agent to each zone, which will be 
responsible for local control and security actions. A block diagram of the security module 
of each agent and its network interfaces is shown in Figure 4.3. As can be seen in Figure 
4.3, the security functionality in each agent is divided into two layers: an AI module and 
an Expert System module. 
4.2.2.1 The AI Module 
In the first layer, the agent is continuously listening to incoming control commands from 
the control center through its Ethernet network interface. Once a command is received, the 
agent decodes the content of the network packets and checks if the requested change is 
within its area or not. The agent gets activated only if the change is within its area. Once 
the agent is activated, the AI module will check if the command is to disconnect a 
generation unit or a critical load. This command will be processed only if the agent sees an 
override signal from the system operator over its isolated network interface. For all other 
commands, the AI module will pass the commands through a trained neural network that 
will solve the power flow problem for the system. The AI module will output the minimum 
voltage in per unit, the bus number on which this minimum voltage is anticipated, and the 
maximum transmission line overloading.  The NN in this work is a feed forward NN trained 
using the back-propagation algorithm.  
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The mathematical processes guarding the operation of the AI module are explained 
below. 
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Figure 4.3: Agent operation and the physical-model-checking approach. 
The NN utilized in this model is a three layer one composed of an input layer, a hidden 
layer, and an output layer. Let }1,1,...,1,1{]1[1 21 ixxxIX  X1[I + 1] =
{x11, x12, … , x1i, 1}be the input coming to the NN, where IIi },,1{ Iis the dimension of 
the input, and 11 1 Ix x1I+1 = 1 is the bias for the input layer. In the input layer, the inputs 
are multiplied by the weights (
ihw ,1 w1h,i) to get the vector }1,...,1,1{][1 21 hxnnHN 
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N1[H] = {n11, n12, … , n1h}. H H is the dimension of the hidden layer and },1{ Hh  h ∈
{1, H}. The elements of 1N N1are calculated in accordance to (1). 



1+I
1  i
,111 ihih wxn  (4.1) 
Next, each element in 1N N1 will be processed through a neuron in the hidden layer, 
which will result in }1,1,...,2,2{]1[2 21 hxxxHX  X2[H + 1] = {x21, x22, … , x2h, 1}. The 
elements in 2X X2are calculated according to (2) and (3).  
1
1
2
2
2



 hnh e
x  (4.2) 
12 1 Hx  (4.3) 
12 Hx x2H+1is the bias of the hidden layer. The equation in (4.2) is considered as the 
activation function for the hidden layer neurons, which represents a sigmoid function. 
Finally, 2X X2will be processed by the output layer to get the output vector
},...,,{][ 21 koooKO  O[K] = {o1, o2, … ok}, where K Kis the dimension of the output and
},1{ Kk  k ∈ {1, K}. The elements in O Oare calculated according to equation (4.4). 
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o  
(4.4) 
w2h,k khw ,2 are weights between the hidden and output layers. The sigmoid function 
is also used as the activation function for the neurons in the output layer, as in (4.4). 
The output vector is then interpreted to get the minimum voltage, the bus number at 
which this voltage occurred, and the maximum transmission line loading. 
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4.2.2.2 The Expert System Module 
This module consists of a fuzzy inference system. The outputs of the AI module, are 
passed to the fuzzy inference system for further processing. These are the minimum bus 
voltage recorded in the power system, the number of the bus at which that minimum voltage 
occurred, and the value of the maximum transmission line overloading. It is to be noted 
here that the expert system module does not account for over-voltage cases. This is due to 
the fact that such cases will be the result of disconnecting multiple loads from the power 
system; however, the proposed security algorithm will automatically counteract such 
incidents. 
The value of the bus voltage, which is passed to the expert system module, is fuzzified 
using four membership functions. These membership functions are designed to reflect the 
behavior of the power system according to the recommendations of the ANSI C84.1-2006 
standard, from the voltage point of view [74]. The membership functions that correspond 
to the voltage are: 
• Very Low (VL), repressing severe under voltage and Very High (VH), 
representing severe over voltage. 
• High (H), representing normal condition and Low (L), representing mild 
undervoltage. For the latter case, a corrective action is necessary, such as reactive 
voltage support. 
In this work, it is assumed that different priorities are assigned to the power system 
buses by the system operator. That is, high priorities will be assigned to the buses where 
main generator units or critical loads are connected, whereas low priorities will be assigned 
to busses with normal loads that can be shed. Due to the limited capacity in the generators 
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adopted in this model, all the buses with generators were considered as critical buses (buses 
1, 2, 3, 6, and 8), because the disconnection of any of the generators can result in cascaded 
failures in the whole system, which will result in a partial or full blackout. Also, generators 
are expensive equipment and are hard to replace within a reasonable time during 
emergencies. The study by Assante, which was conducted in 2007, showed how a massive 
diesel generator could be physically and permanently broken with only digital commands 
[101]. In fact, manipulating digital commands actually occurred in real life in the Crash 
Override malware. The behavior of the power system in response to the Crash Override 
malware that targeted the Ukrainian power grid was considered as an example in assigning 
the critical busses in the test bench system presented in this paper [105]. In the 
aforementioned malware, the attackers targeted switching commands from the SCADA 
system, which controlled the status of circuit breakers. They were able to de-energize some 
of the substations resulting in blacking out a portion of the Ukrainian capital equivalent to 
a fifth of its total power capacity. As reported in [103]: “The command sequence polls the 
target device for the appropriate addresses. Once it is at the subset of known addresses, it 
can then toggle the value. The command then begins an infinite loop and continues to set 
addresses to this value effectively opening closed breakers. If a system operator tries to 
issue a close command on their Human Machine Interface (HMI) the sequence loop will 
continue to re-open the breaker. This loop maintaining open breakers will effectively de-
energize the substation line(s) preventing system operators from managing the breakers 
and re-energize the line(s).” 
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We assigned the loads at buses 2, 3, 4, and 9 to be critical loads. The bus number is 
therefore considered as another second input to the fuzzy system. Finally, the fuzzy system 
takes the maximum transmission loading (TLLmax) as its third input. The membership 
functions for this input are divided according to the rating procedures, that can be found in 
[111], to normal loading (represented by N), allowable overloading (represented by LTE), 
and unallowable overloading (represented by STE). The acronyms are in accordance with 
those is [111].In this work, the trapezoidal membership functions, shown in relation (4.5), 
were considered. 



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The boundaries },,,{ dcba {a, b, c, d} for each input level are defined in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2. Ranges of Membership Functions. 
  a b c d 
Voltage 
(V p.u.) 
VL 0 0 0.872 0.92 
L 0.9 0.924 0.924 0.95 
H 0.94 1 1 1.05 
VH 1.03 1.04 2.082 2.36 
TLL (%) 
N 0 0 73 105 
LTE 100 115 115 130 
STE 128 148 200 200 
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 As for the busses’ number input, impulse membership function are defined, as in 
equation (4.6). 


 

otherwise
Nx
xf
,0
},1{,1
)(  (4.6) 
Where N Nis the number of busses in the system and * Zx x ∈ Z*+. 
The output of the expert system is defuzzified based on the weighted sum for the 
Sugeno technique following equation (4.7): 



i
ii
w
xw
output  (4.7) 
Since this is a Sugeno-like fuzzy system, the output is a number, which value is 
interpreted to be one of the following three cases: normal, alert, or malicious. In the normal 
case, the control commands are executed as they come, whereas in the malicious case, the 
commands are blocked, since they are suspected to put the power system in an insecure 
state. Finally, in the alert case, the control commands are executed, but an alert is passed 
to the system operator over the out-of-band channel to take corrective actions, if necessary. 
The controller makes its decision according to the following four fuzzy rules: 
1. For the cases in which the control commands will lead the power system to have 
extreme over-voltage (represented by VH) or extreme under-voltage (represented 
by VL) on any of its busses, or extreme overloading of any of its transmission lines 
(represented by STE), the control command will be considered malicious by the 
fuzzy inference system. This is because, under no reasonable circumstance, will 
the system operator perform circuit breakers switching actions that will put the 
power system in an insecure state, which might be the cause of cascaded blackouts. 
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2. For the cases in which the control commands will lead the power system to have 
low voltages (represented by L) on one of the busses that has a main generator 
and/or a critical load connected to it, the fuzzy inference system will consider 
command will also consider the command as malicious. This is because such 
critical buses must maintain good voltage conditions at all times. 
3. For the cases in which the voltage ends up to be low (represented by L) on the 
buses, which are not accounted for in the second rule (Rule 2), or when the 
transmission line loading condition is expected to be LTE, the control commands 
will be passed. However, the system operator will receive an alert signal over the 
out-of-band channel, in order to see if further actions are necessary. 
4. For the remaining cases, in which the incoming control commands do not place 
the power system in an insecure state, the fuzzy inference system will pass the 
control commands without any issue. 
Based on the previous rules, and following the standards for voltage rating and line 
loading [74][111], respectively, the voltage at the different busses should be maintained 
within acceptable limits and the line loading should be maintained within certain values to 
avoid overheating. Accordingly, the expert system was designed to ensure that any 
malicious action, which is anticipated to put any part of the system outside the acceptable 
standard limits, whether it is voltage or line loading or loss of generation or critical loads, 
will not be processed. 
It is important to note here that the system operator will need to perform some tasks, 
such as maintenance tasks, which require the temporary disconnection of transmission lines 
or shutdown of generators. For that purpose, the system operator has the ability to 
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communicate with all the agents over an encrypted and out-of-band communication 
channel and send a signal to override the decision of the agents. 
4.3 Simulation Results 
First, the proposed algorithm was verified in simulation on the 14-bus IEEE benchmark 
system, which is shown in Figure 4.1. The system was divided into three zones, in such a 
way that each zone has at least one generation unit and one load. Specifications of the 
system are found in detail in [112] and in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.3. Ratings of the Simulated System 
Generator Number 
Real Power (MW) Reactive Power (MVAR) 
Min Max Min Max 
1 10 160 0 10 
2 20 80 −42 50 
3 20 50 23.4 40 
4 -- -- -6 24 
5 -- -- -6 24 
 
Bus Number Load Real Power (MW) Load Reactive Power (MVAR) 
1 0 0 
2 21.7 12.7 
3 94.2 19.1 
4 47.8 -3.9 
5 7.6 1.6 
6 11.2 7.5 
7 0 0 
8 0 0 
9 29.5 16.6 
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10 9.0 5.8 
11 3.5 1.8 
12 6.1 1.6 
13 13.8 5.8 
14 14.9 5.0 
 
Line Number From Bus To Bus MVA Rating 
1 1 2 120 
2 1 5 65 
3 2 3 36 
4 2 4 65 
5 2 5 50 
6 3 4 65 
7 4 5 45 
8 4 7 55 
9 4 9 32 
10 5 6 45 
11 6 11 15 
12 6 12 32 
13 6 13 32 
14 7 8 32 
15 7 9 32 
16 9 10 32 
17 9 14 32 
18 10 11 12 
19 12 13 12 
20 13 14 12 
 
As mentioned earlier, the AI module of the first layer of the agent is trained to learn the 
characteristic of the system. This is done according to the following procedure: 
 101 
 
• Generating the Training and Test Target Data Sets: First, in this work, we assume N-
1 contingency cases (i.e., disconnecting the transmission lines, one at a time) and the 
disconnection of the generators and the loads. For the simulated 14-bus system, this 
gives us 36 cases plus the normal case, where all the circuit breakers are closed. For 
each case, the power flow problem was solved and the real power (P), reactive power 
(Q), and bus voltage (V) at the different busses, and transmission line loading (TLL) 
results were recorded as follows: 




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

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where, [PiBus1 … PiBusN], [QiBus1 … QiBusN], and [ViBus1 … ViBusN] are the real 
power, reactive power, and voltage of the system busses, respectively, and 
14};37,1{  Ni . [TLLi1 … TLLiK] are the transmission lines loading, and 20K . 
• Generating the Training and Test Input Data Sets: Second, in this case study, the 
switching commands corresponding to each contingency were mapped to a 6-bit 
binary code, as shown in the matrix below. For instance, the code 000010 will be 
utilized to represent a control signal to actuate circuit breakers connecting bus 1 to bus 
2. 
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• Training the Neural Network: The neural network of the agent was trained according 
to the Back Propagation algorithm to accurately predict the system response in terms 
of the real power, reactive power, and voltage of the buses and the transmission line 
loading. 
The accuracy of the neural network is shown in Figure 4.4. The maximum errors 
recorded were 2.6% for the active and reactive power, 10−4 for bus voltages, and 0.614% 
for transmission line loading. 
 
Figure 4.4: Goodness of Fit of AI Module in Terms of Mean Squared Error: (a) Generators 
Active and Reactive Power; (b) Bus Voltages; (c) Transmission Line Loading. 
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Table 4.4: Simulation Results 
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Simulation of the proposed framework were carried out in two different scenarios and 
the results are tabulated in Table 4.4. In the first scenario, the response of the agents is 
assessed for each contingency case separately. That is, after each command, the system is 
reverted to normal case before executing the next command. The results for the first 
scenario are as follows: 
• Cases 21-25 and 29-31 correspond to the disconnection of either a generation unit 
or a critical load from the system. Since the override signal was set to zero 
throughout the experiment, these commands were regarded as malicious and, 
therefore, were not passed to the circuit breakers. 
• Cases 9, 11, 12, 15, 18-20, 27, 28, and 33-36 resulted in alert situation, where the 
commands were passed but an alert was issued to the system operator. It was 
noticed that there was no severe bus voltage deviations in these cases from the 
allowable limits. In fact, in all the cases, the minimum bus voltage was 1.02 p.u.. 
Also, the maximum recorded transmission line loading was 129%, which falls into 
the LTE state of Table 4.2. 
• Cases 1-4, 7, 8 10, and 14 violated the physical operation constraints of the 
microgrid, and thus, were regarded as malicious by the agents. 
• The rest of the cases were regarded as normal. It is worth noting that in these cases, 
commands to disconnect non-critical loads, such as cases 27 and 28, were passed. 
Although these commands might be malicious or erroneous, they were passed by 
the multi-agent system since they did not put the microgrid in a contingency state 
and the microgrid maintained its stability. Therefore, the multi-agent system was 
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successful in satisfying its purpose by ensuring that only signals that do not violate 
the stable operational limits of the microgrids will be passed. 
Therefore, out of all the simulated cases, the multi-agent security framework allowed 
the passage of a command that led to the disconnection of a non-critical load 2 times. This 
is equivalent to 5.56% of the simulated cases. To address this issue, each agent generates 
periodic log reports and sends them to the system operator over its isolated and encrypted 
network interface. This allows the system operator to get feedback about the statuses of the 
circuit breakers and utilize this feedback to take corrective actions, when deemed 
necessary. Also, it can be seen form Table 4.4 that the proper agent was activated for each 
case. That is, in case 1, the control command is intended to actuate the circuit breakers on 
the transmission line connecting bus 1 to bus 2. In this case, the change is in Area 1 only. 
Thus, only Agent 1 was activated. On the other hand, in case 7, the control command is 
intended to actuate the circuit breakers on the transmission line connecting bus 4 to bus 5. 
This line connects Areas 1 and 3. Therefore, Agent 1 and Agent 3 were activated.  In the 
second scenario, the control commands were sent in a sequential manner, one after the 
other, without getting back to the normal case. The results in this scenario produced similar 
outputs to the previous one, with the major difference being the number of activated agents 
in each case. For instance, after executing case 4 in Table 4.4, returning to the normal case, 
then executing case 5, only Agent 1 was activated and gave normal condition. However, 
when executing case 4 then directly executing case 5, Agent 1 and Agent 3 were activated 
and gave normal condition. This is because Agent 1 sensed a change in the status of the 
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CB connecting bus 2 to bus 4 (from 0 back 1) and Agent 2 sensed a status change in the 
CB connecting bus 2 to bus 5 (from 1 to 0). 
 
Figure 4.5: (Left Column) Comparison of Real and Reactive Power, V, and TLL of 
Malicious Case to Base Case; (Right Column) Comparison of Real and Reactive Power, 
V, and TLL of Alert Case to Base Case. 
A sample report of the post processing done by the system operator based on the log 
reported by the agents is shown in Figure 4.5. A comparison between the real and reactive 
power of generation units, bus voltages, and transmission line loading of the normal case 
and case 3, which is a malicious situation, is shown in Figure 4.5 (Left Column). Figure 
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4.5 (Right Column) shows the same for an alert situation, which corresponds to case 9. The 
reported data for case 3 shows that if the agent were to process that control command, the 
system would significantly deviate from its normal case. On the other hand, the graphs 
corresponding to the alert state show that the processing of the control command would 
not result in a significant deviation from the normal case in terms of generators’ power and 
bus voltage. However, the transmission line loading would change but will not exceed the 
allowable limits. These graphs are useful visualization tools for system operators and 
designers that will assist them in future plans and lessons learned. 
4.4 Hardware Setup and Experimental Results 
4.4.1 Description of the Hardware Setup 
The performance of the proposed security framework was tested on the 5-bus microgrid 
shown in  
Figure 4.6 (a). The microgrid has the following components: 
• Two generation units, Generator 1 and Generator 2, with 13.8 KVA 230 V and 5 
KW and 10.3 KVA 230 V and 3 KW, respectively.  
• Seven distribution lines with a typical π-model. 
Three loads, each having 10 levels of parallel resistive loads, ranging from 300-W 
to 3-kW. In this experiment, L1, L2, and L3 are set at 600 W each. L3 is considered 
to be a critical load, and therefore, has a redundant path to the generation units. 
 
• Each of the five buses has three sets of three-phase inputs and outputs with 
530V/25A solid-state relays, whose switching can be controlled by digital inputs. 
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Each phase has its own potential and current transformer for measurement data 
collection. 
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Figure 4.6: (a) One-line diagram of the 5-bus hardware microgrid; (b) Actual laboratory 
setup; (c) Network topology of agents. 
 
Complete specifications of the system components are found in [1][113]. It is be noted 
that the experimental setup is not a portion of the simulation network. It is a totally new 
physical system, with its own parameters and components. Contingency analysis for the 
experimental system were also done independently and were fed to the neural network for 
training. Therefore, the two neural networks, the one used for simulation and the one used 
for the experimental work, are different networks and are not meant to mitigate attacks for 
the same power network. We emphasize that the experimental setup is not a portion of the 
simulation network. It is rather a different small-scale testbed benchmark that was used to 
validate our algorithm experimentally. 
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Table 4.5. Parameters of the Hardware Setup 
Generator Number 
Real Power (KW) Reactive Power (KVAR) 
Min Max Min Max 
1 0 5 0 4.8 
2 0 3 0 7.5 
 
Bus Number Load Real Power (W) Load Reactive Power (VAR) 
1 0 0 
2 0 0 
3 600 0 
4 600 0 
5 600 0 
 
Line Number From Bus To Bus KVA Rating (3-Phase) 
1 1 2 5.4 
2 1 3 5.4 
3 1 5 5.4 
4 2 4 5.4 
5 4 5 5.4 
 
4.4.2 Information Exchange and Agent Development 
Figure 4.6 (c) depicts the information exchange between the developed agents and the 
system operator at the control center, which follows the IEC 61850 GOOSE 
publisher/subscriber model for high speed communication. The software embedded into 
the agents has two threads running in parallel. The first thread is a GOOSE Subscriber. 
This thread listens to incoming GOOSE commands over network interface 1 and processes 
them through its security module before interacting with the physical microgrids through 
its digital outputs. The second thread is a GOOSE publisher. This thread waits for an 
internal flag from the security module to issue an alert to the system operator over the 
isolated and encrypted network interface. 
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Figure 4.7: Developed agents and their corresponding human machine interface. 
Figure 4.7 shows the actual hardware agents with their digital output extension board. 
The embedded microcontroller on each agent has an AM335x 1GHz ARM® Cortex-A8. 
512MB DDR3 RAM processor running a Linux kernel. Agent 1 has 4 digital outputs 
interfaced with the circuit breakers connected to Generator 1 (G1), Load 1 (L1), the Long 
Path (LP) connecting busses 1 and 5, and the Short Path (SP1) connecting busses 4 and 2. 
4.4.3 Results and Discussion 
A data set including bus measurements of previously recorded events and measurement 
data collected from a simulated model of the microgrid for various contingency cases was 
used to train the AI module of the two developed agents. The simulated microgrid was 
developed in Matlab/Simulink and was verified by comparing bus voltages, currents, and 
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power measurements with experimental data for three different cases shown in Figure 4.8 
(a), (b), and (c). The results show that the model accurately represents the actual system. 
 
Figure 4.8: Comparison of the voltage, current, and power on all 5 buses between the 
simulation model and experimental setup in three cases: (a) normal case; (b) supplying 
CL3 from redundant path only; (c) under voltage case on CL3. 
The performed experiment comprises of 9 control command signal combinations, 
which are: 
• R1: Normal condition. All circuit breakers are closed. 
• R2: Disconnection of slack generator (G1). 
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• R3: Disconnection of generator 2 (G2). 
• R4: Disconnection of load 1 (L1). 
• R5: Disconnection of load 2 (L2). 
• R6: Disconnection of critical load 3 (CL3). 
• R7: Disconnection of the circuit breakers between bus 4 and bus 5, which represents 
the main path to CL3. 
• R8: Disconnection of the circuit breakers between bus 1 and bus 5, representing the 
redundant path to CL3. 
• R9: Disconnection of the path between G1 and G2.  
The power measurements on each of the buses were plotted throughout the duration of 
the experiment in Figure 4.9 to visualize which control commands actually passed and 
which were considered as malicious, and therefore, prevented. Note that in Figure 4.9, there 
is no relation between the regions (R1–R9) and the time scale. Since this is a hardware 
setup, which requires careful synchronization among the generators, the power system was 
ran and the attacks were performed. The power was plotted throughout the duration of the 
experiment to show which commands were passed by the agents and which ones were 
blocked. Also, Table 4.6 shows the output of the AI module and the decision of each agent 
in response to each command signal. As can be seen from the results of the normal case 
(R1), each of the three loads was at around 600 W summing to around 1800 W, which was 
provided by G1. G2 was acting as a synchronous condenser. As can be seen from Table 
4.6 and Figure 4.9, the commands that attempted to disconnect G1 (R2), G2 (R3), and 
critical load L3 (R5) were directly considered as malicious commands. This is because the 
 113 
 
override signal sent over the isolated network interface to the agents was set to zero. The 
disconnection of the main path to CL3 (R7) was considered a malicious command, since 
the AI module anticipated an under voltage of 0.90 p.u. on the critical load bus. 
R1 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9R2
 
Figure 4.9: Power on each of the 5 buses of the studied microgrid. The figure is divided 
into 9 regions (R1 – R9) covering all 9 test cases. 
It is noted that the disconnection of L1 and L2 was considered as a normal command 
by the agents. This is shown by the drop of power on L1 and L2 from around 600 W to 0 
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W in Figure 4.9. Although this command was actually not issued by the system operator, 
the agents still passed these commands, since they did not put the microgrid in an insecure 
state. As mentioned earlier, this is compensated for by the periodic reports that each agent 
sends to the system operator to take corrective action. In this experiment, after receiving 
periodic reports, the system operator restored power to L1 and L2, as shown in Figure 4.9. 
Similarly, the command to open the redundant path to CL3 (8) was passed. Finally, in the 
case where the circuit breakers connecting bus 1 to bus 2 (R9) were open, the minimum 
recorded voltage was 0.92 p.u., which was regarded as an alert situation and an alert signal 
was sent to the system operator. It is also noted in Table 4.6 that each agent was activated 
only when a change was detected within its zone. 
Table 4.6. Experimental Evaluation of the proposed security system. 
 
Cases (Fig.8) Description Vmin (pu) Bus Nb. TLLmax 
(%) 
A1 A2 
R1 NC 0.95 3 40.8 N N 
R2 Open CB G1 --- --- --- M  
R3 Open CB G2 --- --- ---  M 
R4 Open CB L1 0.96 5 30.6 N  
R5 Open CB L2 0.96 3 30.5  N 
R6 Open CB CL3 --- --- ---  M 
R7 Open CB B4-B5 0.90 5 40.0  M 
R8 Open CB B1-B5 0.95 3 40.9 N N 
R9 Open CB B1-B2 0.92 3 52.7 A A 
 
Finally, a comparison of the online detection latency of the proposed method, which 
utilizes artificial intelligence to characterize the power system, with the work in [30], which 
uses a modified power flow analysis technique, is presented. [30] is chosen for comparison 
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because it targets the same type of control-related attack detection utilizing power flow 
models. The results reported in [30] show that the online detection latency increases with 
the expansion of the system and can reach up to 200 ms. This is because their detection 
algorithm requires solving the adapted power flow problem online, every time a control 
command is issued. Thus, the time to solve the power flow problem is directly proportional 
to the size of the system. However, in the proposed framework the detection latency is in 
the order of (297 microseconds) and remains marginally constant as the number of the 
buses in the power system increases. This is because in this work, the computation time 
required for the AI module to produce an output is relatively constant regardless of the 
number of buses. It is worth noting that the performed comparison is for the online 
detection latency. That is, detecting attacks while the system is up and running. It is true 
that more than 200 ms would be required to collect training data and train the AI module; 
however, this will be performed offline and will not significantly affect the detection 
latency. 
4.5 Conclusion 
The work in this chapter proposed an artificially intelligent physical model-checking 
approach to detect malicious and erroneous control commands controlling the state of 
circuit breakers in power systems. The security algorithm was established as a multi-agent 
system, in which a given power system is sectionalized into separate areas and an agent is 
assigned to each area. The purpose of the work is to push enough intelligence into the 
agents controlling the microgrid to enable them to assess the consequences of control 
commands before taking actions on the physical system. The proposed security framework 
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was tested on a 14-bus IEEE benchmark system. The results showed the accuracy of the 
AI module in characterizing the system under study and its effectiveness in not allowing 
the system to go into an insecure state. Next, the proposed multi-agent security framework 
was verified experimentally on a 5-bus power system with an IEC 61850 communication 
architecture. 
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Chapter 5 Online False Measurement Data Detection System Using Time Series 
Neural Networks 
 
Migrating to a smart grid requires a paradigm shift in the implementation of power 
system applications. With the advent of IEC 61850, contemporary SASs are utilizing 
electronic instrument transformers and merging units to transmit current and voltage 
measurements over Ethernet as SMV. Also, the strict 4ms time constraint imposed on 
SMVs makes encrypting these messages nearly impossible. As such, this chapter this 
presents a detailed analysis of the Sampled Measured Values protocol and its benefits, then, 
it identifies its vulnerabilities and derives the associated cyber threats. Secondly, current 
security measures are outlined and the feasibility of using neural network forecasters to 
detect spoofed sampled values is investigated. The proposed forecasting algorithm was 
implemented in a system composed of merging units and intelligent electronic devices 
developed for this purpose. Real-time experimental results of the proposed algorithm over 
a real IEC 61850 network showed that neural network forecasters have good potential in 
terms of detecting fake messages and increasing the robustness of control and protection 
algorithms. 
5.1 Introduction 
IEC 61850 tackles data exchange in modern substation automation systems on three 
levels, being the process, field, and station levels, as in Figure 5.1. To achieve 
interoperability, IEC 61850 standardizes self-describing data, services, networks, and 
configuration for a complete description of a field device [8]. In order to achieve flexibility 
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in SAS communications, the concept of a process bus has emerged as an Ethernet-based 
communication network between bay level Protection and Control IEDs and switch yard 
equipment [76]. Today, MUs play a significant role in an IEC 61850 process bus. In 
modern substations, MUs are installed near primary equipment in switchyards and are 
meant to provide synchronized phase voltage and current measurements, digitize them into 
a SMV packet format, and transmit them over a substation process bus network [76][79]. 
The deployment of the Process Bus in SAS has introduced several advantages including 
reduced copper wiring, modular substation architectures, easier commissioning and 
maintenance processes, as well as enhancing protection and control applications by 
leveraging data availability. 
Given all the advantages of IEC 61850 process bus, extreme care must be placed on  
IED IED IED
MU MU
CT VTCT VT
Ethernet 
Process Bus
Ethernet Substation Bus
Field Level 
Devices
 
Figure 5.1: Communication between Bay and Process Level Devices. 
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its deployment from a cyber-security and network implementation perspective, as it carries 
extremely time-critical messages for sensitive substation protection and control 
applications. As per the IEC 61850-9-2, the maximum end-to-end time delay allowed for 
SMV messages is 4ms, which includes the time for processing, queuing, and transmission. 
This tight limitation on message transmission time makes it nearly impossible to encrypt 
SMV packets, especially with the low processing power of publishing MUs and receiving 
IEDs. IEC 62351-6, which covers the cyber security of SMV messages and relieves time-
critical SMV messages from the burden of being encrypted, asserted this fact. The lack of 
encryption provides a great and easy attack surface for prying eyes, if a substation network 
is breached, to manipulate and send fake measurements, leading to catastrophic 
consequences in the power system [42]. 
As such, this chapter presents an analysis of the SMV protocol and discusses its 
advantages and disadvantages. Then, it outlines the cyber vulnerabilities and current 
security countermeasures. Finally, this chapter investigates the feasibility of using neural 
network forecasters to detect spoofed SMV measurements. 
We conducted the study in this chapter on the cyber-physical smart grid test bed at 
Florida International University. IEC 61850-based MUs and IEDs were programmed and 
connected to the test bed’s network in order to assess the performance of the system in a 
real-time environment and over a real network. The results showed excellent performance 
of the false data detection system in detecting fake measurements. It is worth noting that 
the proposed system did not violate the 4ms time constraint imposed on SMV protocol. 
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5.2 Overview of the SMV Process Bus Benefits 
Generically, merging units are used to digitize the voltage and current measurements 
from potential and current transformers, respectively, and publish them as SMV messages 
to the process bus. In some situations, non-conventional instrument transformers directly 
publish measurements as SMV messages.  
As described in IEC 61850–9–2, and later in the 9-2 Light Edition, the SMV protocol 
broadcasts measurement data across a LAN using a switched Ethernet-network to 
communicate. SMV messages are directly mapped into the Data Link Layer, which is 
Layer 2 of the OSI model. The OSI model divides the network into seven abstraction layers 
with the goal of providing interoperability to computer networks. 
SMV messages that are broadcasted to the process bus are classified based on their 
Sampled Value ID (svID) field. Since SMV messaging follows the publisher/subscriber 
model, the controllers, that are commonly IEDs, subscribe to SMV messages based on the 
svID. This means that the IED does not have to receive all the measurements on the process 
bus, rather it filters the required measurements based on their svID. 
This architecture introduces a lot of advantages to the control and operation of 
individual microgrids, and eventually the smart grid, from different perspectives.  
• Firstly, in terms of system monitoring, the networked process bus simplifies the 
connections required for monitoring systems, thus, improving the visibility of 
the power network [79].  
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• Secondly, in terms of cost, the use of the process bus eliminates the need for 
point-to-point analogue connections. Therefore, this will drastically reduce the 
use of expensive copper wiring and will also reduce the cost of installation and 
maintenance.  
• Thirdly, in terms of control, the SMV process bus facilitates the migration from 
centralized control network architectures to decentralized and distributed 
architectures that enhance the reliability of the power system. In centralized 
control, a single server communicates with all the sensors and issues most of 
the control commands. From a reliability view-point, the server is a bottleneck 
and a single point of failure. This vulnerability is avoided in decentralized and 
distributed control.  
• Finally, in terms of data handling, the SMV process bus provides data 
interoperability between multi-vendor devices. By standard practice, all IEC 
61850 SMV-compliant merging units and IEDs should abide by the message 
structure shown in Section III A. Therefore, the process bus is vendor-
independent. 
However, the benefits of the process bus do not come without risks. The following 
section will outline the vulnerabilities of the SMV protocol and current countermeasures 
efforts. 
5.3 Threat Identification and Current Security Countermeasures 
In this section, we analyze the vulnerabilities of the SMV process bus in terms of cyber-
attacks. We start by discussing the sources of attacks on the process bus. Then, for each 
 122 
 
attack type, we explain how the attack works, if the SMV process bus is resilient to it, and 
the possible countermeasures. 
Despite its benefits, the process bus has vulnerabilities that need to be addressed to 
ensure its security. Since SMV are directly mapped to the data link layer of the OSI model, 
they are non-routable and non-blocking. Therefore, in this discussion, we consider the 
cyber threats that could potentially occur on the SMV protocol within a local area network.  
The sources of attacks on an IEC 61850 network could be an inside person, who has 
access to the IEC 61850 network, and has the capability to infect the system with malware. 
This action could be intentional, from a disgruntled employee, or unintentional by improper 
use of infected devices. Another source of attack could start from the supply chain, where 
a device, IED, is infected with malware during production [86]. A savvy attacker could 
also penetrate a LAN through corporate networks or personal devices of the employees 
with techniques, such as password cracking, spam emails, and backdoors [30]. Two major 
public disclosures on successful attacks on industrial systems and power system control 
networks are the Stuxnet incident, where a nuclear plant control network was attacked, and 
the Crash Override incident, where several substation networks in the Ukrainian power 
grid were attacked [102][103]. 
Once the LAN is compromised, the attacker has the potential to launch several types 
of attacks on the SMV process bus. 
1. Denial of Service (DoS): as the term indicates, a DoS attack is when a user or a 
machine is maliciously prevented from accessing a service. One possible way 
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to perform a DoS attack is by flooding the network to delay message delivery 
past the critical flooding rate through congesting the communication channel 
and exhausting the computation resources of the communicating nodes. 
Flooding attacks can happen on the network or the application layer of the OSI 
model. In this work, we are interested in DoS attacks on the process bus. A DoS 
by flooding the network could occur on the data link layer by broadcasting SMV 
messages with a high publishing rate, imposing delays on legitimate SMV 
messages beyond 3 ms. This form of DoS could be detected by classifying the 
SMV packets based on the APPID and monitoring the rate of publishing of each 
one on the process bus. According to IEC 61850-9-2LE, there are two allowed 
publishing rates for SMV messages, either 80 samples/sec or 256 samples/sec. 
If these rates are violated for a certain SMV, a DoS attack could be detected.  
If an attacker, however, uses more than one physical or virtual device to publish 
SMV packet streams within the acceptable publishing rates, s/he could still 
congest the network. Here, the operator could create a list that defines the 
allowed svIDs and the corresponding data in the PDU. Utilizing an undefined 
svID is, thus, easily detected. Also, since each SMV is associated with a sample 
counter, if an attacker uses one or more the registered svIDs, the operator can 
detect repeated or out-of-sequence sample counters. This is because Layer 2 
messages cannot be blocked. Finally, small and separated message bursts, 
which do not trigger the preset publishing thresholds, could also be detected by 
monitoring the sample counter. 
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2. Eavesdropping: this is a passive attack, where an attacker sniffs network traffic. 
Nonetheless, this attack allows the attacker to gain knowledge about the power 
system. For applications that are on the IP Layer and above, defense strategies 
against eavesdropping include encryption, such as utilizing Secure HTTP 
(HTTPS), Secure File Transfer Protocol (SFTP), and Secure Shell (SSH). 
Defense mechanisms, such as monitoring network traffic and scanning network 
cards in promiscuous mode, could be used [115]. 
However, in practice, and due to the timing limitations on SMV messages, they 
remain unencrypted. In fact, IEC 62351-6, which covers security for SMV, 
states that for applications using SMV and requiring 3 ms response times, 
multicast configurations, and low Central Processing Unit (CPU) overhead, 
encryption is not recommended [117]. Therefore, eavesdropping on the process 
bus is a cyber-threat, which leverages the capabilities of attackers. 
3. Replay: in a replay attack, an attacker sniffs network packets and replays them 
at a later time. Since each SMV message is associated with a sample counter, 
and given the fact that Layer 2 messages cannot be blocked, a replay of SMV 
messages could be detected by monitoring the process bus for the messages 
with repeated sample counters or out-of-sequence sample counters. 
4. Man-in-the-Middle (MITM): a MITM attack occurs when an attacker forces 
traffic between two communicating nodes to go through the attacker’s machine 
before reaching the intended recipient. This is possible through ARP Poisoning.  
ARP is a communication protocol used to convert IP addresses into MAC 
addresses [42]. In ARP Poisoning, the attacker sends an ARP Reply to fake the 
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IP and MAC addresses mapping on the network. As such, the IP address of the 
attacker is, now, associated with an incorrect MAC address. This allows the 
attacker to intercept the messages exchanged between the communicating 
nodes. The attacker can, then, perform a MITM attack by manipulating the 
intercepted data. 
Being broadcast Layer 2 messages, a MITM is not possible on the SMV 
protocol, except when a control network in physically compromised by a person 
from the inside. 
5. SMV Spoofing: in this attack, an attacker publishes an SMV message, with 
manipulated data, to the process bus from his/her machine using the source 
MAC address of the original sender. This is possible because the process bus 
network is unencrypted. An attacker can sniff an SMV message, decode its 
fields, perform changes on certain fields, and publish the message back with a 
spoofed MAC address. 
To defend against this attack, IEC 62351 recommends the use of RSA-based 
signatures to authenticate SMV packets and ensure their integrity. However, 
RSA-based authentication is unsuitable for the SMV protocol, which requires a 
3 ms response time, since it is computationally expensive [9][11].  
The use of a Hash-based Message Authentication Code is also recommended 
by IEC 62351, and it was found to have an average latency in the range of few 
hundred microseconds. As reported in [117], this latency significantly increases 
with the message size. The latency studies in the literature were performed on 
processors with very high computational powers, such as Intel core i7 
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processors and Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) [117][118]. This 
kind of processing power comes at the expense of high monetary costs and is 
not commonly available on IEDs and MUs, especially those devices currently 
available in the field. 
Also, in multicast applications, such as SMV, MAC authentication does not 
provide non-repudiation [117]. That is, any subscriber can create a message and 
a MAC and send it as if they were the publisher. This of course, requires the 
attacker to know the secret key. Several attacks on the subject matter were 
reported in the literature, including length extension attacks, internal state 
attacks, key recovery attacks, and forgery attacks [119][120][121]. 
If an attacker successfully sends a spoofed SMV message, which is verified by the 
subscriber, the attacker cannot stop the original publisher from sending the original SMV 
message. Therefore, the subscriber will have two SMV messages with either a repeated 
sample counter, or an out-of-sequence one. The problem that arises here is that the 
subscriber does not know which packet is valid and which packet is spoofed. The same 
logic applies to the replay attack. The IED will not know which message stream to use for 
the control operation to continue. 
It can be concluded from the previous discussion that the structure of the SMV protocol 
and the associated recommendations of the IEC 62351-6 make the SMV process bus 
resilient to several types cyber-attacks. However, devoting the necessary time and effort, 
savvy attackers can still perform SMV spoofing attacks to disrupt the operation of the 
power system. 
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As mentioned earlier, issuing a spoofed SMV will result in a repeated or out-of-
sequence sample counter. However, the subscribing device will not be able to distinguish 
which message holds the true measurement value. Accordingly, the next sections study the 
feasibility of using neural network forecasters to identify spoofed and legitimate messages. 
5.4 System Description and Generation of Training Data 
Figure 5.2 shows the simulation microgrid model used to generate the proper training 
data for the fake data detection system. In fact, the same microgrid model was used in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.4 for the online lost packet forecasting algorithm. 
Similarly, the same training data set, as in Section 3.4, was utilized to train the 
developed neural network. A small recap on the selection of the training data is presented 
here for the convenience of the reader. 
Two major cases were studied:  
1. The grid-connected mode of operation.  
2. The islanded mode of operation.  
For each of the two cases mentioned above, and on each transmission line, five types 
of faults were applied, namely: 
1. Single-line-to-ground (A-G). 
2. Line-to-line (B-C). 
3. Double-line-to-ground (B-C-G). 
4. Three-phase (A-B-C).  
5. Three-phase-to-ground (A-B-C-G) faults.  
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Figure 5.2: Block Diagram of the Physical System. 
Additionally, each type of fault was applied on the beginning (10%), middle (50%), 
and end (90%) of each transmission line. 
For all the cases mentioned above, current and voltage measurements from the merging 
units on transmission line TL3 were recorded, as this is where the proposed algorithm was 
implemented.  
In order to make sure not to over train the network, only samples that represent the shift 
from normal operation to the unstable fault operation are utilized for training. Also, one 
AC cycle after the fault clearance was used for training. 
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5.5 The False Data Detection Algorithm 
As shown in Figure 5.2, IED3 subscribes to SMV messages published by MU31 and 
MU32. In a simple differential protection scheme, IED3 calculates the difference between 
the received current values and compares the results to a predefined threshold. If the 
difference is greater than the threshold, then IED3 sends a trip signal in the form of a 
GOOSE message in order to isolate the fault. Therefore, the proposed IDS is implemented 
on IED3. The developed MUs and IED are detailed Section 6.4.  
Here, the forecasting problem depends on a single variable, which is time. Therefore, 
a time series approach was used in training the developed neural network. To capture all 
the features in the current waveforms and decrease the forecasting error, a window of 20 
samples was selected. These 20 samples cover a quarter AC cycle for a 60 Hz system.  
The developed NN has an input layer with twenty neurons to accommodate the 20 
previous samples, a hidden layer with 10 neurons, and an output layer with 1 neuron that 
produces the forecasted sample. 
If an anomaly in the sequence number field is detected, the IED passes the two samples 
through its first thread, which is the Neural Network Forecaster (NN-F). The NN-F utilizes 
20 previous samples to forecast the value of the incoming measurement. The NN-F will 
compare the error between the received samples and the forecasted value. Only the 
received SMV, which has an error less than a specified threshold, will be marked as benign 
and is passed to the control logic. This process is depicted in  
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Figure 5.3. It is worth noting that the Normalized Mean Root Square Error (NMSRE) 
is used as opposed to the Mean Square Error Error (MSE) because of the presence of small 
measured values. 
Start
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Figure 5.3: Online IDS and Forecasting Algorithm. 
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In such situations, the MSE would yield very high error percentages, and thus, the 
NMSRE is a better statistical error indicator. The proposed system is intended for data 
manipulation attacks, since it relies on measuring the distance between forecasted and 
received samples. 
5.6 The Developed MUs and IEDs 
MU 32
IED 3
Ethernet 
Switch
MU 31
 
Figure 5.4: Process Bus Ethernet Network. 
In order to assess the performance of the developed spoofed sample detection system, 
two merging units that publish the 3-phase current measurements at both ends of TL3, and 
one IED, which subscribes to those messages and issues a trip signal, were developed. The 
SMV publisher and SMV subscriber were coded in C language, utilizing the open source 
IEC 61850 library, libIEC61850 [75]. As per the IEC 61850 standard, the collected 
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measurements were published with a 4,800 Hz frequency. The code of the SMV subscriber, 
which was implemented on IED3, was modified to include the proposed forecasting and 
IDS algorithms. The developed codes were downloaded on 3 Odroid C2 single board 
computers (SBCs) running a Linux kernel. The communication took place over a dedicated 
network switch, as shown in Figure 5.4. 
5.7 Results and Discussion 
Several experiments were performed on the proposed forecasting system and are 
reported in this section. First, the forecasting accuracy of the NN under different conditions 
was tested. Second, fake measurements were randomly injected in the collected. A log file 
with all the fake data detection alarms was collected and analyzed from the subscribing 
IED performing the differential protection application previously described.  
5.7.1 Performance of the Neural Network 
Test cases with 43 AC cycles each, covering fault and normal operation periods, were 
performed. The NN was subjected to data for all types and locations of faults and the 
forecasting errors were recorded in Figure 5.5. Analyzing all the forecasted samples 
revealed that 99% of the data have a forecasting error less than 1.5%. Two random test  
 
Figure 5.5: Maximum Normalized Root Mean Square Error for all Fault Types and 
Locations. 
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Figure 5.6: Comparison of Forecasted and Actual Current Measurements. 
cases were selected, representing a line-to-line fault at the end of TL4 and another 3-phase-
to-ground fault at the middle of TL3. The forecasted and actual results of these cases were 
plotted in Figure 5.6. The results showed very low error rates, which indicates a robust NN 
with high forecasting accuracy. It is worth noting from this graph that the forecasting 
accuracy of the samples corresponding to the fault period, which is a critical period in 
protection applications, is high. 
In fact, the proposed cyber security solution depends on the ability of the artificially 
intelligent module (the neural network in our case) to learn the physical properties, i.e. 
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features, of the system. There is extensive work in the literature that relies on artificial 
intelligence techniques in intrusion detection [81][122][123]. However, such techniques 
do not incorporate the physical characteristics of the system in intrusion detection. They 
are purely reliant on cyber rules, such as detecting high bandwidth consumption. There are 
few recent efforts to incorporate the physical properties in securing power systems 
[29][124]. However, these are based on a set of predefined mathematical equations against 
which an incoming command/packet is compared. The complexity and the number of these 
equations will add significant processing time, which needs to be studied given the low 
processing power of current IEDs. The work in this chapter introduces the incorporation of 
the physical properties’ dimensionality in intrusion detection, utilizing artificial intelligent 
modules. The use of artificial intelligence for characterizing complex systems has been 
justified in the scientific and engineering literature. In addition to learning the features of 
the power network, the fast response of properly trained neural networks makes them 
excellent candidates in time-critical applications, such as protection. The overall 
transmission and processing time of an SMV packet was measured to be less than the 4 ms 
constraint set by the IEC 61850 standard. 
5.7.2 Performance of the Spoofed Data Detection Algorithm. 
Fake packets with high current values were intensively injected in the system in order 
to trick the IED into sending trip messages. During the normal operating conditions, the 
system showed that it can successfully detect fake measurements with high current values. 
On the other hand, during fault conditions, the proposed system was able to detect low 
current measurements successfully. The performance of the system is shown for several 
 135 
 
normal and fault operating conditions in Figure 5.7. As can be seen from Figure 5.7, the 
blue curve represents the fake data, while the red curve shows the real and the forecasted 
data. Therefore, the proposed system did enhance the resiliency of the protection scheme 
against fake current measurements. Here, it is important to note that the choice of the 
decision threshold between real and fake measurements is of paramount importance and 
requires fine tuning based on system observations. In the performed case studies, a 2% 
threshold level was selected and resulted in 273 false positive measurements from a pool 
of 48,343 measurements, representing 0.56% of all the published data, as shown in Table 
5.1. 
 
Figure 5.7: Performance of the Fake Data Detection System. 
Table 5.1: Performance of Neural Network IDS 
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Here, one would ponder the response of the forecaster against fast electric transients 
(EFT). In fact, fast transients in power systems can be divided in general into fast transients 
generated by natural causes (e.g. lightning) or fast transients generated through the use of 
equipment (e.g. de-energizing heavy duty motors, switching in and out power factor 
correction equipment, and opening and closing circuit breakers) [125][126]. As per the IEC 
61000-4-4 specifications, which define the requirements for immunity to repetitive fast 
transients and the necessary test methods, an Electromagnetic Fast Transient (EFT) pulse 
has a minimum period of 200 microseconds at a 5 Khz burst. The waveform, as adopted 
from [126], is shown in Figure 5.8. 
The developed neural network is intended to forecast IEC 61850 SMV. IEC 61850 – 
90 – 2 specifies a publishing rate of 80 samples per AC cycle for 50-60 Hz systems, which 
is equal to 4.8 KHz sampling frequency. Therefore, even if the communication network is 
ideal, the sampling frequency set by the standard won’t be able to properly capture fast 
transients, which typically have frequencies of 5 KHz and above (4.8 KHz < 5*2 KHz, thus 
failing to satisfy Nyquist’s theorem). Also, since the sampling frequency is 4.8 KHz, the 
merging unit is usually accompanied by a low pass filter with sampling frequency 
fsampling/2 = 2.4 KHz. On the other hand, IEC 61000-4-4 defines various test levels for 
EFT immunity. Such transients have their own protection schemes and devices (surge 
arrestors, proper system grounding and insulation …), which are different than the 
protection functions played by the IEDs and MUs used for dealing with regular system 
faults. 
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Finally, one does not need to forget here that the number of consecutively lost or 
manipulated samples plays a critical role in the success of such algorithms. This is due to 
the fact that every time a packet is dropped or manipulated, its estimated value is used for 
forecasting the next sample. Having several consecutive lost or manipulated packets will 
lead to the accumulation of the forecasting error. 
 
Figure 5.8: Fast Electrical Transient Pulse per IEC 61000-4-4 [126]. 
 A large window size could thus be a possible solution to allow the system to 
compensate for a good number of lost or manipulated samples. However, this will lead to 
a tradeoff between the window size used for forecasting and the computation time. Given 
the strict 4ms time constraint on SMV messages, a window of 20 previous samples 
covering a quarter AC cycle has been used in this study. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
This chapter presented an online fake data detection and dropped packet forecasting 
system for IEC 61850 SMV messages. The system utilizes a combined NN – time series 
forecasting module to detect fake measurement data injection attacks. The proposed system 
proved its effectiveness in enhancing the resiliency of modern protection schemes against 
false data injection attacks. The system was implemented on a real IEC 61850 Ethernet 
network and was able to meet the 4ms time constraint set on SMV messages. Finally, it is 
important to emphasize the ability of the system in detecting fake messages during critical 
events, such as peak fault currents. 
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Chapter 6 Developing a Targeted Attack for Enhancing Resiliency of Intelligent 
Intrusion Detection Modules in Energy Cyber Physical Systems 
 
Secure high-speed communication is required to ensure proper operation of complex 
power grid systems and prevent malicious tampering activities. In the previous chapter, 
artificial neural networks with temporal dependency were introduced for spoofed data 
identification and mitigation for broadcasted IEC 61850 SMV messages. The fast 
responses of such intelligent modules in intrusion detection make them suitable for time-
critical applications, such as protection. However, care must be taken in selecting the 
appropriate intelligence model and decision criteria. As such, this chapter presents a 
customizable malware script to sniff and manipulate SMV messages and demonstrates the 
ability of the malware to trigger false positives in the response of the neural network. The 
developed malware is intended to be a vaccine to harden the intrusion detection system 
against data manipulation attacks by enhancing the neural network’s ability to learn and 
adapt to these attacks, as will be seen in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Introduction 
The power industry is increasingly relying on robust communication infrastructures to 
transmit and analyze transmission and distribution measurements in adaptive protection 
and control schemes. As the reliance on these technologies increases, so does the threat 
posed by attackers. If not properly secured, these communication-enabled technologies will 
be vulnerable and pose a potential to cripple the reliability and economy of the grid. The 
main enabler of automated adaptive protection schemes is the IEC 61850 data modeling 
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standard. One of the main security challenges faced by modern IEC 61850-based protection 
techniques is data manipulation attacks within the process bus. According to the IEC 61850 
model, the process bus is the medium where current and voltage measurements and event 
triggered commands are communicated as SMV and GOOSE messages, respectively, 
within a local area network. The core vulnerability is in the fact that these time-critical 
messages are broadcasted over the LAN unencrypted. Therefore, in the event of a network 
breach or the presence of a malicious insider within the network, data manipulation of such 
messages is an easy task, and thus, the opening and closing of circuit breakers is possible 
via injecting fake current and voltage values [41][42]. 
In fact, the catastrophic impacts of data manipulation and false data injection attacks 
on the reliable operation of the power system have been widely researched in recent 
literature. Authors in [31] showed how false measurements feedback to automatic 
generation control could impact the physical system stability by causing sudden declines 
in the system frequency, which in its turn causes unwanted load shedding schemes. The 
work in [37] demonstrates two realistic false data attack scenarios, in which attackers 
introduce arbitrary errors to state variables to achieve a false state estimation of the power 
system. In the study conducted in [127], the authors quantitatively analyze the damage 
caused by false data injection with regards to the power system operation and security. 
On the other hand, there are several works in the literature that focus on defense 
strategies to minimize service loss through several defense mechanisms. In [128], the 
authors recognize the potential impacts of data injection on the process bus and proposed 
an agreement algorithm to detect, locate, and prevent malicious data from being accepted 
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by the IEDs and protection devices. In [129], the authors presented an overview of 
vulnerabilities in the IEC 61850 protocol suite and discussed a method of GOOSE message 
modification using a malware script to sniff, manipulate, and inject control messages into 
the process bus in detail. In [130], the authors presented an intrusion detection system that 
is capable of filtering malicious messages based on predefined rules and known malicious 
signatures. In [18], an intrusion detection system based on GOOSE and SMV rule violation 
indicators was presented. This system, similar to other rule based systems, will not be able 
to detect unknown attacks that are not defined in their rule base. 
Even though the IDS will filter out uncoordinated attacks, it is still not robust enough 
to secure IEC 61850 automation processes. These solutions are also network-based and are 
themselves vulnerable to data manipulation from a savvy attacker. Attackers with sufficient 
information can spoof different data fields to obfuscate themselves from this IDS. 
 To accomplish the goal of robust security, machine learning techniques have been 
introduced to leverage the intelligence of rule-based IDS. Machine-learning systems use 
the approach of anomaly detection, in which a model is defined and positioned as normal 
and if an outlier is detected, it is considered to be an anomaly [131]. This need is recognized 
by the authors in [99], and to that end, they incorporated a protection algorithm using a 
trained coupled time-series NN that predicts incoming current measurement based on the 
microgrid’s recent operating history. Then, an intrusion is detected and announced if a real 
measured value deviates from the predicted one. The potential of this solution was tested 
on data collected from a simulated microgrid and the results in [99] are promising for rapid 
verification of data integrity. However, the accuracy demonstrated was cultivated in a 
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controlled testing environment using high current values for the malicious data injection. 
In a case where the attack is designed for the target system, the accuracy of the IDS deviates 
from the results in [99]. This issue must be addressed in the NN to ensure reliability in real-
world attack scenarios. 
Accordingly, the work in this chapter is an extension of the author’s work in the 
previous chapter, where a configurable malware is developed to be used as a tool to 
examine and quantify the reduction in accuracy experienced by the NN in targeted attack 
scenarios. The purpose of this tool is to be used as a vaccine to harden the IDS against 
smart attacks by fine tuning its decision criteria and model parameters. 
6.2 System Description 
The targeted attack was performed on the co-simulation setup described in Chapter 5, 
Ssection 5.2 and is shown in Figure 6.1 here. 
 Figure 6.1 also shows the hardware setup built to test the IDS and implement the 
developed malware script over a real IEC 61850 process bus architecture. The recorded 
current values of both transmission lines from the simulated microgrid model were 
recorded in a database of coefficient files and fed as inputs to the merging units. The 
measuring units then publish these measurements as IEC 61850 SMV packets. IED3 is 
programmed to subscribe to these messages and processes them through the IDS NN, 
which it hosts. The firmware for MU31, MU32, and IED3, along with the IDS, were coded 
in C and downloaded on three different Odroid C2 devices running a Linux kernel. 
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Figure 6.1: Software and Hardware Setup. 
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6.3 Malware Development 
6.3.1 SMV Message Structure 
 
Figure 6.2: SMV Datagram Structure. 
In order to better understand the malware development procedure shown in Figure 6.3, 
the structure of the SMV message will be explained first. An SMV datagram follows a 
modified ASN.1 BER Tag/Length pair encoding scheme [88]. The Tag field represents the 
type of information, which is represented in the following SMV frame. 
 As shown in Figure 6.2, the SMV datagram starts with the Destination MAC 
Address, which is a multicast address reserved for IEC 61850 applications always starting 
with 01-0C-CD and is followed by the source MAC address. An SMV message has an 
IEEE 802.1Q VLAN ID and a unique Ethernet type (88-BA). The APPID field is a 4 octet 
field, which the subscribing IEDs use to identify messages they are subscribing to. The 
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Length field represents the length of the overall SMV datagram and is followed by two 
reserved fields left out by the standard for future use. 
 The second layer of an SMV message is the Application Protocol Data Unit 
(APDU), which consists of one or more Application Service Data Units (ASDU). The 
number of ASDUs is in the noASDU field [132]. Each ASDU then contains the following 
subfields [8]: 
• svID: unique identifier for each SMV message. 
• SmpCnt: incrementing counter with each published SMV. 
• ConfRev: counter for configuration changes. 
• SmpSynch: A boolean value indicating synchronization with a clock signal. 
• SeqData: List of data values related to the data set definition. 
6.3.2 Malware Development 
In order to properly inoculate the NN against smart attacks, a malware script for 
targeted attacks against the process bus was developed. The malware was written in Python 
in conjunction with network sniffing and packet crafting libraries from Scapy. As 
mentioned earlier, SMV messages are broadcasted over the LAN and are unencrypted. 
Once the malware is run, it starts to passively sniff packets from the network. Next, it filters 
those messages looking for the destination MAC address assigned for SMV messages, the 
Ethertype (88xBA), and the designated APPID identifier. 
 Once the SMV packet has been identified, it is converted into a list of hexadecimal 
pair strings that will make searching the packet more convenient. After the  
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Figure 6.3: Malware Development Process. 
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packet has been properly decoded and stored as hex pairs, the malware can be utilized 
to spoof any desired field of the captured SMV packet. However, the developed malware 
will spoof all the fields (source MAC address, destination MAC address, APPID …) and 
change only the seqData field, which holds the value of the current measurement. This is 
intended to trick the IED into recognizing this packet as being sent from its original 
merging unit. 
In order to manipulate the current measurements, a class called “ASDU” was created 
and used to store the data collected from the packet, and to conveniently build the new 
packet before it is injected into the process bus. A major obstacle in the design of this script 
is to write it in a way that will be able to process any number of ASDUs and seqData for 
the SMV packet. These values are not static and can be changed by the network 
administrators based on how often they want the collected measurements to be sent. In 
order to address this issue, we implement our datafield search function, which is called in 
an incremental manner, to make sure the packet will be of the appropriate length and that 
it modifies all ASDUs and seqData fields detected by the script.  
The first field searched for is the noASDU field, as this will describe the number of 
ASDUs present in the packet. Once this value is determined, a loop is created that iterates 
through each ASDU and records the information into the ASDU class. An array of pointers 
to ASDU objects is used to easily navigate through the collected data, as this can become 
quite tedious when an extremely large amount of ASDUs are introduced. For each ASDU, 
the datafield type, length, and value of each field is stored into its own array of hex pairs 
for reasons that become apparent when the script re-crafts the packet with the modified 
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data. As each field is decoded, it is stored into the corresponding ASDU class member. 
Once the entire packet has been decoded, the final step is to modify the existing data and 
send the new packet. 
It is important to note that the attacker must configure which fields they wish to modify 
and either manually change the value of the data, create an arithmetic function to 
manipulate the data, or read in predetermined values from a file. Depending on the method 
chosen, the script will begin to modify the data based on the attacker’s configuration, and 
overwrite the original ASDU class members with these new values. Once the modification 
is complete, the packet is rebuilt in the correct order and the spoofed packet with false data 
is broadcasted into the LAN. The flowchart in Figure 6.3 presents the malware algorithm 
for visualization of the process. 
6.4 Results and Discussion 
Once this tool had been developed, spoofed messages were injected into the process 
bus to test the response of the IDS. The malware is assumed to be running on a computer 
device connected to the LAN of the microgrid under study. In order to test the efficacy of 
the NN for intrusion detection, two data modification methods were used and the results 
for each were observed. 
First, the values of the currents were recorded and analyzed for the first few AC cycles. 
It was noticed that the amplitude of the recorded current waveform was around 3 A. As 
appreciated from [99], injecting values far above 3 A triggered an intrusion alarm. 
However, as explained earlier, the NN was trained to recognize the current values for 
normal and fault conditions. Therefore, in the first attack, fake packets were injected with 
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alternating 3.5 A and -3.5 A at a fixed rate to signal a fake beginning of a fault situation. 
When configuring the malware script, the two values will be written to an input file and 
then the malware changes the data fields of the sniffed packets by alternating between these 
values. The following algorithm was used to inject the fake packets and is written 
generically to be applicable for many systems: 
Table 6.1. Algorithm to Inject Fake Packets. 
f = fopen(“FakeSV.txt”, r+) 
Generate Fake Values (inject +/- 3.5) 
f.write(Fake Values) 
SetSampleRate(pps) 
while(!f.EndofFile){ 
f.readline(n) 
sendpacket(rate, mod_pkt) 
n += 1  
} 
 
It is to be noted that the user of the malware tool is free to experiment with other 
algorithms or arithmetic functions for generating the fake values. The user can also 
experiment with the packet sending rate for a completely configurable data injection tool. 
The received and the forecasted samples from the IED were recorded in a log file and are 
plotted in Figure 6.4. The blue waveform represents the SMV packets received by the IED, 
whereas the red waveform represents the forecasted values by the NN. The actual 
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measurements (blue) were broadcasted at a rate of 4,800 Hz in accordance to the 
recommendations of the IEC 61850 standard, whereas the malware tool was transmitting  
 
Figure 6.4: Incorrect Forecasting Triggered by Malicious Alternating Sampled Values. 
 
Figure 6.5: Results for Injected Measurements Simulating a Real AC Waveform 
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5750 5800 5850 5900 5950 6000 6050 6100 6150 6200 6250
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
C
u
rr
e
n
t 
(A
m
p
s
)
Sample Number (fs = 4800 Hz)
 
 
Received Samples
Forecasted Samples
1.705 1.71 1.715 1.72 1.725 1.73 1.735
x 10
4
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
Sample Number (fs = 4800 Hz)
C
u
rr
e
n
t 
(A
m
p
s
)
 
 
Received Samples
Forecasted Samples
 151 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6.6: Sample Shifting. 
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maximum of around 4.5 A. This value is 1.5 times the rated value and was enough to issue 
a false positive and trigger a trip command. 
 The next data injection method is one that showed more promising results in 
successfully corrupting a network. This attack continuously replays values from a recoded 
log file that simulates the same waveform that the NN had been trained on for forecasting 
a fault. This method will increase the period of the injected values; however, the results 
show that the NN was not prepared to handle this kind of targeted attack. In Figure 6.5, it 
is observed that the NN incorrectly forecasted the sampled values in two different locations 
within a window of 200 samples between sample 17,050 and sample 17,250. Any one of 
these incorrectly forecasted paths would trigger a false positive and cause service 
interruption. If the injected data results in a false negative for more than three AC cycles, 
permanent damage can be inflicted upon the power grid’s equipment. 
It is known that Layer 2 broadcast messages, such as SMV messages, cannot be 
blocked. An important observation from the results of these attacks is that when the IED 
received the spoofed packet, it processed it along with true message, thus introducing a 
misleading entry in the buffer used for forecasting. This is shown in packet number 17,166 
in Figure 6.6 (a). As can be seen from Figure 6.6 (a), when the IED received the fake 
packet, the original data stream of legitimate SMV messages was shifted by 1 sample. This 
shift was accumulated as more fake SMV packets were injected. As can be seen in Figure 
6.6 (b), the shift accumulation led to the IED receiving SMV messages that are totally out 
of phase from the original data stream. Here again, the utilization of the developed malware 
exploited another vulnerability in the studied process bus, which needs to be addressed. 
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Figure 6.7: Malware Data Injection Statistics. 
It is also important to mention that the malware provides the user a means to control 
the rate of sending fake packets using the Scapy library function “pps” or packets per 
second. A test has been conducted to test the maximum speed at which the malware could 
broadcast fake SMV messages. Figure 6.7 shows a summary of the statistics of the 
conducted experiment. For around one minute, the malware was sending at an average 
speed of 9,656 Hz, which is almost double that set by IEC 61850 (4,800 Hz). These 
statistics are affected by the message length and the specifications of the machine hosting 
the malware. In this test, the malware was run on a Linux machine with Intel i7 processor 
rated at 3.50 GHz with an average packet size of 95 bytes. 
The previous results showed the effectiveness of the developed malware in testing the 
efficacy of the proposed predictive IDS. Using this developed malware as a training tool, 
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not only can this NN be trained to detect several targeted attacks, but it can also be used to 
fine tune event thresholds to prevent service interruption during targeted attacks. Moreover, 
the developed malware tool can be used to benchmark other NN-related intrusion detection 
algorithms present in the literature. As mentioned earlier, the developed tool is 
configurable. Therefore, the user can control the type of attack by manually changing the 
value of the measurements, providing the tool with an arithmetic function to simulate 
certain scenarios or replay given values from a log file. Also, the user can adjust the rate 
of false data injection as desired. By these experimentations, the user can quantitatively 
analyze the performance of his or her IDS in terms of the ability of the tool to produce false 
positives and false negatives. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter developed the design and implementation of a targeted data injection 
attack that will simulate real AC waveforms in an attempt to interrupt power flow in a 
compromised power network. The targeted malware was developed in a configurable 
manner to allow the attacker to choose different methods of data injection. A predictive 
NN-IDS was then tested against the targeted malware to observe how it would handle the 
smart attack. The results of the experiment demonstrated that the NN is yet to be properly 
trained or fine-tuned enough to detect malicious measurements. Fake measurements could 
lead IEDs to issue trip signals that would result in service interruptions in a real system. 
The NN showed resistance to less sophisticated data injection methods; however, it is still 
vulnerable to malicious data injection methods. Also, the NN demonstrated very little 
resistance to the simulated AC waveform. In order to better prepare the NN, the developed 
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malware will also be used as a training tool to identify attack signatures, and allow the user 
to tune the event thresholds that would result in controlling messages being sent to the 
IEDs. The malware is configurable, easy to understand, and is simple to use to train 
predictive intrusion detection systems. 
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Chapter 7 Content-Aware Intrusion Detection for Operational Security in 
Microgrids 
 
Reliable microgrid operation is becoming heavily reliant on microprocessor-based 
controllers and communication networks, making it prone to cyber-attacks. The work in 
the previous two chapters analyzed the IEC 61850 Sampled Measured Values protocol and 
investigated the feasibility of using neural networks to detect spoofed sampled measured 
values. It was shown that although such forecasters have high spoofed-data-detection 
accuracy, they are prone to the accumulation of forecasting error. Accordingly, in this 
chapter, an algorithm to detect the accumulation of the forecasting error based on 
lightweight statistical indicators is proposed. 
We illustrated experimentally the practical relevance of the proposed security 
framework against fake data injection attacks on a hybrid AC/DC laboratory-scale cyber-
physical microgrid. The results showed that the artificially intelligent forecaster has a 
95.6% attack detection accuracy. It was also shown that Layer 2 is also capable of detecting 
the normal accumulation in forecasting error, which grows naturally over time, and allows 
operators to adjust the parameters of the forecasting module. Finally, experimental 
demonstrations showed that the overall detection latency of the proposed system is near 
real-time, in the range of 1-2 ms. 
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7.1 Introduction 
Microgrids are becoming the building blocks of modern power systems. Lately, 
resilient and secure operation of microgrids has become heavily reliant on judicious 
cooperation between cyber and physical actors. 
Recent public disclosures and research efforts showed the ability of attackers to exploit 
vulnerabilities in power system communication protocols and to use them in launching 
successful attacks that lead to catastrophic consequences [102][103]. Although most 
industrial communication networks are not open to the public internet, they can still be 
penetrated through corporate networks or personal devices of the employees with 
techniques, such as password cracking, backdoors, malwares, among others [30].  
Here, it is important to mention that the power grid requires real-time control, which 
needs strict time-delay requirements on information exchange ranging from milliseconds 
to few seconds depending on the application. Therefore, most industrial control networks 
are left unencrypted and sometimes without authentication [41] This gives attackers more 
freedom to launch sophisticated data manipulation attacks and imposes challenging 
constraints on intrusion detection developers.  
While other works, which were discussed in the introduction of Chapter 6, provide a 
tremendous amount of insight into a multi-agent based model checking intrusion detection 
system, none of the literature addresses the major limitations involved in intrusion 
detection and prevention for power systems. Thus, there is a need for a new generation of 
IDS with enhanced awareness to be able to understand messages’ contents and have a low 
detection latency, which does not hinder the real-time operation requirements of grid 
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processes. Accordingly, this chapter presents a low-latency, content-aware, and bi-layer 
intrusion detection system for secure operation and control of microgrids. Unlike the work 
presented in the literature, the first layer of the proposed IDS utilizes AI to learn the 
characteristics of the microgrid in different operating states, and benefits from the fast 
responses of the AI to decode network packets and verify the legitimacy of received 
measurements. If the AI module flags a certain measurement sample as suspicious, the 
second layer of the proposed IDS is invoked, where a collaboration between control agents 
and their associated merging unit is instantiated over a secure out-of-band private network. 
A final decision, with the corresponding preventive measure, is made based on statistical 
formulations. 
The contributions of this chapter are summarized in what follows. First, whereas the 
work in the literature assesses network packets against mathematical models of the power 
system, this work utilizes machine intelligence to develop a low-latency content-aware 
intrusion detection system that decodes the content of network packets and decides on their 
physical relevance. Second, the use of AI accelerates the attack detection and decision-
making processes to the millisconds range, compared to what is presented in the literature. 
This is because AI reduces the online computational burden compared to complex system 
models. Most of the time, however, is spent on offline training. Third, the proposed Finally, 
experimentally verifying the developed IDS on a hardware laboratory scale AC/DC cyber-
physical microgrid setup. 
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7.2 Analysis of Hierarchical Microgrid Control 
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Figure 7.1: Hierarchical microgrid control (red dashed curves represent information 
exchange). 
The decentralized nature of microgrids, which constitutes both energy production 
(distributed energy resources) and energy consumption (loads) entities, makes information 
exchange a challenge for proper control operations. To address that, the hierarchical control 
architecture of microgrids has been proposed in the literature [96][133][134]. As seen in 
Figure 7.1, the hierarchical control architecture divides the control operations of a 
microgrid into three levels, depending on the latency and information update time 
requirements. In the lower level, primary control applications, such as droop and local 
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control, require fast responses in the ranges of milli- to microseconds. In the middle level, 
secondary control applications, such as automatic generation control, require a response 
time in seconds. The upper layer has a much more relaxed response speed, in the minutes 
to hours range, for applications such as energy management and demand response. 
To properly implement this control architecture and to manage the exchange of 
information within and between all three layers in an orderly fashion, a link to industrial 
standards with interoperable data and protocols is necessary [96]. The IEC 61850 standard 
has been the most widely industry-accepted standard that provides a comprehensive data 
modelling and organization method, which unifies data structure definitions across 
equipment from different manufacturers. Recently, IEC 61850 has been used for microgrid 
control applications. The standard is well fit for decentralized and distributed control 
architectures because it abstracts the definition of the service and data items to be 
independent from the underlying protocols. The abstracted data items and services can thus 
be mapped into any other communication protocol [41]. Of particular interest to us in this 
work is the SMV protocol and the concept of the process bus. In decentralized industrial 
control networks, controllers acquire data about the surrounding environment through 
sensor readings and then issue control commands to actuators accordingly. The IEC 61850 
standard stipulations have introduced an intuitive method to make sensor measurements 
simultaneously available to all controllers in a microgrid network by introducing the 
concept of the process bus. As shown in Figure 7.2, this is done by splitting the input/output 
of control agents and their control logic, and placing a communication bus between them. 
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Figure 7.2: IEC 61850 process bus. 
According to IEC 61850-9-2, the maximum end-to-end time delay allowed for SMV 
messages is 3 ms. This tight limitation on message transmission time makes it nearly 
impossible to encrypt SMV, packets especially with the low processing power of 
publishing MUs and receiving IEDs. This fact is further asserted by IEC 62351-6 security 
standard, which covers the cyber security of SMV messages, and relieves time-critical 
SMV messages from the burden of being encrypted. Therefore, in the event of a network 
breach, as mentioned in the introduction, manipulating digital measurement data is an easy 
task. Similarly, the literature showed several methodologies on fake data injection attacks 
on other industrial protocols [30][102]. 
7.3 Proposed Content-Aware Intrusion Detection and Prevention Mechanism 
Since SMV is Layer 2 and non-blocking, issuing a spoofed SMV will result in a 
repeated or out-of-sequence sample counter. However, the subscribing device will not be 
 162 
 
able to distinguish which message holds the true measurement value. Accordingly, this 
section studies the feasibility of using neural network forecasters to identify spoofed and 
legitimate messages.  
As can be seen in Figure 7.3, the cyber layer detection engine is complemented by a 
physical layer forecaster. The cyber layer looks at standard stipulations, such as repeated 
sample counters, whereas, the physical layer refers to the ability of the forecaster to predict 
the value of the incoming SMV measurement, thus, being aware of the physical 
characteristics of the system. 
Incoming Data Stream
Cyber Detection
Physical 
Detection
Cyber-Physical Defense
 
Figure 7.3: Cyber-physical detection of attacks. 
With a fundamental understanding of the SMV datagram structure, it is possible to 
develop malware that specifically targets the measurement data sent along the process bus.  
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Layer 1: The Neural Network Forecaster 
In the proposed framework, each of the control agents (IED)s and the SMV publishing 
agents (MU)s will have two threads running in parallel, as seen in Figure 7.4. Thread 1 of 
the publishing agent receives analogue measurements (via current or potential 
transformers), digitizes them through its analogue to digital converter, and publishes them 
over the LAN as SMV packets. On the other hand, the control agent subscribes to these 
measurements. If an anomaly in the sequence number field is detected, the control agents 
passes the two samples through its first thread, which is the NN-F. As will be detailed later, 
the NN-F utilizes N previous samples to forecast the value of the incoming measurement. 
The NN-F will compare the error between the received samples and the forecasted value. 
Only the received SMV, which has an error less than a specified threshold, will be marked 
as benign and is passed to the control logic. 
The NN-F has three layers: one input, one hidden, and one output layer. The input layer 
has 20 neurons corresponding to 20 previous samples, whereas the output layer has 1 
neuron corresponding to the forecasted sample. The number of neurons in the hidden layer 
is 10. The forecasting accuracy of the neural network against the computation time was 
studied. Based on this empirical study, it was found that 20 previous samples and 10 
neurons in the hidden layer produce the highest accuracy in the least amount of time. 
• Generating the Training, Target, and Test Data Sets: the effectiveness of using 
neural network forecasters to distinguish spoofed from legitimate messages was 
studied on the hardware microgrid setup shown in Figure 7.9. Data 
corresponding to different events of the hardware microgrid considered in this 
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Figure 7.4: Proposed algorithm for detection of spoofed measurements. 
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Figure 7.5: Sliding window training/target data generation. 
work were collected from history logs. These events include different fault 
events that has previously happened and other contingencies, such as loss of 
transmission lines or generation units. Next, an exploration simulation approach 
was adopted to generate a rich set of training, target, and test data. That is, an 
accurate model of the microgrid was developed on Matlab/Simulink to generate 
data for the remaining contingency cases. Details on the accuracy of the 
developed model are given in Section VI. 
• Training the Neural Network: the neural network was trained with the back-
propagation algorithm with a sliding window approach. Starting from the first 
sample, 20 samples were counted as input and the 21st sample was set as the 
target output. Next, the window will move one sample, where the input will 
become samples 2 to 21, inclusive, and the target output is sample 22, and the 
process continues. The general process is depicted in Figure 7.5. 
• Setting the NN-F Decision Threshold: to set the decision threshold of the NN-
F, Monte-Carlo simulations were performed for more than 2,500 test cases, 
each with 2001 measurement samples. For each of the test cases, random fake 
data was injected at different instants according to equation (7.1). The fake data  
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Figure 7.6: Performance of the NN-F. 
was ranging between -4 and 4 Amps, which is 1.5 times the rated current of the 
microgrid under study. 
𝑓𝑎𝑘𝑒 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑎 = (𝑏 − 𝑎) × 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑() + 𝑎 (7.1) 
Where 𝑎 = −4, 𝑏 = 4, and 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑() is pseudo-random number generator that 
produces a random number between 0 and 1. Then, the forecasting error of the 
neural network was recorded. It was found that a 2% decision threshold 
produces the highest accuracy in detecting spoofed samples. 
Layer 1 was tested on fake SMV packets with current measurement values 
1.5 times the rated current and above. As can be seen in Figure 7.6, the NN-F 
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has a high accuracy in forecasting the incoming measurement value. The 
performed study shows that using a NN-F has good potential in identifying 
spoofed messages based on learning the system’s characteristics; however, over 
time, forecasters are susceptible to the accumulation of the forecasting error. 
Knowing that, an attacker could publish spoofed messages such that they don’t 
violate the 2% decision threshold. If the IED uses the fake message, the buffer 
used to forecast the incoming measurements will have a misleading entry. In 
this situation, the IED will become indecisive. 
To address this issue, an algorithm based on lightweight statistical indicators 
is proposed. 
Layer 2: Enhancing the Resiliency of the NN-F 
Based on the results from Layer 1, when the IED receives an SMV with a repeated or 
out of sequence sample counter, and is unable to distinguish the spoofed message, it will 
activate Layer 2 of the defense mechanism. 
Case 1: Attacker sends one spoofed message 
As mentioned earlier, if the IED uses the fake message, the buffer used to forecast the 
incoming measurements will have a misleading entry. Eventually the accumulation of the 
forecasting error with time, will lead the NN-F to start discarding legitimate messages, 
thus, disrupting the control operation of the IED. To avoid this situation, when the IED 
receives only one spoofed message and it cannot decide on its legitimacy, it will hold onto 
the suspected samples and will receive 5 new consecutive samples. For every one of the 
new samples, the error between the forecasted sample and the received one will be 
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recorded. Then the error derivative will be calculated. If the derivative indicates that the 
error is increasing, a flag is issued. At this stage, thread 2 of the control agent is activated. 
Thread 2 will create two datasets. The first set contains the one of the suspected samples, 
five previous samples, and the five new samples, which were monitored. On the other hand, 
the other dataset contains the other suspected sample, five previous samples, and the five 
new samples, which were monitored. It will then calculate the mean, the variance and the 
standard deviation of these datasets. These datasets are all from the measurements received 
over the network. Simultaneously, the control agent sends the flag and the position of the 
suspected sample to thread 2 of the MU agent over an out-of-band trusted network. The 
MU will create a similar dataset composed of the suspected sample, five previous, and five 
later samples. However, this dataset will be from the local digitized data that hasn’t been 
altered. Similarly, thread 2 of the MU agent will calculate the mean, the variance, and the 
standard deviation of the created dataset, and will send them to the control agent over the 
trusted network. Finally, the control agent will compare both sets of statistical indicators. 
The dataset which has matching statistical indicators is the one bearing the legitimate 
message. 
Case 2: Attackers simulates a fault condition or hides a fault condition by replaying 
normal condition. 
The NN-F is trained to forecast measurement values under fault conditions and other 
contingencies. The attacker could inject spoofed messages simulating a fake fault and the 
NN-F could identify them as legitimate. The attacker simulates a fault, one sample after 
the other. The attacker sends the 1st packet, which doesn’t violate the threshold. If the IED 
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uses it, in the next time step, the NN-F will forecast a higher current value (fault) and will 
discard the legitimate message.  
In this case, if two repeated or out-of-sequence samples are detected after each other, 
then Layer 2 is activated to decide if this is a real fault or not. Similar to Case 1, the IED 
will create two datasets. One dataset has the samples that correspond to the fake fault, while 
the other has the normal measurements. The dataset which has matching statistical 
indicators with the MU will be the legitimate one. Conversely, the attacker could hide an 
actual fault by replaying measurements corresponding to the normal condition. Following 
the same procedure, the IED could decide which message stream is valid and which is not. 
• Selection of the Statistical Indicators: the purpose of the statistical module is to 
create a small yet indicative feature vector of the two datasets generated by the 
control IED and the MU. The selected statistical features for the two datasets 
are the mean, variance, and standard deviation, calculated as shown in equations 
(7.2), (7.3), and (7.4), respectively. 
𝜇 =  ∑
𝑥𝑖
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (7.2) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 =  
1
𝑁
∑(𝑥𝑖 −  𝜇)
2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (7.3) 
𝜎 =  √
1
𝑁
∑(𝑥𝑖 −  𝜇)2
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (7.4) 
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In order to select the appropriate number of samples for the IED to hold on 
to, the following study was performed. Consider the current data shown in 
Figure 7.7. Various spoofed data were injected at the peak of the sine wave 
ranging between +/-0.5 to +/- 1.5 times of that sample. Next, 5 samples were 
taken before and after the peak sample and the mean, variance, and standard 
deviation were calculated. The same were also calculated to the same sample 
from the original data (i.e. with the actual value instead of the fake sample). The 
error of both statistical vector indicators was then calculated for all the fake data 
cases. Next, the dataset size was increased to 10 before and 10 after the fake 
sample and the error was calculated. The same procedure was then repeated 
reaching a dataset size of 60 samples before and 60 samples after the fake 
sample.  
Minimum
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Zero Crossing Zero Crossing
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Edge
+ve Rising 
Edge
+ve Falling 
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5 5
10 10
15 15
 
Figure 7.7: Performed fake data injection attack study. 
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The same procedure was repeated at all the critical locations in the sinusoid: 
the minimum, negative/positive rising/falling edge, and zero crossing. All the 
error data were then averaged for each data set size and are plotted in Figure 
7.8. As shown in Figure 7.8¸ the most indicative dataset (largest errors) was for 
5 samples before the suspected sample and 5 samples after it. 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Percentage error of the feature vector with increasing sample size. 
7.4 Experimental Setup and Model Verification 
7.4.1 Hardware Setup 
The performance of the proposed security framework was tested on data collected from 
the hybrid AC/DC cyber-physical microgrid, shown in Figure 7.9 and Figure 7.10. The 
microgrid has two generation units, Generator 1 and Generator 2, with 13.8 KVA 230 V 
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and 10.3 KVA 230 V, respectively. The two AC loads shown each have 10 levels of parallel 
resistive loads ranging from 300-W to 3-kW. In this experiment, Load 1 and Load 2 are set 
at 600 W each. Each of the shown buses has three sets of three-phase inputs and outputs 
with solid-state relays, and has its own potential and current transformer for measurement 
data collection. The DC microgrid is connected to the AC microgrid via a bi-directional 
inverter. A DER is present in the DC microgrid along with a 12-Ω DC resistive pulse load 
and a 60-Ω DC constant load. 
The AC and DC microgrids exchange power to support each other, when necessary, 
through setting the direct component of the current of the controller shown in Figure 7.11. 
The controller uses the dq transformation to convert the direct current and quadrature 
current reference from the dq to the abc reference frame. The results of the transformation 
are the three-phase reference currents, which are injected or drawn from the AC system to 
transfer the required active and reactive power. The actual current is generated using 
hysteresis current controller, which controls a voltage source converter operating in current 
control mode. 
7.4.2 Model Development and Verification 
As mentioned earlier, the AI module was trained using datasets for different operational 
states/contingencies of the microgrid collected from history recorded data or from 
simulation data. To ensure the fidelity of the simulation model, the simulated microgrid 
developed in Matlab/Simulink was verified by comparing bus voltages, currents, and 
power measurements with experimental data. Table 7.1 shows that the simulated microgrid 
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accurately describes the real one. Also, we further investigated the power sharing between 
the AC and DC microgrids in the simulated and actual system.  
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Figure 7.9: General overview of the AC/DC microgrid (CB: Circuit Breaker). 
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Figure 7.10: Labeled image of the hardware equipment used. 
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Figure 7.11: Control of the Bi-directional Inverter. 
Table 7.1: Simulated Model Verification 
 
G1 Bus G2 Bus AC Load 1 AC Load 2 DC Microgrid 
S E S E S E S E S E 
Irms 2.1 2.6 0.7 0.8 1.5 1.2 1.3 1.5 0.4 0.4 
Vrms 120 119 120 120 116 116 118 119 118 118 
P (W) 761 758 243 255 431 435 441 442 170 170 
 
Figure 7.12 shows the power on the DC microgrid interconnection bus. It can be seen 
from Figure 7.12 that both systems performed the same, thus, further verifying the fidelity 
of the simulated model. In practice, each utility or system operator has their own tools to 
model their power systems for internal studies. Such models and tools can be used to 
generate training data. 
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(a)                                                      
 
(b) 
Figure 7.12: Model verification against experimental results. (a) Simulation; (b) 
Experimental. 
7.5 Results and Discussion 
To study and analyze the effectiveness of the proposed framework, we implemented 
a MU at Load 1 and an associated control agent that receives current measurements of Load 
1 on the other side of the process bus.  
Several experiments were performed to assess the effectiveness of the different modules 
in this framework against spoofed measurement attacks and the results are reported in this 
section. 
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• The malware script was used to inject a small perturbation to the current value 
at sample 1200. In this small perturbation attack, the NN forecasting error 
started to accumulate. At this stage, the AI module monitored the rate of change 
of the error of the next few samples. As seen in  
• Figure 7.13, the error derivative was increasing indicating that indeed an 
accumulation of the forecasting error between the received and forecasted 
samples was occurring. Therefore, the IED sent a flag to the merging unit 
including the position (i.e. sample 1200) of the suspected sample to activate 
layer 2 of the proposed framework. Both the control agent and its merging unit 
performed the statistical study explained earlier. The results of the statistical 
analyses showed a difference in the calculated mean, variance, and standard 
deviation. This means that the forecasting error accumulated due the 
perturbation attack. 
• The malware script was used to inject spoofed messages simulating a fake fault. 
As seen in Figure 7.14, the attacker injected current measurement values 
corresponding to a fake fault condition. Since the first spoofed sample does not 
violate the detection threshold, it is assumed that that IED uses it to forecast the 
next sample. The next forecasted sample will be closer to the fault condition, 
rather than the legitimate SMV. Therefore, the IED will forecast that there is a 
fault, and will act accordingly. However, given the proposed cyber and physical 
defense mechanism, when the IED noticed two SMV messages, one after the 
other, each with repeated sample counters, it performed the algorithm in Section 
V B. Based on comparing the statistical indicators it received from the MU and 
 178 
 
the ones it calculated, it was able to identify that there is an attack and that this 
was a fake fault condition. 
 
Figure 7.13: Detection of perturbation attack. 
 
Figure 7.14: Detection of a fake fault. 
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• Finally, the latency of the complete detection process including the information 
exchange over the out-of-band network and the hardware time required for 
packet crafting was assessed. In Figure 7.15, t1 is the time starting from the 
instant of issuing the flag, the time to calculate the statistical vector in the 
control agent, and finally the decision making. t2 is the time it takes the first 
packet, which contains the flag, to reach the MU. t3 is the time for calculating 
the statistics vector by the MU. Finally, t4 is the time for the packet, which 
contains the statistics, to reach the control agent. Therefore, the total detection 
latency is calculated in equation (7.5): 
𝑡𝑇 = 𝑡1 + 𝑡2 + 𝑡3 + 𝑡4 
𝑡𝑇 = 0.4 + 0.25 + 0.25 + 0.3 
𝑡𝑇 = 1.2 𝑚𝑠 
(7.5) 
 
Figure 7.15: Detection of Latency. 
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We designed the following experiment within the private network to determine the 
latency of this two-message exchange, while accounting for delays imposed by the 
hardware. By using one of the General Purpose Input Output (GPIO) header pins on the 
agent devices, we can instruct the device to craft a packet and send it on the network in 
response to a High digital input. Then, we can instruct the receiving device to set one of its 
digital output pins to Low after it has received and processed the GOOSE message. Figure 
7.15 shows the results of the experiment, demonstrating that the entire process of sending 
a single message takes roughly 0.25 ms. 
7.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the reliability of utilizing neural network forecasters to detect spoofed 
messages was studied. It was found that although they have a high detection accuracy, they 
could still be susceptible to the accumulation of the forecasting error. Accordingly, this 
chapter also presented a lightweight algorithm, based on statistical indicators, to enhance 
the reliability of the neural network forecaster in terms of detecting spoofed sampled 
measured values. This algorithm is considered as a second line of defense, complementing 
the cyber security methods, such as encryption and authentication. The studies were 
conducted on a laboratory-scale hardware microgrid with a commercial network switch to 
be more representative of the microgrid environment than event-based simulation models. 
The detection latency of the proposed algorithm was found to be near real-time, in the 
range of 1-2 ms. 
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Chapter 8 Utilizing Energy Storage Devices to Ensure Customers’ Privacy 
through Smart Energy Management 
 
The load-demand profiles of customers reveal a lot of information about the customers’ 
daily behavior, such as their sleeping schedules and the time they spend inside or outside 
their homes. Customers’ load-demand data is transferred to utility control centers over wide 
area networks through an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI). If an attacker 
intercepts this data, he/she will be able to infer private and sensitive information about the 
customer. To that end, this chapter discusses the development of an energy management 
prototype, which utilizes energy storage and local generation devices to camouflage 
customers’ load-demand profiles, ensuring their privacy. 
8.1 Introduction 
The AMI allows bi-directional information exchange between smart meters and utility 
control centers. The meters send consumption information, usually every one hour, and 
receive price information and control commands from the smart meter head-end. Since the 
smart meters collect accurate load consumption data, a lot of information about the 
customer can be extracted from the meter data. This information includes private customer 
behavior, such as the customer’s sleeping schedule, the time at which the customer leaves 
or comes back home, the type of appliances they are using, and even the time at which each 
appliance is used. Therefore, if an attacker were to access this data, the customer’s privacy 
and safety may be jeopardized. 
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This privacy problem is not only a concern to residential customers, but is also a big 
concern for military bases that are present abroad, and are connected to foreign utility grids. 
The privacy of the load-demand consumption profiles is of high importance in this case. 
The technique by which data is extracted from load-demand consumption profiles is 
called Non-Intrusive Load Monitoring (NILM). NILM was first introduced in 
[135][136][137]. The idea behind NILM is to disaggregate the consumption data for 
individual appliances from the total metered data. In order to identify the individual 
appliances, NILM utilizes current, active power, and reactive power signatures. 
In order to ensure the privacy of customers and obfuscate their metered data, several 
privacy preserving techniques were introduced. A study in [138] categorizes these efforts 
into three main categories: 
1. Anonymization of metering data, which involves the utilization of an ID escrow 
third-party to separate meter data and ID’s of customers. 
2. Privacy-preserving metering data aggregation, which involves the aggregation 
of meter data from several households within a certain district, before sending 
this data to the utility center. 
3. Metering data obfuscation, which involves utilizing energy storage to hide 
individual load profiles. 
This chapter will focus on metering data obfuscation efforts. In [139], a comparison 
between Battery-based Load Hiding (BLH) techniques and Load-based Load Hiding 
(LLH) techniques was presented. The main difference between the two techniques is that 
BLH techniques use battery charging/discharging algorithms to flatten peak demand and 
eventually obfuscate meter data, whereas LLH techniques use controllable loads to 
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increase the metered load level compared to the net demand. The authors in [140] proposed 
the usage of electric vehicles for household load-demand profile hiding. Their work 
achieved a dual purpose of optimal electric vehicle charging and obfuscating metering data. 
In [141], a power management model, using a rechargeable battery, was introduced under 
the assumption that electrical power routing can be used to hide usage information of home 
appliances. Many other similar works are also present in the literature.  
In this chapter, the development of an energy management algorithm, which utilizes 
batteries and local generation devices to obfuscate meter data, is discussed in detail. First, 
an overview of the energy management system will be presented. Next, details about the 
system’s main module, which is the fuzzy logic controller, are discussed. Then, the 
optimization problem is formulated along with the details of the implemented exploration 
simulation approach. Finally, the results of the presented energy management system in 
terms of hiding customers’ load-demand profiles are given for residential load consumption 
in Miami, Florida, for the year 2014. 
8.2 Description of the Energy Management System 
The developed energy management system is intended to hide the load-demand profiles 
of small microgrids, or as they have been referred to in the recent literature “nanogrids”.  
Since the expertise and manpower that are present in large utility systems is not always 
available for operating small microgrids, energy management systems for small microgrids 
should be designed for ease of installation, support, and maintenance. Therefore, a robust, 
resilient, and distributed communication infrastructure, with failover mechanisms, is 
required. Accordingly, the DDS standard from OMG has been selected as the 
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communication middleware that orchestrates all the energy management system’s 
components together. The DDS is a peer-to-peer data-centric protocol capable of meeting 
the required performance metrics of the developed energy management for small 
microgrids. The DDS middleware is explained in detail in Chapter 2. 
Figure 8.1 shows the overall topology of the nangorid on which the proposed energy 
management system is implemented. The controlled nanogrid has its local energy storage 
(battery in our case), distributed energy resource (a PV system in our case), and local loads. 
At all times, the nanogrid is assumed to be connected to the utility system through a 
bidirectional grid-tied inverter. The Direction of Power Flow signal is a control command 
that is issued by the energy management system that sets the percentage of the power that 
is to bought from or sold to the utility grid. 
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Figure 8.1: Topology of the Nanogrid. 
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In the case the nanogrid has surplus energy, the energy management system’s controller 
outputs a power reference signal, which dictates the percentage of excess energy that is to 
be stored in local energy storage devices and the percentage that is to be sold to the utility. 
This is done only after ensuring that the local load-demand of the nanogrid is satisfied. 
Contrary to this, if the nanogrid has energy deficiency, the energy management system’s 
controller checks the amount of power that is needed to cover the local load, then it 
purchases that amount from the utility grid. This process is explained in the diagrams in 
Figure 8.1. 
 
Figure 8.2 shows the logical relations between the DDS topics and the components of 
the developed system. In the proposed EMS, in order to forecast the anticipated load-
demand for the next operating period, the load forecasting module depends on weather data 
and previous load-demand profiles. The load forecasting module publishes the anticipated 
load-demand to the Forecasting Data topic. The smart meter, battery system, and the smart 
loads publish the local measurements, available energy, and local load data to the Available 
Energy, Load Data, and Local Measurements topics, respectively. The converter controller 
also publishes to the Local Measurements topic. Finally, the energy management system 
subscribes to the Available Energy, Forecasted Data, Price Information, and Local 
Measurements topics and publishes the control command and price information. 
The energy management system controller is based on a set of fuzzy logic rules, and 
takes its decision based on several input parameters, which are going to be discussed in the 
next section. 
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Figure 8.2: Logical Relations between the DDS Topics and the EMS Components. 
8.3 The Fuzzy Inference System 
The energy management system’s controller is a fuzzy inference system built in 
accordance to the Sugeno-like model. The controller takes the batteries’ state-of-charge 
(SOC), current price (CP), next hour price (NHP), and available energy minus local load-
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demand (AE - LLD) as inputs, and produces the nanogrid’s reference power (P_ref) as 
output according to equations (8.1) and (8.2): 
Excess Energy Case:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 = (𝐴𝐸 − 𝐿𝐿𝐷)𝑥 + 𝐿𝐿𝐷         (8.1) 
Deficit Energy Case:  
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑓 = (𝐿𝐿𝐷)𝑥     (8.2) 
Where 𝑥 is the raw output of the controller, and is a number between zero and one. In 
the case of excess energy, 𝑥 is thought of as the percentage of extra energy that is going to 
the local storage devices, and thus, (1 − 𝑥) is the percentage of energy that is to be sold to 
the grid. On the other hand, in the case of deficit energy, 𝑥 is thought of as the percentage 
of energy that is required to cover the deficit in local generation, in order to cover the 
nanogrid’s local load-demand. 
Figure 8.3 shows a block diagram of the developed fuzzy inference system. Each input 
is passed through a set of trapezoidal membership functions and its membership value is 
evaluated. The ranges for the membership function are tabulated in Table 8.1. It is 
important to mention here that in order to maintain a good state of health of the battery, the 
controller does not allow the battery to drop below a state of charge of 40% [142]. Next, 
the firing strength of each rule is calculated using the minimum operator. Finally, the 
weighted sum technique is used to calculate the crisp value of the output. 
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Table 8.1: Ranges of the Membership Functions 
Input Membership Function Range 
Battery State of Charge 
(%) 
Don’t Sell 𝑆𝑂𝐶 ≤ 40 
Low SOC 40 < 𝑆𝑂𝐶 ≤ 50 
Medium SOC 50 < 𝑆𝑂𝐶 ≤ 60 
High SOC 60 < 𝑆𝑂𝐶 < 100 
Fully Charged 𝑆𝑂𝐶 =  100 
Current Price (c/kWh) 
Low CP 𝐶𝑃 = 10  
High CP 𝐶𝑃 = 14  
Next Hour Price (c/kWh) 
Low NHP 𝐶𝑃 = 10  
High NHP 𝐶𝑃 = 14  
Available Energy (%) 
Low AE 𝐴𝐸 ≤ 50 
High AE 𝐴𝐸 > 50 
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Figure 8.3: The Fuzzy Inference System. 
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8.3.1 Evaluating the Performance of the Energy Management System 
The nanogrids, energy management algorithm, energy storage, renewable resources, 
and load models are developed on MATLAB/Simulink. Instead of having all the modules 
exchange data internally within the MATLAB environment, the developed modules are 
integrated with a DDS communication middleware to exchange the data over a real 
Ethernet network. This approach was adopted in order to account for networking issues, 
such as packet drop, latency, and QoS. The merging of real network hardware and 
simulation software creates a hybrid modelling environment, which allows accurate 
emulation of the proposed energy management system as an integrated cyber-physical 
system. Finally, a software module, representing a smart meter head-end, collects all 
consumption measurements, feeds the data to the utility pricing module, and publishes back 
the real time energy prices. 
 
Figure 8.4: Winter Real-time Pricing. 
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Figure 8.5: Summer Real-time Pricing. 
Here, we present the results of applying the proposed energy management system on 
load-demand profiles and solar irradiance measurements, that were collected for Miami, 
Florida, USA in the Winter and Summer seasons for the year 2014. The month of January 
has been selected to represent the Winter season, whereas the month of August was selected 
to represent the Summer season. Additionally, each case was emulated with real-time 
pricing profiles. 
Figure 8.4 and Figure 8.5 show the result of applying the proposed energy management 
algorithm with real-time pricing scheme in Winter and Summer seasons, respectively. 
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Looking at the zoomed parts in Figure 8.4, the original load-demand profile had peaks 
during high-energy price periods. The proposed energy management system was 
successful in reducing these peak values by managing the consumption from energy 
storage and renewable resources. In the Winter season, the peak load-demand at time t = 
6.8 days, which corresponds to a high-price period, was reduced from 3600 W to 2571.3 
W. Looking at the SOC profile, one notices that the SOC ranges between 60-100%.  These 
results are also asserted in the Summer season, shown in Figure 8.5, where the peak load-
demand at t = 7 days dropped from 3600 W to 2628.3 W. Similarly, the SOC of the batteries 
ranges between 60-100%. 
Using the previous discussion, and comparing the load profiles before and after running 
the energy management system, one notices that the energy management system was 
clearly able to hide the original load demand profile, ensuring the privacy of the customer’s 
data. 
8.4 Optimizing the Controller’s Parameters for Better Results 
As discussed earlier, the purpose of the energy management system is hiding the 
customer’s load-demand profile as much as possible, to ensure his/her privacy. In order to 
achieve the best results, an online parameter optimization scheme for the fuzzy logic 
controller parameters, based on Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO), was developed.  
Figure 8.6 shows the chronological order of the optimization process. At the beginning 
of each day, the collected data from the previous day are fed into the optimizer, and the 
optimization process is initiated to come up with new optimized controller parameters for 
that day. It is worth noting that the optimization process in this work falls into the category 
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of exploration simulation. That is, during the second day, while the system is in operation, 
the optimization process is being executed in the background on a simulated microgrid 
model to evaluate the performance of the new optimized parameters. Once the processes 
finalizes, the controller’s parameters are updated online without any disturbance to the 
overall system operation. 
Consider the three-day period shown in Figure 8.6. During the previous twenty four 
hours, measurement units in the microgrid are continuously collecting data about available 
energy, local load demand, current price, next hour price, and state-of-charge of the 
nanogrid’s energy storage devices. All of the collected data for the past twenty-four-hour 
window are stored in the nanogrid’s database. At the end of the first day, the optimization 
process initiates. First, a search space is randomly generated by defining a population of 
varying combinations of membership functions. The population generation process is 
bounded by vectors of lower bounds (LB) and upper bounds (UB) for each of the vertices 
of the membership functions. Proper definition of the lower and upper bounds is critical 
for the success of the optimization process. Figure 8.7, shows the search space for a given 
trapezoidal membership function. In order to ensure proper operation of the fuzzy 
controller, the condition that A < B < C < D must be met. 
Also, assume that the red membership function corresponds to a low SOC and the green 
membership function corresponds to a high SOC. It is important, thus, that the green 
membership function remains to the right of the red one. All these conditions have been 
taken into account in the setting of the lower bounds’ and the upper bounds’ vectors. The 
objective function to be minimized is shown in equation (8.3). 
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Figure 8.6: Optimization Process. 
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Figure 8.7: Constrained Search Space for Trapezoidal Membership Functions. 
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (∑ 𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦(ℎ) × 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡(ℎ) 
24
ℎ=1 )                                         (8.3) 
In a unique exploration simulation approach for fitness function evaluation, a software 
model of the physical nanogrid with its controller was developed and used to simulate the 
response of the nanogrid to the various particles in the swarm, and evaluate the profits and 
expenditures. In all situations, the optimization processes is bound by the constraints of 
checking that the nanogrid is covering its base load and that the energy storage devices are 
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maintained at a proper state of charge that does not deteriorate them. The optimization 
process is repeated until the combination of membership functions that results in better 
utilization of the nanogrid’s energy storage, to shift peak loads to low price periods, is 
achieved. This process is summarized in the flowchart of Figure 8.8. 
Stop
Define LB and UP for 
Controller Parameters
Generate random 
population within LB and UB
Evaluate fitness function for 
each particle
Get best solution (max 
profit/min cost)
Minimum reached or 
Maximum iteration reached
Update particle 
velocities and 
positions within 
LB and UB
Get best solution
Update controller 
parameters
Start
True
False
 
Figure 8.8: Flowchart of the PSO problem. 
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8.4.1 Results of the Online Optimization 
 
Figure 8.9: Winter Real-time Pricing with Optimized Parameters. 
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energy storage devices in the nanogrid. Looking at the SOC profile, one notices that the 
SOC with optimization ranges between 40-100%. These results were similar in the summer 
season, where the peak load at t = 7 days dropped from 3600 W to 0 W with optimization. 
Similarly, the SOC with optimization ranges between 40-100%. 
 
Figure 8.10: Summer Real-time Pricing with Optimized Parameters. 
The results of the optimized parameters further assert the robustness of the developed 
energy management system in hiding the original customer load-demand profile, ensuring 
his/her privacy. 
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In addition to hiding the load demand profile, the energy management system provides 
customers with savings on their energy bills. Table 8.2 shows the anticipated savings that 
customers will achieve if they implemented the proposed energy management system. As 
can be seen in Table 8.2 for the real-time pricing scheme, the overall savings without 
optimization in the winter and summer seasons were 7.5% and 7.3%, respectively. The 
savings increased with the optimized parameters to 14.86% and 18.56% for the winter and 
summer seasons, respectively. 
Table 8.2: Total Savings 
Pricing 
 
Season 
 
Total Cost 
Without EMS 
Total Cost 
with EMS 
Total Cost with 
Optimized EMS 
RTP 
Winter $ 145.74 $ 134.76 $ 124.08 
Summer $ 90.81 $ 84.12 $ 73.95 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, an energy management system to hide the load demand profile for small 
microgrids was developed. An online optimization module accounting for history, current, 
and future system observations, utilizing particle swarm optimization, was also developed 
to enhance the results of the energy management system. The DDS middleware was 
selected as the communication backbone for the proposed framework for its robust failover 
mechanisms and rich set of QoS profiles. The energy management system was tested on 
actual residential energy consumption and irradiance data from Miami, Florida, and proved 
its effectiveness not only in hiding the customer’s load demand profile, but also in reducing 
the consumer’s bills and achieving flat peak load profiles  
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Chapter 9 Cyber Security Issues and Measures in Movable Systems 
In today’s world, EVs are becoming a reality, and therefore, their public charging will 
be required extensively. Being mobile by nature, EVs require the availability of 
information over wide geographical areas. Accordingly, this chapter briefly introduces the 
reader to the EV charging process and discusses both its vulnerabilities and cyber security 
requirements. 
9.1 Introduction 
The evolution rate of the power industry is increasing year after year. Over the past 
decade or two, this progress has been culminated by the emergence of the concept of Smart 
Grids, which is seen as a power system with real-time communication and control 
capabilities between energy providers on one hand, and energy consumers on the other. 
This modern power system model allows facilities to adopt new technologies and 
consumers to perceive new services. Utilizing communication technologies, the smart grid 
topology allows optimization of energy usage based on several factors, including 
environmental, price preferences, and system technical issues [1]. The term Smart Grid 
may refer to large systems with a large number of interacting energy production sources 
and energy consumption components. However, the same real-time communication and 
control capabilities can be applied to smaller scale systems, such as microgrids. The 
Department of Energy (DoE) defines a microgrid as “a group of interconnected loads and 
distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical boundaries that act as a single 
controllable entity with respect to the grid” [143]. 
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The concept of smart grid and microgrids widened the thought horizons and altered the 
perspectives of other industry sectors. One significant example is the introduction of EV 
in the transportation industry. EVs have their energy stored in batteries, and thus, have 
limited operation time. Therefore, EVs need to be recharged regularly. This fact introduces 
a whole new set of complexities to the operation of the power system, one of which is 
related to the effect EVs have on load-demand profiles. It is a common practice to divide 
energy consumers into residential, commercial, and industrial loads with load-demand 
profiles, which can be forecasted with an acceptable accuracy. Conversely, the energy 
consumed by EVs is stochastic in nature and is hard to predict. Several factors are 
incorporated in this issue, including individual driving preferences, manufacturers’ 
specifications, trips’ durations, etc. In fact, extensive ongoing research efforts have been 
placed on EVs, whether plug-in or wirelessly charged, in areas related to design 
optimization, charge control, efficiency boosting, large scale penetration of EVs into the 
smart grid, and many others [144][145][146][147]. 
In the Smart Grid era, EVs are gaining increased attention from various sectors. Given 
the increased demand for power, researches are looking at energy transaction algorithms 
between smart grids and electric vehicles, which not only sell power to EVs, but also draw 
power from them when this power is available and needed. Here, design of a bidirectional 
power flow model for EVs to support Grid-to-Vehicle (G2V) and Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) 
power flow is viable. Looking at an EV as an energy consumer and an energy producer, 
simultaneously, with grid connection capabilities, leads us to define EVs as mobile 
microgrids or microgrids on wheels. Therefore, integration of EVs with the electric grid 
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must be handled with extreme care and studied from various perspectives. While bringing 
many benefits to its owners in terms of cost savings, especially with the work being done 
on energy management systems, EV charging, when looked at as a cyber-physical process, 
puts car owners at risk of several attacks. As detailed later in this chapter, these attacks 
range from fabricating price information to completely shutting off a charging session. 
Like any other modern process, data exchange is a prerequisite for implementing EV 
charging. A major issue to look at, therefore, is the cyber-security of EV-Grid interactions. 
9.2 On the Security of Electric Vehicle Charging 
Today, each EV comes with an onboard Electronic Control Unit (ECU), which holds 
the vehicle’s information and manages communication with charging stations. In fact, there 
are efforts to standardize EV-Grid communication, such as ISO/IEC 15118 and SAE 
J9231. However, robustness of these standards lags behind in issues related to identity 
authentication and data integrity, confidentiality, and privacy [148]. Since the electric 
vehicle technologies are in the early development stage, researchers could incorporate 
cyber-security into their design methodologies from the beginning of the development 
process. Here, it is important to realize the difference between the “functional safety” and 
“cyber-security,” as shown in Figure 9.1. ECUs in the automotive industry are software-
intensive units and are used to control a wide range of safety-critical issues, such as 
emergency brake assist, cruise control, and anti-lock braking systems, to name a few. 
Functional safety measures, such as IEC 61508, WD 26262, and MISRA Guidelines, were 
extensively addressed in the literature and are applied in the automotive industry to ensure 
continuous safe operation of the vehicle. From a cyber-security perspective, this chapter 
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exploits vulnerabilities in the EV charging process and guides researchers into the direction 
of designing robust and highly secure EV ecosystem, which will safely integrate with the 
power grid. 
It is well known that generation-load balancing in power systems is not an easy task to 
perform. The introduction of the EVs into this equation complicates things further. 
Therefore, a lot of feedback control is being developed and implemented on charging  
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Figure 9.1: Functional Safety versus Cyber-Security. 
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stations to maintain a stable operation of the power system. That is, when connected to a 
charging station, the EV’s charging profile must always be monitored and the EV itself 
must properly respond to command signals coming from the charging station. It is 
imperative that such commands come from an authentic source (the charging station) and 
reach the intended host (authenticated EV) unaltered. In a typical charging scenario, an EV 
arrives at a charging station and requests a charging session. As stated by IEC 15118, each 
EV must have a secret key stored in one of its ECUs. If the control station verifies the car’s 
key through wireless communication, the charging process can be easily compromised by 
a MITM attack [149].  
Charging ...
Adversary car being 
charged
Car used for 
authentication
 
Figure 9.2: Man-in-the-Middle Attack. 
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As shown in Figure 9.2, a registered car with a valid key performs the authentication 
process, while the charging cable is connected to a stolen car. Not only do MITM attacks 
allow charging of unregistered cars, but also the firmware on the stolen car’s ECU can be 
modified, such that the car will not to respond to commands from the charging station. It 
is to be noted that modifying a vehicle’s ECU is not an easy task; however, it is not 
impossible. In fact, the authors in [150] were able to reprogram the firmware on a 2010 
Ford Escape and a 2010 Toyota Prius ECU. Such an attack can tamper with or block 
vehicle-to-grid services. 
Today, EV charging stations can be found in public places, such as airports, malls’ 
parking, and roadsides. They are thus exposed to public and vulnerable networks. Although 
security practices are being standardized, it is imperative to continuously evaluate these 
standards to ensure high security levels. In fact, [151] disclosed two weaknesses in the 
NISTIR 7628 security framework in the context of EV infrastructure: one is related to the 
device authentication, while the other is related to location privacy. EVs charging process 
is thus prone to other types of attacks, including eavesdropping, denial of service, and data 
spoofing. It is important to understand how these attacks are implemented in order to study 
their consequences on the EV charging ecosystem and to take appropriate defense 
mechanisms. 
1) Eavesdropping: In this type of attack, it is assumed that the attacker has access to 
the LAN of the charging station. After breaching the network, the attacker can sniff 
and store all the data being communicated between the charging station and the 
electric vehicle, as shown in Figure 9.3. For example,  
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Figure 9.3: Sniffing the Victim's Car Data by ARP Cache Poisoning 
the LAN can be penetrated by ARP Cache Poisoning. 
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IEC 15118 states that before initiating a charging session, an Identification and 
Authentication process must be performed in order to check the EV’s identity. In 
this process, the car’s Identification Number, which is a unique number stored in 
the vehicle’s ECU, is exchanged with the charging station over the LAN. An 
attacker eavesdropping on the network can get hold of the ID of the EV. Although 
IEC 15118 established the requirement of using Transport Layer Security (TLS) 
for communicating data, TLS itself can be compromised [152][153]. With the 
knowledge of an EV’s ID, an attacker can download this ID into an ECU of a stolen 
or an unregistered car and initiate detestable charging sessions. Not only is the EV’s 
ID compromised, but also is the payment information of the attacked vehicle’s 
owner. Charging of unregistered vehicles with fake ID’s could lead to financial 
losses to both the car owner and to the power company. 
2) Denial of Service: DoS attacks put the grid and the EV at risk. As shown in Figure 
9.4, DoS is when an attacker blocks an entity from accessing a given service. 
Technically, DoS can be achieved by flooding the network. That is, the attacker 
attempts to obstruct the communication channels and expend the computational 
resources of the communicating nodes by delaying message delivery past a critical 
flooding rate. Here again, blocking a control signal coming from the charging 
station from reaching the ECU on the EV will prevent the vehicle from responding 
to serious grid commands, such as load shedding. An attacker might as well block 
the whole charging process, leading to inconvenience to the car’s owner. 
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Figure 9.4: Denial of Service Attack. 
3) Data Spoofing: After blocking the communication link between the charging 
station and an EV by a successful DoS attack, an attacker might inject false or 
malicious data both to the charging station and to the EV, as shown in Figure 9.5. 
With accurate knowledge of data and message types, the probability of a successful 
data spoofing attack is relatively high, especially in that IEC 15118 relies on the 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) approach. Although PKI helps authenticate 
identities on a network by a chain of trust of digital certificates, this infrastructure 
is as strong as the weakest device on the network. Interfering with communication 
messages in the context of EV charging opens the road to many fraudulent and 
hazardous acts. Such acts may cause network congestions, delay of successful 
delivery of legitimate messages, and disruption of services [13]. The authors in 
[154] also explained that modifying pricing signals sent to EVs to be very low could 
result in a large number of vehicles requesting charging sessions simultaneously, 
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leading to unstable grid operations or at a larger scale could possibly cause 
blackouts. 
From a broader viewpoint, the attacks on a vehicle are not only limited to the charging 
process. The onboard computers, on current vehicles, can be categorized as computers for 
controlling the car’s Entertainment Systems and computers for controlling and monitoring 
the car operation itself, such as keyless ignition, dynamic breaking, and anti-lock brake 
control, among others. Rigid security of communication channels between these onboard 
computers was not an issue when they first came into the market, as they were  
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Figure 9.5: Altering Commands Sent to Victim EV by Data Spoofing. 
considered to operate within the car’s isolated network. However, entertainment systems 
of new vehicles come with Universal Serial Bus (USB) ports for connecting electronic 
devices and also internet connectivity over mobile networks (GPRS, 3G, and 4G). The 
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vehicle’s network is no longer isolated. Using the entertainment system’s network as an 
entry point, an attacker can benefit from open ports to hack into other ECU’s controlling 
critical operations, such as braking, steering, or even shutting the vehicle off. In fact, 
researchers Miller and Valasek published their work “Remote Exploitation of an Unaltered 
Passenger Vehicle” in August 2015, where they were able to hack into a Chrysler Jeep 
remotely and control any service in the car, which is controllable over the in-car network. 
The researchers used the U-Connect entertainment system in the Jeep as an entry point to 
the car network. This astounding work got a lot of attention from the media, as it was 
applied on a real commercial vehicle, which people were already driving. Yet again, it is 
highly recommended to look into securing all communication links inside a vehicle starting 
from the planning and design stages. 
The likelihood of electric vehicles charging process to be besieged by various attacks 
is now evident. Each type of attack has its own objective and critical consequences both on 
the grid and on the EV itself. These consequences, being grid instability, energy theft, false 
identification, jeopardizing EV owner’s personal security, and others are not to be belittled. 
IEC 15118 did publish security standards for communications regarding charging electric 
vehicles, but its resiliency against the previously mentioned attacks is still debatable. 
Significant thought is being devoted to designing EV charging stations, and considerations 
regarding the security of these systems ought to be considered and utilized at early design 
stages. 
Recently, industry and academic research are gaining insight into the importance of 
securing the EV charging process, and work is being done to defend against some types of 
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attacks. In 2014, the authors in [151] proposed a cyber-physical EV authentication 
mechanism to eliminate the substitution attack, which is a type of MITM attack. Following 
the successful vehicle authentication by the charging station occurring over a wireless 
communication medium, another physical challenge is sent over the control pin of the 
charging cable to make sure that the claimed authenticated car is actually the one being 
charged, and not an adversary one. This approach is tailored and well-suited for plug-in 
electric vehicles and does not account for the next generation wirelessly-charged electric 
vehicles. In the latter, there is no charging cable, and thus, the proposed defense mechanism 
is not adequate. 
In another recent approach, the authors in [155] looked at a comprehensive demand-
side management system, with stringent security mechanisms, for safe integration of 
electric vehicles into the smart grid. First, the authors identified the importance of power 
grids having full access control of the charging process in order to ensure stable and reliable 
grid operation. Then, they started designing their system from a physical and cyber 
perspective, simultaneously. Key to their work, is the digital identity assurance of electric 
vehicles for safe integration with the power grid. One might argue that this system uses 
legacy cryptographic techniques for digital devices’ identification and data encryption; 
however, a big advantage of this work is the thought process followed by the authors, where 
security was tailored in starting from the planning and system design phases. 
The smart grid, as proposed in [156], is divided into five broad components, namely 
“Smart Power Grid,” “Smart Consumer,” “Smart Electricity Service,” “Smart Renewable,” 
and “Smart Transportation”. These are all still envisioned futuristic concepts, which are 
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undergoing extensive research and investigation both nationally and internationally. 
Contrary to the legacy power systems’ communications networks, which were designed to 
operate in close environments, it is about time that communication security is placed at the 
top of the table in designing the future smart power grid in all its components, including 
the EV ecosystem. 
9.3 Conclusion 
This chapter exploited the shortcomings of current EV-Grid integration systems and 
investigated the drawbacks of security breaches on the power grid, the EV itself, and the 
safety of the vehicles’ owners, in hope of advocating a new thought philosophy that gives 
the same importance for system operation and system security. Electric Vehicles are indeed 
microgrids on wheels, but for them to be widely integrated with the smart grid, their 
security has to be placed in the front seat, rather than being left behind. 
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Chapter 10 Working with Embedded Linux 
This chapter is aimed to be as a tutorial on important tools and skillsets that will allow 
the readers to develop technologies related to secure communication and intelligent 
systems, which facilitate real-time, distributed data processing, and multi-level decision 
making in the heterogeneous power and energy infrastructure. By the end of this chapter, 
the reader will be able to develop experimentation with the GOOSE protocol using the 
libiec61850 open source library and RTI DDS on embedded microcontrollers running 
under Linux kernels. The readers will be taught how to interface with hardware equipment 
through analogue inputs and outputs of microntrollers.  
10.1 Working with Embedded Microcontrollers Running under Linux. 
The Beaglebone Black (BBB) is a powerful microcontroller, which enables researchers 
to prototype wide variety of technologies related to energy cyber-physical systems. Figure 
10.1 is a pictorial of the BBB. The BBB is powered by a 5V DC power supply. It has a 
10/100 Ethernet port, a USB host, a micro HDMI, and a micro SD slot. It can be connected 
to WiFi through a dongle connected to its USB host. The BBB, also, has a 512 MB DDR3 
RAM, an eMMC, and a Sitara AM3359 ARM microprocessor. 
The BBB comes with a pair of header pins, annotated as P9 and P8 in Figure 10.1. 
These pair of header pins are of paramount importance to us, since they allow the BBB to 
interface with the real world equipment through analogue inputs and digital inputs and 
outputs. 
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Figure 10.1: The Beaglebon Black and its header pins. 
10.1.1 Installing the Debian Image on the BBB. 
To configure the BBB, we need to setup an operating system on it. To do that, we will 
need a micro SD card with a minimum capacity of 4 GB.  
• Step 1: Download an image flasher software on your Windows or Linux device. 
One possible flashing software, which could be used, is found in [157]. 
• Step 2: Download the Debian Linux image for your BBB from [158]. 
• Step 3: Connect the micrSD card to your computer and burn the image onto it 
using the software downloaded in Step 1. 
•  Step 4: Insert the micro SD card, which has the Debian image on it, and hold 
onto the Boot button. Next, connect the power supply and keep pressing the 
Boot button until all 4 LEDs on the upper left corner of the BBB are lit. 
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At this stage, the Beaglebone black is running the Debian image, which is installed on 
the micro SD card connected to it. To access the BBB, connect it to your computer via the 
USB that comes with it.  
Once the BBB is connected, a new Ethernet interface appears on your computer with a 
.7 subnet. By default the BBB will have an IP address of 192.168.7.2. We connect to the 
BBB with a secure shell (SSH) connection through a terminal. 
• Step 5: Open a terminal on your computer and connect to the BBB by typing 
the following command: ssh user@192.168.7.2, where user is the username 
you are trying to log in to. User could be root, if you want to log in as root, or 
debian, which is the default username on the BBB. At this stage, use the root 
user. The default password for the BBB is temppwd. 
Once you are logged in, it is preferable that you flash the Debian image onto the eMMC. 
• Step 6: To flash the Debian image onto the eMMC of the BBB, change your 
directory with the following command: cd /opt/scripts/tools/eMMC/ 
 then run the shell script  sudo ./init-eMMC-flasher-v3.sh 
• Step 7: Shutdown the BBB using the PWR button, remove the micro SD card, 
and turn the BBB back on. You are now running Debian from the eMMC. 
10.1.2 Network Preferences. 
To connect the BBB to your LAN, you need to setup the network preferences. 
• Step 1: Connect the BBB to your computer through the USB cable and login 
into it as described in Section 10.1.1 (ssh user@192.168.7.2,). 
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• Step 2: Use the following command to open and edit the text file, which 
contains the network settings: nano /etc/networks/interfaces. This step requires 
root privileges.  
• Step 3: To setup a static IP, add the following to the opened text file: 
auto INTERFACE_NAME 
iface INTERFACE_NAME inet static 
address IP_ADDRESS_OF_CHOICE 
netmask NETMASK 
gateway GATEWAY 
• Step 4: To setup a dynamic IP, add the following to the opened text file: 
auto INTERFACE_NAME 
iface INTERFACE_NAME inet dhcp 
Once you configured your network interfaces, reboot the BBB to apply the changes. 
Now you can remotely login into the BBB from any computer on the same network using 
the newly assigned IP address. 
10.1.3 Sampling and Analogue Input. 
The BBB has 7 analogue input pins on its P9 header. These are pins 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 
39, and 40. Before using these pins as analogue input pins, we need to let the 
microprocessor know that these pins will be used as analogue input pins. To do that, we 
need to define a device tree overlay file and echo it into the BBB’s cape manager. We will 
go through creating device tree overlay files and building them in later sections. However, 
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for analogue inputs, there already is an environment variable loaded in Debian for BBB 
that does this. The following command will perform the intended task: 
echo BB-ADC > /sys/devices/platform/bone_capemgr/slots 
It is very important to note that the analogue input pins read voltages between 0 and 
1.8 V. Therefore, any reading from the real world must be preconditioned to be within the 
specified voltage limits. 
To automate data readings and integrate them in your code, the following function 
could be utilized. This function is written in C. 
 
The readADC() function takes the number of the ADC pin to read from as input (0 to 
6) and returns the read value as output. The function creates a file pointer (fd), a file buffer 
(buf), and a character variable (4), which holds up to 4 digits of the ADC value read. Next, 
the ADC pin is treated as a read only file, from which the values can be read through the 
read() function. Finally, the readADC() function requires the following header files. 
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An example C program that utilizes this function to read the ADC values from the 7 
ADC pins and print their values is shown below: 
 
10.1.4 Device Tree Overlays and Digital Inputs and Outputs 
 A Device Tree Overlay, or DTO, is basically data structure of peripherals and their 
properties that describe non-discoverable hardware [159]. A DTO data structure is used to 
assign the general purpose input output (GPIO) pins on the BBB’s header pins as either 
digital inputs or outputs. All GPIO pins and their numbers are shown in Figure 10.1. 
Loading a DTO into the bootloader’s runtime-accessible location of the BBB requires 
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creating a .dtc file and compiling it with a dtc compiler to create what is called a device 
tree blob (.dtb). 
An example dts file from [160] is shown below. 
 
You can edit the file above to describe the hardware (pins) you wish to use. Set them 
as input or output, specify whether or not to use the internal pull up/down resistors …. You 
can use the P9 and P8 header tables, shown in Figure 10.1, to identify the correct addresses 
of the pins.  
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To compile the dts file and load it into the BBB: 
• Step 1: Set the environment variables. Do this once and for all by adding the 
following lines of code to the “.bashrc” file in the beagelbone bone black. 
export SLOTS=/sys/devices/platform/bone_capemgr/slots 
export PINS=/sys/kernel/debug/pinctrl/44e10800.pinmux/pins 
• Step 2: Copy the “.dts” file into the BBB (anywhere, we just need to compile it 
on it) 
• Step 3: Compile the “.dts” file into a “.dtbo” file using: 
dtc -O dtb -o xxxxxx-00A0.dtbo -b -0 - @ xxxxxxx.dts      (notice we added 00A0 at the 
end of the name of .dtbo file) 
• Step 4: copy the “.dtbo” file into /lib/firmware 
cp xxx.dtbo /lib/firmware 
• Step 5: Apply the new changes by: 
sudo sh -c “echo xxxxx > $SLOTS”    (notice -00A0.dtbo was excluded from file name 
in this step) 
sudo sh -c  not always necessary 
• Step 6: Check if the changes were done by cat $SLOTS. A new field will be 
available with the new configurations. 
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Once the device tree overlay is loaded, we can start using the assigned pins as output 
or input digital pins. A library written in C was developed by [161] could be used. This 
library has 7 subroutines of interest in it. 
1. gpio_export: this function is used to create a folder in the /sys/class/gpio that 
has the number on the assigned gpio pin (e.g. gpio60). This folder will then 
have files that are used to control the state of the pin. 
2. gpio_unexport: this function is used to unexport a pin. Once you are done using 
the pin, it is often a good practice to unexport the pin so that it could be used 
for other purposes. 
3. gpio_set_dir: this function is used to set the direction of the digital pin as either 
an input pin or an output pin. 
4. gpio_set_value: this function is used to the set the value of the pin to HIGH 
(3.3V) or LOW (0V), if the pin were an output pin. 
5. gpio_get_value: this function is used to read the value of the pin, if the pin were 
an input pin. It returns 1 (True) if the input was HIGH, and 0 (False) if the input 
was LOW. 
6. gpio_fd_open: this function treats the pin as file onto which we can write the 
pin’s state, or from which we can read the pin’s state. 
7. gpio_fd_close: this function closes the file. 
Note that the library uses the following headers:  
 
#include "SimpleGPIO.h" #include <stdio.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> 
#include <errno.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <poll.h> 
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10.2 Understanding the Open Source libiec61850 Library. 
The open source libiec61850 library is a useful tool for creating application that need 
to comply with the IEC 61850 standard. In this section we will focus on creating a GOOSE 
publisher and subscriber. The complete library can be downloaded from [75]. 
The home directory of the library is shown in Figure 10.2. 
Is created once the library is 
built and contains the built 
library.
Contains the examples that 
comes with the library. Users 
usually edit these examples to 
implement their algorithms
Contains all the definitions and 
header files of the library’s API
Is the main file used to build the 
entire library under Linux
 
Figure 10.2: Home directory of libiec61850. 
10.2.1 Creating a GOOSE Publisher. 
To create a GOOSE publisher using the libiec61850 library, you must follow the 
following steps. 
• Step 1: create an empty linked list data structure and start adding the data fields 
of the GOOSE message according to their type. A linked lit is linear data 
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structure whose elements are linked by pointers. You can add Boolean, Integer, 
or Float fields. The proper function definition for each data type can be found 
in the src/goose folder. The following example creates a linked list structure 
called dataSetValues, and adds to it two integers and a binary time field. 
 
• Step 2: configure the parameters of the GOOSE message. To do that, the library 
defines a data structure called CommParameters. In this structure, you can 
define the APPID, the destination address, the VLAN ID and the VLAN 
Priority, as in the example below. 
 
• Step 3: create the publisher using the parameters that you previously defined. 
 
• Step 4: configure the goCbRef, ConfRev, and DataSetRef fields using the 
funcitons dedicated to them. 
 
• Step 5: Publish the GOOSE message using the GoosePublisher_publish 
function. 
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10.2.2 Creating a GOOSE Subscriber. 
Unlike the GOOSE publisher, the GOOSE subscriber is made of two parts. The main 
program and a thread running in the background. The purpose of the thread is to 
continuously listen on the network interface for GOOSE message. 
 
The main program of the GOOSE subscriber should always contain the 6 steps shown 
above. 1. The receiver should be created. 2. The subscriber should be created. In this step, 
the created subscriber must have an input string matching that in the DataSetRef of the 
GOOSE message being subscribe to. 3. The APPID should also be set to match that of the 
GOOSE message being subscribed to. 4. A listener is assigned to the created subscriber. 5. 
A subscriber is added to the receiver created in step 1. 6. The receiver is started. That is the 
thread, which will be defined later, is activated.  
In the code above, running is a variable set to True for the program to run continuously. 
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Next, the gooseListener thread takes the previously defined subscriber as input, as 
follows: 
 
As can be seen in the example code above, each field of the GOOSE message could be 
accessed through a function defined in the API. All the functions can be found in the 
src/goose folder. 
10.3 The RTI’s Data Distribution Service API 
In this section, we will cover the steps to create a DDS publisher and a DDS subscriber 
on a Linux machine. The tools that we will use are provided by RTI DDS. 
10.3.1 Creating an IDL file and Generating the Draft Code. 
The first step in creating a DDS publisher and subscriber applications is to define the 
data types that you want to publish or subscribe to. This done through creating an IDL file. 
Inside the IDL file, you will be able to define those data types. The structures is the IDL 
file looks as follows: 
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Next, you will use the RTI Code Generator to generate the publisher and subscriber 
draft codes, which you will edit later to implement your application on, and all other 
necessary files to compile the generated codes. As seen in Figure 10.3, once you open the 
Code Generator, you will need to specify the directory of your IDL file, your preferred 
programming language, and the target architecture (i.e. type of processor, such as arm 
processor). Once you click run, the publisher and subscriber codes will be generated. 
The Created IDL 
File
Directory of the 
IDL file
Programming 
Language to use
Target 
architecture
Generated Publisher and Subscriber codes
 
Figure 10.3: Utilizing the code generator. 
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10.3.2 The DDS Publisher. 
The code for the DDS publisher is made of three parts: the main program, the 
publisher_main, and the publisher_shutdown. 
The main program is where the domain ID is defined. Each DDS global data space 
should be assigned an ID. The main program returns the publisher_main, as shown below. 
 
Next, the publisher_main is where all the definitions and configurations are setup. This 
part is divided into 6 sub parts as follow: 
1. Defining the pointers to the DDS participant, publisher, topic, writer, instances, 
and type names. The error and instance handle structures are also defined here 
according to the API. 
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2. Creating the DDS participant and its publisher. 
 
 
3. Registering the topic and then creating it. In this step, we select the name of the 
Topic we want to publish out data types into. In this example, the topic name is 
Example_Data_Topic. 
 
4. Create the data writer and the data sample for writing. 
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5. Modify the main loop and publish the data sample. This the part of the code 
where you apply all the changes you want to data in your defined data types 
before publishing it. This is where your algorithm is implemented. 
 
6. After publishing the data sample, we need to delete it and finally, shut down the 
publisher, if the program was ordered to terminate. 
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10.3.3 The DDS Subscriber. 
Similar to the DDS publisher, the code for the DDS subscriber has three main parts: 
the data listener thread, the subscriber_main, and the subscriber_shutdown. 
The data listener thread is invoked every time a data sample is available to be read. In 
this thread, a pointer to the data reader and the structure data_seq, which is where the read 
data is stored, are created. The data retrieved into the data_seq structure could either be 
stored in global variables to be used in other parts of the code. 
 
Similar the publisher_main, the subscriber_main is composed on 6 sub parts. 
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1. Defining the pointers to the DDS participant, reader, topic, listener, instances, and 
type names. The error and instance handle structures are also defined here 
according to the API. 
 
2. Creating the DDS participant and its subscriber. 
 
3. Registering the topic and then creating it is the same as in step 3 of the publisher 
code. 
4. Creating the data listener and its subscriber. 
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5. Modifying the received data in the main loop. 
 
6. Deleting all entities. 
 
Finally, the subscriber_shutdown is called when the program terminates. 
 
10.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the reader was introduced the beaglebone black microcrontroller. The 
reader was taught how install a Debian image onto the microcontroller and interface with 
real hardware equipment using the analogue inputs and digital inputs and outputs. Next, 
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the read was taught how to create applications using the IEC 61850 GOOSE publishers 
and subscribers. Finally, the user was presented with an example about creating and dealing 
with DDS data types, publishers, and subscribers.  
 233 
 
Chapter 11 Conclusions and Recommendations for Future Work 
11.1 Conclusions 
This dissertation presented the concept of complementing cyber security algorithms 
with information about the physical characteristics of the power system for enhancing the 
resiliency of the grid against cyber-attacks. An analysis of the recent co-simulation 
platforms for smart grid applications was performed. It was shown that there is a need for 
a comprehensive co-simulation platform capable of modeling the relation and interaction 
between the cyber and physical parts of the smart grid. To that end, a network-in-the-loop 
co-simulation platform to analyze and understand cyber information flow, physical power 
system dynamics, and the interrelation between them was developed. A discussion about 
the importance of interoperability in the smart grid was also presented. As such, the data-
centric DDS communication middleware was selected to seamlessly integrate the 
components of the developed co-simulation platform together and to bridge the different 
communication protocols and software applications.  
To verify the effectiveness of the developed network-in-the-loop co-simulation 
platform, three case studies were performed, including electric vehicle charging, protocol 
emulation, and a lost sample forecasting algorithm. 
 Being the most widely industry-accepted standard, the IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging 
standard was analyzed. In addition to that, testing of two different implementations of the 
IEC 61850 GOOSE messaging protocol on commercial IEC 61850-based devices and on 
the open source libiec61850 library was performed. It was found that different 
implementations of the same standard might lead to different behaviors even if the devices 
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were present under similar conditions. Deviation from the actual procedures set forth by 
the IEC 61850 standard and its complementary cyber security IEC 62351 standard were 
found in the responses of the devices. This vulnerability provides a strong attack surface 
for attackers to inject malicious activities in power systems, such as the GOOSE poisoning 
attack demonstrated in this work. The work in this dissertation also proposed guidelines to 
better enhance utilization of IEC 61850, such as proper processing of a message’s source 
MAC address, better utilization of the time stamp field to check for messages’ validity, and 
the association of new messages’ content with a status number increment. 
An artificially intelligent physical model-checking approach to detect malicious and 
erroneous control commands controlling the state of circuit breakers in power systems was 
developed. The purpose of the work is to push enough intelligence into the agents 
controlling the power system to enable them to assess the consequences of control 
commands before taking actions on the physical system. The proposed security framework 
was tested on a 14-bus IEEE benchmark system. The results showed the accuracy of the 
AI module in characterizing the system under study and its effectiveness in not allowing 
the system to go into an insecure state.  
To detect spoofed sampled measured values in the smart grid, the feasibility of using 
neural network forecasters to detect spoofed IEC 61850 Sampled Measured Values was 
investigated. The system utilized a combined neural network – time series forecasting 
module to detect fake measurement data injection attacks. The proposed system proved its 
effectiveness in enhancing the resiliency of modern protection schemes against false data 
injection attacks. The system was implemented on a real IEC 61850 Ethernet network. 
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Next, the design and implementation of a targeted data injection attack that simulates real 
AC waveforms in an attempt to interrupt power flow in a compromised power network was 
presented. The previously developed neural network forecaster was then tested against the 
targeted malware to observe how it would handle the smart attack. Experimentation with 
the malware demonstrated that the NN is yet to be properly trained or fine-tuned enough 
to detect malicious measurements. The NN showed resistance to less sophisticated data 
injection methods; however, it is still vulnerable to malicious data injection methods. Also, 
the NN demonstrated very little resistance to the simulated AC waveform. In order to better 
prepare the NN, the developed malware was also used as a training tool to identify attack 
signatures, and allow the user to tune the event thresholds that would result in controlling 
messages being sent to the IEDs. The malware is configurable, easy to understand, and is 
simple to use to train predictive intrusion detection systems. 
Based on the previous study, it was found that although neural network forecasters have 
a high detection accuracy, they are susceptible to the accumulation of forecasting errors. 
As such, a lightweight algorithm, based on statistical indicators, to enhance the reliability 
of the neural network forecaster in terms of detecting spoofed sampled measured values 
was developed. This algorithm is considered as a second line of defense, complementing 
the cyber security methods, such as encryption and authentication. The studies were 
conducted on a laboratory-scale hardware microgrid with a commercial network switch to 
be more representative of the microgrid environment than event-based simulation models. 
On the application layer of the smart grid, an energy management system to camouflage 
the load demand profile for small microgrids was developed. An online optimization 
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module accounting for history, current, and future system observations, utilizing particle 
swarm optimization, was also developed to enhance the results of the energy management 
system. The energy management system was tested on actual residential energy 
consumption and irradiance data from Miami, Florida, and proved its effectiveness not only 
in hiding the customer’s load demand profile, but also in reducing the consumer’s bills and 
achieving flat peak load profiles. 
The shortcomings of current EV-Grid integration systems was investigated. The 
drawbacks of security breaches on the power grid, the EV itself, and the safety of the 
vehicles’ owners, were outlined in hope of advocating a new school of thought that gives 
the same importance for system operation and system security. 
Finally, to be able to develop and prototype applications related to energy cyber-
physical systems, the reader was taught how to configure and program a Linux-based 
microcontroller and interface with real hardware equipment using the analogue inputs and 
digital inputs and outputs. The read was taught how to create applications using the IEC 
61850 GOOSE publishers and subscribers, and was presented with an example about 
creating and dealing with DDS data types, publishers, and subscribers. 
11.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
This dissertation covered several aspects related to interoperability and security 
challenges in the smart grid. The smart grid’s cyber and physical domains were modeled 
in a high-fidelity co-simulation platform. Also, artificial intelligence was used to 
complement the decision of conventional cyber security algorithms, such as authentication 
and encryption, with physical characteristics of the power system. Nonetheless, since the 
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smart grid is a complex cyber-physical systems covering interdisciplinary topics, it is 
recommended that this work is expanded by others according to the following research 
directions: 
• Detection of switching related attacks: Conduct a study to optimally allocate 
the switching-attack-detection agents in the power system taking into 
consideration constraints from the power system and the communication 
network sides. 
• Detection of anomalous sampled measured values: Compare the performance 
of the developed neural network forecaster with deep learning techniques in 
terms of accuracy and detection latency. Expand the work to cover other types 
of protocols and other applications, such as PMU measurements for wide area 
monitoring. 
• Interoperability: Although there are a couple of standards for data modeling, 
such as CIM and IEC 61850, they do not cover all the different applications in 
the smart grid. Therefore, it is necessary to study the development of a unified 
data model to cope with the new technologies that are being introduced to the 
smart gird. 
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